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 This dissertation traces the historical emergence of what I call the romance 
with Melville during the postwar moment and argues that its striking endurance 
demands that we rethink the relationship between the discipline’s past and present. 
For the enduring vitality of the romance with Melville throughout the twentieth 
century points to deep continuities across major cuts in the discipline’s history. These 
continuities that the romance makes visible suggest that the discipline’s past is not so 
monolithically invested in masculinism, nationalism, and racism as many dominant 
voices have claimed it was, and also that the discipline’s present has not broken with 
its predecessors as completely as many had thought.   
 I begin with a chapter that introduces the prevalence of the romance with 
Melville in American literary history, interrogates why Melville’s work lends itself so 
readily to this hermeneutic move, and articulates how the persistence of this move 
upsets the authoritative histories of American literary studies. My second chapter 
describes how Melville’s final story Billy Budd elicited a remarkably explicit 
transatlantic conversation about the affective and political ramifications of postwar 
heteronormativity. Chapter 3 examines C.L.R. James’s conversation with postwar 
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Americanists about Moby-Dick, a conversation in which James sought to galvanize the 
critical community to fight the anti-democratic Cold War immigration laws under 
which James himself was being deported. My final chapter analyzes Ralph Ellison’s 
use of Moby-Dick, “Bartleby,” “Benito Cereno,” and The Confidence-Man to argue that 
American literature is fundamentally concerned with and informed by issues of racial 
injustice and inequality. In both his literary criticism and his fiction, Ellison, I argue, 
used Melville’s writing to criticize the racial negligence of American literary critics and 
to reflect on the ironies of his own abiding loyalty to white canonical writers like 
Melville.  
 When one follows the various permutations of the romance with Melville in 
this moment and attends to the contestations it facilitated, one finds a rich, politically 
multivalent critical discourse that in many important but unacknowledged ways lays 
the groundwork for the political desires and textual attachments that continue to 
animate American literary studies.  
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Preface 
 
 From its foundational moments in the early twentieth century to its diverse 
array of manifestations a century later, the field of American literary studies appears 
to be irresistibly drawn to the writings of Herman Melville. Melville’s centrality to 
Americanist discourse has persisted through the major sea-changes in our discipline’s 
history. His work has captured the admiration of modernists engrossed with the 
iconoclastic artist of complexity and ambiguity, proponents of the democratic 
possibilities of literature, of ideology-critique radicals, canon-busting multi-
culturalists, and queer theorists. Celebrations of American literature and culture, 
critical inquiry into American citizenship, deconstructions of nationalism, assaults on 
imperialism, racism, and state homophobia—all these projects of Americanist 
criticism find powerful expression through readings of Melville’s work. I call this 
sense that Melville speaks directly and powerfully to one’s most pressing political and 
critical concerns “the romance with Melville.”  
 This dissertation traces the historical emergence of the romance with Melville 
and argues that its striking persistence demands that we rethink the relationship 
between the discipline’s past and present. For the enduring vitality of the romance 
with Melville throughout the twentieth century points to deep continuities across 
major cuts in the discipline’s history—continuities in both our attachments to certain 
texts and in our desires for radical political change to follow from the work of literary 
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criticism. These continuities that the romance makes visible suggest that the 
discipline’s past is not so monolithically invested in masculinism, nationalism, and 
racism as many dominant voices have claimed it was, and also that the discipline’s 
present has not broken with its predecessors as completely as many had thought.   
 “The romance with Melville” is a term I adapt from the work of Winfried 
Fluck. Drawing on “the close connection between romance and national self-
definition,” Fluck uses the phrase “romance with America” to describe the 
hermeneutic practice of interpreting a cultural artifact as representative of a 
generalized “Americanness.” Whether one celebrates that Americanness or condemns 
it as racist, masculinist, or imperialistic, the “romance with America” remains intact. 
Even after the transnational turn, many of the most influential Americanists, Fluck 
convincingly shows, continue to be “motivated by a search for, and a projection of, 
certain ideals [. . .] like democracy, multicultural citizenship, or civil disobedience” 
(88). Fluck’s argument here builds on Eliza New’s important insight that “the 
romance” is “as much a critical as a fictional genre.” And she shares Fluck’s sense 
that Americanist criticism, with “its penchant for projections of national selfhood,” 
remains deeply invested in this particular critical genre (New 31, 7).  
 Fluck and New persuasively criticize the “totalistic rhetoric” of the critical 
romance (New 7). Both argue that the romance tends to oversimplify its objects of 
analysis by placing texts within deterministic national narratives or enlisting them in 
the service of presentist political agendas. While I am sympathetic to their critique of 
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the romance, I want to take a less denunciatory and more anthropological approach 
to the romance with Melville, so that I can attend to the diversity of its manifestations 
and the possibilities for critical disputation, social criticism, and disciplinary self-
reflection that it has opened.   
 I argue that Melville’s relevance to issues of nation, democracy, sexuality, and 
economic and racial oppression emerged alongside the concretization of his 
disciplinary centrality in the 1940s and 50s—the culmination of what is known as 
“the Melville revival.” The Melville revival is often associated with the 1920s—a 
decade that witnesses the first Melville biography (by Raymond Weaver, 1921) and 
the first statements of Melville’s importance to American literature (Van Wyck 
Brooks, 1918; D.H. Lawrence, 1923), leftist politics (Brooks, 1918; Lewis Mumford, 
1926), and race (Sterling Brown, 1937).  But these early conversations are but the tip 
of the iceberg when one considers the veritable explosion of romances with Melville 
during World War II and the following decade.  
  Jennifer Fleissner has rightly suggested that most contemporary Americanists 
approach postwar criticism with an attitude of “moral superiority,” and this attitude, 
Fleissner argues, has produced reductive, misleading histories of Americanist 
discourse (“After the New Americanists” 177). Indeed, this pervasive disposition of 
political contempt for what might called the “old Americanists” has obscured the 
power and prescience postwar writers inside and outside the discipline, many of 
whom were writing about issues that continue to animate American literary studies. 
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By analyzing the rich, contentious conversations about nation, democracy, sexuality, 
and race that the romance with Melville facilitated, this dissertation aims to rectify 
widely shared misperceptions of postwar Americanist discourse as formalist, 
nationalistic, uncritically masculinist, and only political in hegemonic ways.   
 Central to these prescient postwar conversations was F.O. Matthiessen’s 
foundational work American Renaissance (1941), which devotes a book-length section 
to Melville. Matthiessen’s work became a discursive “center of gravity,” to borrow 
Cody Marr’s and Christopher Hager description of American Renaissance, as a 
constellation of diverse positions emerged in response to his readings of Melville’s 
work (263).  Critics like Richard Chase (1949) and Newton Arvin (1950), followed by 
the British artists Benjamin Britten and E.M. Forster in their collaborative opera of 
Billy Budd (1951), would explicate and extend Matthiessen’s conflicted writing about 
Melville’s entanglements of same-sex desire and democratic sociality. At the same 
time, non-academic intellectuals like C.L.R. James (1953) and Ralph Ellison 
(beginning in 1951) would perform readings of Melville to elaborate and radicalize 
Matthiessen’s criticisms of capitalism, nationalism, and racism.  
 But the postwar romance with Melville was more than just a means to 
articulate and authorize critical and political interventions. It also compelled intensive 
reflection on the political intricacies of midcentury intellectual life.  The always-
perceptive “New York Intellectual” Mary McCarthy argued that the coercive 
conservativism of the postwar years demanded that intellectuals disguise their more 
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subversive positions under the mask of “the American way of life.” “The 
investigative demands of [Joseph] McCarthy and [Pat] McCarran,” she writes, “create 
new underground men behind the façade of conformity [. . .] who float like glittering 
icebergs on the surface of society with the perilous eight-ninths submerged” (40-42). 
The pervasive anticommunism and xenophobia of the Cold War led even Marxist 
radicals like James to cast their politics in the language of national unity and 
patriotism. Melville’s growing status as an icon of national pride—“the great 
American novelist,” as James more than once calls him—made the genre of Melville 
criticism into an effective “façade of conformity.” There is perhaps no better example 
of this Melvillean conformity than when James, while awaiting deportation, wrote a 
book about Melville from prison and sent it to every member of Congress as part of a 
plea for U.S. citizenship. 
 In this moment of the “underground” intellectual, many of Melville’s 
characters became means of articulating the complex, multi-faced political agency that 
McCarthy describes. Several critics in the emerging academic discipline of American 
letters used the “intellectual” but tragically dutiful Captain Vere to draw out the 
sexual and political compromises demanded of postwar academics.  James read 
Ishmael’s conflict between his sense of Ahab’s cruel coercion of the Pequod’s crew 
and his complicity in the hunt for Moby Dick as anticipating the dilemma of 
midcentury intellectuals.  And Ellison, always highly conscious of his performative 
intellectual identity, identified Melville’s shape-shifting tricksters, Babo and the 
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confidence man, as models for strategic political intervention—for what he called 
“striking back in hard angry collaboration” (Three Days 392). 
      This seminal moment in the history of both Melville and American literary studies 
thus consists of uneasy, complex entanglements of complicity and resistance, of 
collaboration and anger. Melville’s writing was used to celebrate literary nationalism 
while denouncing the injustices of the state, to affirm a white canon while calling out 
the literary academy’s racially negligent hermeneutics, to defend heteronormative 
masculinity while implicating it in affective suffering and state violence.  
 While I draw on and make arguments about texts ranging from Melville’ 
public emergence in the antebellum period to the present, my focus is on the 
constellation of meanings and the discursive power that Melville’s texts accumulate 
during the postwar years.  During this moment, I argue, writers like Matthiessen, 
Chase, Arvin, Ellison, and James invested Melville’s work with relevance and value 
that persists into the twenty-first century. These postwar conversations about Melville 
placed his work at the center of American literary studies, where they for better or 
worse remain.  But more importantly, they tilled the soil of Melville’s dense writings, 
making them a fertile site for the radical interventions of succeeding generations of 
Americanists.  
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Chapter 1 
The romance with Melville  
 
 Many of the most sweeping disciplinary innovations in American literary 
studies have been conducted by means of the romance with Melville. Consider, for 
instance, three key statements of the political turn in Americanist critical history. 
Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jehlen’s New-Americanist manifesto Ideology and Classic 
American Literature (1987), which calls for reinterpreting American “ideals” of 
patriotism and democracy as hegemonic “ideologies,” concludes with an entire 
section on “The Example of Melville” (14-15). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology 
of the Closet (1990) launches its exposure of the critical centrality of “the crisis of 
homo/heterosexual definition” to “twentieth century western culture” with an 
extended reading of Billy Budd (1). And Toni Morrison’s “Unspeakable Things 
Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature” (1989) exposes the 
constitutive presence of African Americans in American cultural production through 
an analysis of Moby-Dick. 
 How did Melville’s once-marginal body of work come to command such 
power for Americanists, theorists, and artists? Certainly the issues that animate these 
seminal renderings of Melville—national identity, democracy, sexuality, race—
intermingle on what might be called the “surface” of his writing. But these issues only 
emerge in response to Melville’s writing decades after the publication of his most 
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celebrated works. The resonances between Melville’s writing and the concerns of his 
most influential interpreters imply a complex reciprocity between texts and readers. 
These resonances suggest that the romance with Melville cannot be described as 
either the result of Melville’s “influence” or as the product of readers peering into the 
sea of his writings only to see their own reflections.  To speak of Melville’s 
“influence” would be to suggest that his works manifest a stable, timeless meaning 
that dictates the readings of his interpreters. Studying Melville’s “influence” would 
thus efface the historical emergences of these meanings—emergences that this 
project aims to document. But to speak of these readings as mere projections of a 
critical community would be to overlook the historically formative role that Melville’s 
writings have played across multiple communities in American literary studies.  
 Eschewing these “originalist” and “constructivist” theories of meaning, I want 
to suggest that the mutuality between Melville and his interpreters is best understood 
according to Hans Robert Jauss’s account of the “dialogical” relationship between 
texts and readers. Jauss argues that a text’s meaning is neither a “self-mediating event 
nor an emanation [of the reader]” (32). Rather, for Jauss meaning emerges only in “a 
dialectical relationship of the present to the past, according to which the past work 
can answer and ‘say something’ to us only when the present observer has posited the 
question that draws it back out of seclusion” (32). The dialogical relationships 
between texts and readers mark what Jauss calls “the successive unfolding of the 
potential for meaning that is embedded in a work” (30). They are, to quote Jauss once 
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more, the sites at which meaning is “activated in the stages of [the work’s] historical 
reception” (30).  
 Melville’s “revival” from obscurity in the second quarter of the twentieth 
century manifests the historicity—the madeness, or activated-ness—of the meanings and 
power that his writings continue to command. Between the 1920s and the 50s, one 
witnesses formative dialogical relationships between Melville and the critical 
community, as many of the most resonant critical innovations of the moment emerge 
from close encounters with the details of Melville’s writing: encounters between 
Ishmael and Queequeg’s queer intimacy and F.O Matthiessen and Newton Arvin’s 
concerns with homosexuality and democracy, or between the elaborate descriptions 
of the working life of the Pequod’s crew and C.L.R. James’s radical politics, or between 
Babo and the confidence man’s racial masquerades and Ralph Ellison’s 
preoccupation with the democratic possibilities of racial performativity. It is easy to 
take Melville’s relevance to homosexuality, capitalist critique, and racial politics for 
granted. These meanings, however, are not inherent, self-manifesting qualities of 
Melville’s work, but qualities that have been made, forged in the complex transactions 
between his writings and their twentieth-century readers. This dissertation tracks how 
such meanings and value happened to Melville’s writings during the postwar moment 
by analyzing the writings of some of Melville’s most visionary, influential readers. 
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Disciplinary histories 
 By analyzing the postwar romance with Melville in its various and conflicted 
permutations, this project demands a critical reconsideration of the most commonly 
cited narratives of Americanist critical history. These accounts, written by scholars 
who fall under the umbrella of the “New Americanists,” present postwar criticism as 
a nationalistic, masculinist, racist, and heteronormative discourse. The New 
Americanists boldly articulated seminal critiques of a white, male-dominated field, 
and their work has been instrumental to the democratization of American literary 
studies. While I acknowledge the profound political importance of the New 
Americanists’ work and share their conviction that literary interpretation should be an 
instrument of social justice, I argue that their accounts of disciplinary history are 
often reductive and misleading. The New Americanist critique of postwar criticism 
does not account for the rich contestation among critics of the postwar moment, nor 
does it acknowledge the ways in which a single critical text can pull in conflicting 
ideological directions. Neglecting the most compelling, prescient dimensions of 
postwar literary criticism, the New Americanist account of postwar criticism fuels 
what Jennifer Fleissner has called  “a narrative of progress conjoining ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
American literary studies” (“After” 186). My dissertation calls into question this all-
too-familiar narrative, and joins Fleissner in challenging the “moral superiority” with 
which many Americanists approach our critical history (“After” 178). 
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 As Fleissner’s recent comments suggest, the New Americanist consensus 
appears to be loosening, but it currently persists as the dominant account of 
Americanist critical history. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this consensus 
guides how the contemporary field of American literary studies conceptualizes its past 
and defines its identity in the present moment. One could cite multitudes of its 
manifestations, but for now I want to locate its major claims in two book-length 
studies published amid the political turn of the 1980s and 90s: Russell Reising’s The 
Unusable Past (1986) and David Shumway’s Creating an American Civilization (1994).  
 Both Reising and Shumway argue the same point: that until the late 1960s, the 
project of American literary studies existed to promote and extend the hegemonic 
power of an oppressive national ideology rooted in U.S. global dominance, racism, 
and heteronormative masculinism. As Reising puts it, the study of American literature 
represented “a form [. . .] of  American cultural imperialism functioning to 
consolidate and define the cultural dominance of the U.S” (218).  Focusing on Van 
Wyck Brooks, F.O. Matthiessen, Lionel Trilling, and Richard Chase, both books find 
this ideological agenda at work throughout what they call “the most influential 
theories” and “the dominant products and practices” of postwar American literary 
studies. Different as these theories, products and practices may appear, according to 
Reising and Shumway, they all perform the same cultural work: they “celebrate 
American civilization” and “reinforce the pervasive political message of the postwar 
era that America had achieved a legitimate global superiority” (Shumway 132).  
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 As a corollary to this claim, Reising and Shumway also argue that the 
“dominant” voices in the field suppressed the “social” concerns of the texts they 
canonized. “These theorists,” writes Reising, referring to Matthiessen, Trilling, and 
Chase, “project a vision of American literature as an isolated body of texts, estranged 
from [. . .] American social or material reality” (17).  Their “asocial critical theses,” he 
writes, “deflect the social and political significance of American literature” (48). And 
any political opposition that might have emerged from writing about authors like 
Whitman, Melville, Emerson, or Thoreau was silenced in the service of national 
hegemony. Shumway goes as far so to claim that it would be “wishful thinking” to 
believe that there was “significant opposition” to nationalism and its attendant forms 
of racism and masculinism “during the entire period of [his] study,” which extends 
from the 1920s to the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s (Shumway 10). 
Writing as if his audience might be hesitant to accept such a sweeping thesis, 
Shumway reassures us: “the simple fact is that before the late 1960s the academic 
study of literature was not rife with emergent forces” (12). 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Historians of the discipline who are less invested in the radical break 
between “old” and “new” American literary studies have also raised objections to 
how many New Americanists have oversimplified pre-New Left criticism. Graff, for 
instance, rightly claims that postwar critical discourse was “far from being organized 
on a centralized logocentric model” and that it consisted of “a variety of disciplinary 
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 Paul Lauter’s essay “Melville Climbs the Canon” (1994) applies this dismal 
thesis to the foundation of Melville studies. In this well-researched account of “how 
it was that Melville was transformed during the 1920s from an obscure teller of South 
Sea tales into the pre-eminent American novelist,” Lauter raises the rich, provocative 
question of “Melville’s usefulness to the modernist project of the 1920s,” and he 
documents the first generation of critics to champion Melville as “high art” and to 
celebrate his “allusive, syntactically intricate style and convoluted plotting” (1). Yet 
Lauter ultimately comes to a conclusion resonant with Shumway and Reising’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vocabularies that nobody can reduce to the common measure of any metalanguage” 
(12-13). Like Graff, Leitch and Vanderbilt also provide remarkably well-researched, 
richly heterogeneous accounts of American critical history that rigorously detail the 
contentious debates among New York intellectuals, leftist Americanists, and New 
Critics. Leitch’s work is particularly helpful, in that it articulates compelling 
continuities between the critical concerns of the Old and New Left and provides a 
thick account of the history of leftist politics in American criticism. Graff and 
Leitch’s work is a compelling alternative to the reductive arguments of Shumway and 
Reising, but all these accounts totally ignore the critical contributions of lesser-known 
critics like Arvin and non-academics like James and Ellison—all of whom were in 
direct dialogue with and published in the same journals as Matthiessen, Trilling, and 
Chase.  
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arguments. As “Melville climbs the canon,” he argues, critics of the 20s use his work 
to articulate and reinforce “traditional high cultural values—often connected with the 
academy—against a social and cultural ‘other’ generally, if ambiguously, portrayed as 
feminine, genteel, exotic, dark, foreign, and numerous” (6). What emerges is “a 
distinctly masculine, Anglo-Saxon image of Melville”—an image used to evidence “an 
equality in culture which would be consonant with America’s established title to 
military and diplomatic parity” (5).2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 2 One important account of Melville studies that I do not discuss here is Clare 
Spark’s Hunting Captain Ahab: Psychological Warfare and the Melville Revival. I do not 
mention her work in this conversation because her stringent arguments for 
“individualism” and against “multiculturalism” are so out of keeping with the leftism 
of the New Americanists, and because her work has not inspired a scholarly 
following. In a reactionary tone, Spark argues that the early Melvilleans—she cites 
Henry Murray, Charles Olson, Mumford, Matthiessen, and Chase—and New 
Americanists are all “romantic anti-capitalists” who have “submerged,” in her terms, 
“the legitimacy and value of the dissenting, creative individual” to elevate “fascist” 
ideologies of “corporatism” and “group cohesion” (12-13). That Spark would opt to 
conduct this ideological battle by way of arguments about Melville and Melville 
studies speaks to the ongoing importance of Melville’s work as a facilitator of 
intensive political disputation.    
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 The New Americanism’s account of postwar criticism, I argue, neglects 
important conversations about issues of social justice, race, and sexuality—but their 
critique of the patriarchy of Old Americanism cannot be questioned. With a few 
notable exceptions, this was a generation of men writing about men.3 Before the New 
Americanism, Nina Baym had brilliantly explicated how the postwar moment’s most 
influential accounts of American literature excluded both women writers and women 
characters in texts written by men. Baym shows that critics including Matthiessen, 
Trilling, Chase, R.W.B. Lewis, and Leslie Fiedler were all beholden to fundamentally 
masculine critical concerns—“man in the open air,” the individual in opposition to 
“society,” the “American Adam,” etc. This is also true of the Melvilleans I focus on 
here, many of whom actually used Melville to conceptualize and perform their own 
masculine identities. Matthiessen, Arvin, and Chase all look to Vere as an exemplary, 
even if tragic, model of “manly excellence,” to quote Chase. And James, when he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 3 These notable exceptions include Constance Roarke, whose American Humor 
(1931) was widely influential, and Eleanor Melville Metcalf—Herman’s 
granddaughter—who played a pivotal role in publishing the Billy Budd manuscripts 
and published a biography of Melville in 1953. It is also worth noting here that 
Matthiessen’s first book was about Sarah Orne Jewett. For an excellent analysis of 
Matthiessen’s writing about Jewett, see Travis M. Foster’s “Matthiessen’s Public 
Privates: Homosexual Expression and the Aesthetics of Sexual Inversion.”  
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fighting deportation, cited his expertise on Melville as he presented himself to the 
authorities as the masculine head of an American nuclear family.4 Coupled with the 
scarcity of female characters in Melville’s writing, the masculinism among postwar 
Melvilleans produced a distinctly male critical culture. As a measure of the field’s 
reputation of masculinism, one could point to the renowned feminist critic Lillian 
Robinson’s expression of utter alienation in 1983 from Melville and Melville studies.  
“My bête noire,” she writes, “has always been the white whale” (Feminisms 120).  Until 
later in the 80s, Melville studies involved only a few women and even fewer 
challenges to the transparent masculinism of the field.  
 The feminist critique of Americanist critical history calls attention to the 
important limitations in the practice and scope of the postwar academy, and to the 
very real political progress the field has made.  Condemning this undeniably 
patriarchal, mostly white generation of critics was integral to what, from the 
perspective of social justice and democracy, must be considered the most important 
“turn” in critical history. I refer, of course, to the racial and sexual diversification of 
both the texts the field studies and teaches, and the demographics of those working 
in the field—an effort that began in the late 1960s and continues into the present 
moment. As Baym’s argument suggests, attacking an older generation of critics was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4 For an excellent analysis of James’s masculinity, see W. Chris Johnson, “Sex 
and Subversive Alien.” 
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understood to be a necessary component of opening the field to a new generation of 
radical scholars who would institutionalize the study of women writers, popular 
literatures, and minority writers. 
 Robyn Wiegman has persuasively argued that the New Americanists’ primary 
endowment to American literary studies is not attention to gender, race and justice —
for that attention came primarily from feminists and ethnic studies advocates—but 
the institutionalization of disciplinary self-reflexivity. According to Wiegman, "the 
priority of reflecting on the state of the field is not simply one of its most familiar 
gestures but the engine of its disciplinary reproduction"(“The Ends” 386). And this 
"self reflexive critical assessment,” Wiegman adds, was always conducted in the 
service of "radical self-transformation" (“The Ends” 386). I would add to Wiegman’s 
point here that it is precisely this commitment to oppositional transformation that led 
the New Americanists to obfuscate political, sexual, and racial conversations among 
postwar critics and prevented them from recognizing that their own democratic 
critical desires were in many ways consistent with those of their predecessors. The 
New Americanism’s self-reflexivity is always, as Wiegman puts it, "bound to some 
version of critique as a political rhetoric ”(“The Ends” 387). And this binding to 
critique has drawn New Americanists to present their work as attending to the 
contestations of race, gender, sexuality, and class that they accuse their predecessors 
as having effaced (Wiegman Object 200). 
 18	  
 I want to acknowledge here that my analysis of the romance with Melville 
emerges from and extends the New Americanist imperatives to consider the 
discipline’s fraught relationship with race, class, and gender, and to interrogate the 
stakes of our attachments to objects of study and modes of literary analysis. Lauter 
speaks to the motivations of my own project in his self-reflexive demand that we not 
take Melville’s power and value to American literary studies for granted, and that we 
always inquire “into what contests for cultural authority Melville was being 
conscripted” (1).5 But how can we claim to understand these contests over “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5 There are a few notable books on the history of Melville studies that do not 
consider the important ideological questions of “cultural authority” that Lauter’s 
analysis raises. One of these is George Cotkin’s Dive Deeper, which seeks to trace 
Melville’s presence in twentieth-century American culture, but never rises to any 
serious analytical argument beyond the trivial claim that Moby-Dick inspires it readers 
“to dive into mysteries of meaning, into the storms of existence, into the depths of 
our souls” (ix). Similarly, David Dowling’s Chasing the White Whale claims to 
interrogate “what Melville means today” in its subtitle, but also remains mired in 
unanalytical praise for “the still palpitating spirit of Melville,” and bland pleas for 
Moby-Dick’s “power to move us, change us.” (5-7). Much more helpful and well-
researched than Cotkin or Dowling’s work, Brian Yothers’s Melville’s Mirrors is an 
immensely useful survey of Melville criticism that includes short summaries of many 
 19	  
meanings of ‘Herman Melville’ in literary study”—to quote Lauter once more—
without attending to the plurality of complex voices involved in the contestation? If 
we are interested in “Herman Melville” and masculinity, why not bring into the 
conversation the fact that many of the first books about Melville were written by 
homosexuals? Or if we want to understand the relationship between “Herman 
Melville” and racial politics, why not discuss the rich writings by James, Ellison, and 
Sterling Brown about Melville’s depictions of nonwhite characters?  
 These problems with the standard histories of the discipline have begun to be 
addressed in several book-chapters and articles, which provide a much broader, 
murkier account of American literary studies in the first half of the twentieth century. 
In an early example of this sort of work, Alan Nadel champions Ellison’s writing for 
“decentering” the “ethno- and logocentricism” of the postwar Americanists by 
exposing the importance of race and slavery to writers like Melville and Twain (xii). 
Ellison, he argues, “exposes” postwar critics’ avoidance of race as “a typical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the critics I focus on here. None of this work, however, considers Melville’s 
cultural authority, nor do they make arguments about how Melville’s reception helps 
us to understand the unacknowledged continuities in disciplinary history. These 
“uncritical” accounts of Melville studies, in other words, fail to interrogate what I 
think are the most important implications of Melville’s longstanding disciplinary 
centrality for Americanists.    
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whitewashing of American history, one that flows from the social/historical 
consciousness that forced the black into invisibility” (94). Similarly, Donald E. Pease 
has argued that James’s book about Moby-Dick radically subverted the hegemonic 
nationalism of Americanist discourse. Pease claims that in the hands of the 
nationalistic postwar Americanists, Moby-Dick became “one of the planetary agents 
responsible for the global hegemonization of American values” (“Extraterritoriality” 
205).6 James’s work, according to Pease, “dismantles” this “Cold War consensus” by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 Pease claims that critics like Matthiessen and Chase enlisted Moby-Dick in the 
anti-communist, imperialistic national “hegemon” by juxtaposing Ishmael’s 
“individual freedom” to the “totalitarian power” of Ahab, and reading “Ishmael’s 
survival [as] a sign of the free world’s triumph over totalitarian power.” (“Melville” 
415). Summarizing this widely cited argument, Spanos writes that postwar 
Americanists “privileged Ishmaelite America as the symbolic agent of the ‘free world’  
in its self-ordained effort to resist Ahabian communist aggression” (Errant 33). 
Recently, Castiglia has rightly pointed out that no postwar critic ever actually made 
this argument (“Cold War” 221-222). Castiglia’s point here is true and important, but 
I am hesitant about his corollary claim that Pease and Spanos were the Americanists 
who really were complicit with “the Cold-War State,” since their critical methodology 
leads them “to search for and report hidden and threatening ideologies in seemingly 
innocuous places, remaining themselves free from ideological motives” (“Cold War” 
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reconfiguring Moby-Dick into a critique of the oppression of “the mariners, renegades, 
and castaways whose catastrophic deaths had been justified by the Americanist 
interpretive community” (“Extraterritoriality,” 206).  
 More recently, several scholars have repudiated such condemnations of “the 
Americanist interpretative community,” identifying critics like Matthiessen, Trilling, 
Arvin, and Chase as voices of political opposition and democratic hope. Fleissner 
claims that “the New Americanists tended to oversimplify their predecessors’ 
arguments” by “attacking” them as “Cold Warriors” (“After” 175). In fact, she 
argues, postwar Americanists were actually the ones who pioneered American studies 
as “a space for meaningful social critique” of heteronormativity and economic 
injustices (“After” 175). Elaborating this point, Castiglia calls Arvin’s 1950 book on 
Melville a “queer socialist manifesto” and argues that Chase’s critical work “staunchly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220). Like Pease and Spanos, Castiglia plays fast and loose with the idea of “Cold War 
ideology”—a concept that for all these critics becomes little more than a rhetorical 
tool for making one’s critical processors into politically corrupt, hegemonic straw 
men. While I deeply admire Castiglia’s compelling reparative work on Arvin and 
Chase, I fear that this critique of Pease and Spanos here perpetuates a tiresome sort 
of “gotcha game,” in which critical discourse threatens to become a succession of 
attempts to call out and overcome the corrupt political “complicities” of one’s 
predecessors.   
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criticized the tendencies in American culture that led to Cold War conformity” 
(“Arvin” 178 ; “Cold War” 219).  Fleissner and Castiglia thus overturn the New 
Americanists “self-congratulatory narrative of progress” by showing how postwar 
Americanists founded the discipline on the values of democratic dissent.7 
 Nadel and Pease’s version of the violent ethnocentrism of postwar 
Americanists certainly differs from Fleissner and Castiglia’s revisionary accounts of 
their democratic queer socialism. But all of these analyses of Arvin, Chase, Ellison, 
and James are fundamentally committed to a similar project: documenting the voices 
of radical racial, economic, and sexual opposition that traditional disciplinary histories 
efface. And in this sense, these reparative readings represent important correctives to 
Shumway, Reissing, and Lauter’s homogenization of pre-New Left Americanist 
discourse. 
 Compelling as this work is, I want to argue that the language of radical 
oppositionality—“dismantling,” “social critique,” “staunch” criticism—that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7 I should note here that before Castiglia and Fleissner’s self-consciously 
“reparative” return to Arvin and Chase, there were also several efforts to recuperate 
the progressive leftist and sexual politics of Matthiessen, most notably David 
Bergman’s “F.O. Matthiessen: The Critical as Homosexual” (1990) and Jay 
Grossman’s “The Canon in the Closet: Matthiessen’s Whitman, Whitman’s 
Matthiessen” (1998), which I discuss below.  
 23	  
characterizes this reparative approach does not do justice to the complex political 
agencies at work in Arvin, Chase, James, and Ellison’s writing. Furthermore, this way 
of positioning these critics and intellectuals relies on what has become a predictable 
tendency either to attack what one studies as complicit or to celebrate it as subversive 
and liberatory. Eve Sedgwick, along with many others, has compellingly criticized this 
tendency.8  The dualism of “the hegemonic and the subversive,” she argues, has 
become a “reified form” of critical analysis, in which “the hegemonic” means little 
more than a vague “status quo” and “the subversive” names “a purely negative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8 Another seminal document of the “post-critique” position is Bruno Latour’s 
much discussed 2003 article in Critical Inquiry, “Why Has Critique Run Out of 
Steam?” It’s important to note here that Castiglia and Fleissner have both eloquently 
voiced this weariness with critique in the field of American literary studies. Castiglia 
has argued that as ideology critique “becomes graduate-training dogma,” it “threatens 
to become intellectually ubiquitous” and “loses its innovative edge” (“Arvin” 180). 
And just earlier this year, Fleissner voiced a similar concern about graduate programs 
in American literature becoming “training factories” that endlessly reproduce “the 
self-aggrandizing tendencies of [. . .] moralized ideology critique” (“Historicism” 700). 
The fact Castiglia and Fleissner both slip into the language of radical oppositionalism 
in their discussions of Arvin and Chase suggests how deeply American literary studies 
is mired in ideology critique.  
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relation” to it (Touching 12). Sedgwick calls for a critical practice that would be 
“structured quite differently from the heroic, ‘liberatory,’ inescapably dualistic 
righteousness of hunting down and attacking” the “hegemonic” and valorizing the 
“emergent” or “subversive” (Touching 10). Elaborating Sedgwick’s point here, Lauren 
Berlant has also criticized this “dialectical description” of political agency. “Critics 
interested in how structural forces materialize” in the texts they analyze, Berlant 
argues, have tended to treat those forces as a “world-homogenizing sovereign with 
coherent intentions.” The text becomes either the mere “effect of powerful, 
impersonal forces,” or “a singularity so radical” that it can “restructure the world that 
cannot fully saturate” it (Berlant 15). To put it more simply, the hegemonic-versus-
subversive dialectic is a mode of analysis in which “one’s choices narrow to accepting 
or refusing” (Sedgwick, Touching 13). And it thus effaces what Sedgwick has 
compellingly described as “the middle ranges of agency that offer space for effectual 
creativity and change” (Touching 13).  
 I aim to approach the romance with Melville through these “middle ranges of 
agency.” Jay Grossman’s compelling writing about Matthiessen has already 
exemplified what this approach might look like, even though his work actually 
predates what I’ve cited from Sedgwick and Berlant. Arguing that postwar 
heteronormativity “structures” Matthiessen’s writing about sexuality, Grossman 
demonstrates how to “see an individual’s perspective as inextricably—and 
unpredictably—linked to that of his culture, and thereby to witness a text (including 
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the ‘text’ and texture of the life) within frames larger than those of personal 
culpability or heroism” (“The Canon” 805).  One could also argue that 
heteronormativity and other hegemonic ideologies—white literary nationalism, anti-
communism, masculinism—“structure” all the postwar romances I write about. But 
just as Matthiessen, according to Grossman, reveals postwar heteronormativity as a 
“source of anguish and ambiguity,” the critics and artists I analyze feel through, 
unravel, and fray these ideologies even as they advance them (“The Canon” 805).  
 Take, for instance, Richard Chase’s strikingly violent pronouncement in his 
reading of Billy Budd: Vere’s execution of Billy, Chase argues, demonstrates that “the 
passive, hermaphrodite youth [. . .] must continuously be killed” (Herman Melville 277). 
No doubt, the immense arsenal of anti-homophobic critique could be unloaded on 
this passage that unequivocally advocates for the repression of same-sex desire. 
Clearly Chase is in some profound way attached to a heteronormative ideology of 
what he calls “manly excellence” (283). But on a closer reading, this passage also 
describes the stubborn persistence of same-sex desire, such that it must be subdued 
continuously. This is certainly not a critique of heteronormativity, but it does unsettle the 
postwar fantasy that same-sex desire can be successfully repressed and that its 
repression would promote a stable democratic nation of healthy citizens. From this 
perspective, we see in this passage something more difficult and subtle than radical 
subversion. We see “the unraveling of a normative social convention,” “the attrition 
of a fantasy,” to borrow two rich phrases from Berlant (7,9). Rather than complicit 
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affirmation or absolute rejection, we see the conflicted language of one who is 
“overwhelmed [. . .] and yet also stuck” (Berlant 21).  
 In our moment of frustration with the radical posturing of critique, perhaps 
what is most salient about writers like Chase is that they consciously recognize their 
situatedness inside hegemonic ideologies. Ellison, for example, speaks of engaging in 
a tactical “guerilla warfare” with postwar racism, and his abiding loyalty to white 
canonical authors certainly kept him “in the lion’s mouth,” as Invisible Man’s 
grandfather might have put it. Similarly, Chase claims to practice a “dissidence from 
within,” a mode of ideological engagement that affirms national values—like 
heteronormativity—but also explores how those values “have produced much in 
human experience which has been damaging and cruel.” “This is not,” he writes, “for 
those who insist on purity or perfect rationality in their view of history or morals” 
(America and The Intellectuals 29-30). Attending to the political and moral impurity of 
the romance with Melville strikes me as an important and worthwhile challenge for 
our critique-weary field.   
 
Melville and “Home Criticism” 
 Melville’s writing readily lends itself to the “impurity” of the romance with 
Melville—its uneasy coupling of patriotic faith in American values with articulations 
of that democracy’s exceptions, injustices, and cruelties. In what remains of this 
introduction, I aim to unpack this reciprocity by showing how Melville emerged from 
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an antebellum literary discourse whose ambitions and concerns in many important 
ways anticipate the hermeneutic practices of twentieth and twenty-first century 
American literary studies. The antebellum discourse I refer to is the Young America 
Movement.9 Its major voices, including Melville himself, repeatedly articulate a 
preoccupation with literary nationalism and democracy—issues that continue to 
animate the work of even the most transnational and radical voices among the New 
Americanists. Melville’s writing, as many critics have shown, betrays both sympathy 
with and distance from the Young Americans, and this ambivalence toward issues of 
nation and democracy has made Melville’s writing remarkably useful to the 
heterogeneous projects of American literary studies.  
 As I’ve already suggested, the rich dialogue between Melville and American 
literary studies derives largely from their mutual preoccupation with literary 
nationalism and with the relationships between literature and democracy. Despite the 
major political upheavals in American literary studies—the radical politics of the 
Vietnam era, the ascendency of diversity studies, the current prevalence of 
transnationalism—Winfried Fluck has persuasively argued that “a striking continuity” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9 For detailed historical studies of the Young America Movement, See 
Widmer’s Young America: The Flowering of Democracy in New York City and Yonatan 
Eyal’s The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828-
1861. 
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links midcentury and contemporary scholars of American literature. The continuity, 
Fluck argues, is that Americanists past and present operate according to the Hegelian 
idea of the literary text as “a condensed expression of national identity” (8). Fluck 
maintains that regardless of raucous political disputations, most Americanists remain 
preoccupied with the “national representativeness” of the texts they study, and they 
use these texts to articulate accounts of “what America is really all about” (8). 
 Fluck’s exposition of the methodological continuities in American literary 
studies is astute and provocative, but a preoccupation with the “national 
representativeness” of American literature dates back to long before the Myth and 
Symbol school (where Fluck’s analysis begins). Benjamin Spencer’s classic study of 
nineteenth-century American literary nationalism shows that this preoccupation goes 
back to foundation of the nation itself and “reached its crest in the mid-1840s.” In 
this moment, Spencer shows, the Young Americans vociferously declared the 
importance of cultivating a specifically American literary tradition. But, more 
important for my argument here, they also articulated a nationally and democratically 
oriented literary critical agenda. Cornelius Matthews, an ardent Young American, 
succinctly expressed the literary priorities of the movement: “Home Writers, Home 
Writing, and Home Criticism” (quoted in Duyckinck, “Nationality” 270). 
 In the decades before the Civil War, numerous writers conceptualized and 
practiced what might be called “Home Criticism,” interpreting the landscape, history, 
and literature of the U.S. as reflective of America’s democratic institutions and 
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culture. George Bancroft’s Hegelian historical epic, History of the United States from the 
Discovery of the American Content (1834) is an early, influential instance of this 
hermeneutic trope. For Bancroft, even pre-national moments—the Mayflower 
Compact, initial interactions between natives and colonists, King Phillip’s War—
represent “the germs of our institutions” (3). “Centuries before the Declaration of 
Independence,” writes Jonathan Arac, “the ‘United States’ is made to live in 
Bancroft’s pages” (Arac, Narratives 626).10 Indeed, for Bancroft the ‘United States’ 
becomes the basis for a providential narrative of national development, from 
colonization to the divinely protected “present happiness and glory” of Jacksonian 
Democracy (4). 
 In the inaugural issue of The United States Magazine and Democratic Review (1837), 
John O’Sullivan urges all American writers to follow Bancroft in illuminating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 10 Although I emphasize the importance of Bancroft’s work here, during the 
1830s and 40s several other writers produced influential “national narratives.” Arac 
argues that writers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Francis Parkman, William H. 
Prescott, James F. Cooper, and Washington Irving were all preoccupied with the 
project of constructing a “national narrative [that] told the story of the nation’s 
colonial beginnings and looked forward to its future as model for the world.”  This 
narrative form, he shows, “began to take on its fully articulated form around the 
presidency of Andrew Jackson (1828-36)” (608). 
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artifacts of history with the light of democracy. The title of his essay evokes the core 
ideals of the Young Americans: “The Democratic Principle—The Importance of its 
Assertion to our Political System and Literature.” O’Sullivan argues that “our national 
progress” depends on “the advocacy of that high and holy DEMOCRATIC 
PRINCIPLE,” and he commits The Democratic Review to this purpose. “The vital 
principle of an American literature,” O’Sullivan writes, “must be democracy,” and the 
burden of American writers is to animate whatever they write about with this vital 
principle:  
All history has to be rewritten; political science and the whole scope of 
moral truth have to considered and illustrated in the light of the 
democratic principle. All old subjects of thought and all new questions 
arising [. . .] have to be taken up again and reexamined in this point of 
view. 
O’Sullivan never clearly explains what exactly this democratic “point of view” 
consists of. But his argument that American writers should unpack the democratic 
significance of whatever it is they might be writing about resonates throughout both 
antebellum and twentieth-century American literary criticism.  
 This concern for a national literature and a democratically-focused reading 
community drives the Young America movement’s ambitious literary project. At the 
center of this project was Evert Duyckinck, Melville’s editor, publisher, and close 
friend. In 1845, Duyckinck became the literary editor of O’Sullivan’s Democratic 
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Review, where he published a regular column called “Nationality and Literature.” 
(Vanderbilt 61-62). Duyckinck’s mantra was that America must produce a unique, 
“original” literature that reflects the emerging prowess of this young nation.  As “the 
scepter of civilization” is handed to the U.S., he writes, American writing must 
“reflect the physical, moral, and intellectual virtues of the nation.” 11 Several powerful 
writers of this moment express the same sentiment: James Russell Lowell proclaims 
himself as “the first poet who endeavored to express the American idea”; the 
Southerner William Gilmore Simms advocates for Americanism in literature; 
Emerson calls for awakening “the sluggard intellect of this continent” in “The 
American Scholar,” a speech Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. called “our Declaration of 
Literary Independence”; and Margaret Fuller calls for an American literature with 
“genius as wide and full as our rivers, [. . .] and as impassioned as our vast prairies, 
routed in strength as the rocks on which the Puritan Fathers landed” (quoted in 
Vanderbilt 61-70). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 Duyckinck’s columns on “Nationality in Literature” often cite German 
literary history, particularly the work of Karl Wilhelm Frederick Schlegel. Jauss’s 
succinct gloss of German nineteenth-century literary history makes clear why 
Duyckinck would have been so interested in it: it’s primary “conviction,” Jauss writes, 
is “that the idea of national individuality was the ‘invisible part of every fact,’ and that 
this idea made the form of history representable even in a series of literary works” (8). 
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 But the promotion of a national literature was only half the battle, for, as 
Lowell famously puts it, “before we can have an American literature we must have an 
American criticism.” Part of the goal of “American criticism,” according to 
Duyckinck, is to “point out the American writers and writing most deeply imbued 
with a national spirit.” Duyckinck also calls for a more involved hermeneutic practice 
that actively explicates the Americanness of U.S. literary production. He argues that 
American critics must “look to the writers of the land for the lineaments of its 
people, and trace the influence of its institutions.” Using literature to understand 
national identity, drawing out literature’s lineaments with civil institutions, and 
cultivating a democratic culture of literary interpretation—these prescient ambitions 
of the Young Americans deeply resonate with the priorities of twentieth century 
Americanists, and they prefigure what Fluck calls “the Romance with America” in 
American literary history.   
 These political and literary values of the Young Americans also resonate 
throughout much of Melville’s writing. They are particularly apparent in his 
enthusiastic praise for Hawthorne in “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” which 
Duyckinck published in 1849 just a few months after he had introduced Melville and 
Hawthorne.12 This review of Mosses from an Old Manse (1846) echoes Duyckinck’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 12 Duyckinck published “Hawthorne and His Mosses” in the Literary World, a 
magazine he started when he left The Democratic Review in 1849. 
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sense that the ascending political power of the nation demands commensurate literary 
accomplishments: “While we are rapidly preparing for that political supremacy among 
the nations, which prophetically awaits us at the close of the present century; in a 
literary point of view we are deplorably unprepared for it” (1164). The problem, 
Melville claims, is not merely that America has no great literature. It is a matter of 
critical appreciation. He thus exhorts his readers to “recognize the meritorious writers 
who breathe that unshackled democratic spirit of Christianity in all things” (1164). 
 Melville proclaims that Hawthorne is just such a great American writer—an 
American genius who has surpassed even Shakespeare. But much more important 
than Hawthorne’s proximity to the accomplishments of European literature is his 
Americanness: “The smell of your beeches and hemlocks is upon him; your own 
broad prairies are in his soul; and, if you travel away inland into his deep and noble 
nature, you will hear the far roar of his Niagara” (1165). “Hawthorne and His 
Mosses” thus provides an exemplary performance of Young American literary 
hermeneutics: it explicates and celebrates the “democratic spirit” and Americanness 
that, when we read correctly, shines forth from American literature.  
 Melville’s creative writing also frequently testifies to his saturation in the 
Young America movement. The narrator of Redburn (1849), for instance, imagines all 
the peoples of the world uniting under the banner of American democracy: “We,” 
Melville writes in reference to the national community, “are not a nation so much as a 
world” (169). Likewise, in White-Jacket (1850), Melville proclaims, “Long enough have 
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we been skeptics with regard to ourselves and doubted whether the political Messiah 
has come. But he has come in us” (153). And in one of the most frequently quoted 
passages from Moby-Dick (1851), Ishmael invokes “thou great democratic God” as his 
muse, and presents the Pequod’s crew as an embodiment of “democratic dignity.” 
Most recent critics detect “more than a touch of irony” in Melville’s nationalistic 
moments, many of which betray the imperialistic implications that underlie Young 
American patriotism and remind us that O’Sullivan also coined the portentous phrase 
“Manifest Destiny.”13 But even if we read these passages as satire, it is undeniable 
that Melville’s writing is steeped in Young American values and rhetoric. Even after 
Melville notoriously attacks Duyckinck and the Young Americans in Pierre (1852), 
their ideals still permeate his later writing. Clarel (1876) contains lengthy discourses on 
democracy, and Billy Budd (posthumously published in 1924) begins with a sailor 
being impressed from ship suggestively titled “The Rights-of-Man.”  
 But Melville’s writing also shows a dark skepticism about the possibilities and 
practice of democracy in America. In stark contrast to O’Sullivan and Duyckinck’s 
democratic triumphalism, Robert Milder compellingly argues that “democracy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13 Wald and Levine both convincingly read “Hawthorne and His Mosses” with 
“more than touch of irony,” to quote Levine, while Rogin reads it as an earnest 
“Young American literary manifesto.” See Wald’s Constituting Americans (125), Levine’s 
Dislocating Race and Nation (148), and Rogin’s Subversive Genealogy (74). 
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Melville’s writing is not set against a backdrop of universal consonance; [. . .] it is set 
against a backdrop of blackness, or tragic dissonance” (51). Milder’s emphasis on 
“blackness” here alludes to Melville’s praise for Hawthorne’s “great power of 
blackness.” “It is that blackness in Hawthorne,” Melville writes, “that so fixes and 
fascinates me”—“a blackness,” he adds, “ten times black” (1158-59).  Milder argues 
that Melville’s emphasis on Hawthorne’s “vision of life’s blackness” marks a criticism 
of the Young America movement’s call for a celebratory literature of national and 
democratic pride. Robert Levine and Pricilla Wald have argued that there is a 
“racialized” dimension to Melville’s usage of “blackness” to affront the Young 
Americans (Wald 125). Melville’s praise for literary “blackness,” they argue, makes a 
subtle case for a literature that calls attention to those excluded from democracy in 
America—to “the whiteness inside and the blackness without,” as Levine puts it 
(162). 
 As almost every Melvillean has noticed, Melville appears to be characterizing 
the “blackness” of his own work here. And it is Melville’s complex entanglements of 
American pride with national cruelty—of democratic optimism with a tragic sense of 
democracy’s exclusions and failures—that has made his work so uniquely useful to 
various projects of American literary criticism. 
 The Young Americans attacked Melville for precisely the features that would 
be celebrated during his “revival” in the 1920s. Duyckinck was “compelled to object 
to” Melville’s later writing, due to its “piratical running down of creeds and opinions” 
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(“Melville’s Moby Dick” 41). The first revivals of Melville’s work echo Duyckinck’s 
reading of Melville’s subversion of accepted ideas, but they reassess the value of this 
subversion. In his widely influential criticism of the “Genteel Tradition” in 1911, 
George Santayana had attacked American culture for having “few misgivings about 
the perfect health and the all-embracing genius of the nation” and for maintaining a 
“sentimental faith in liberty and democracy” (154, 156). To many writers in the 1920s, 
Melville’s writing presented a compelling alternative to a culture they understood as 
arrogant, shallow, and individualist. Lauter is certainly right to argue that there was a 
great deal of highbrow elitism and nationalism in this modernist revival of Melville as 
an author who boldly repudiated the conventional pieties of his day. But Lauter’s 
account neglects the fact that many revivers believed that the primary value of 
Melville’s writing was its repudiations of national arrogance and naïve democratic 
optimism.  
 The first major studies of Melville all follow in the wake of Van Wyck 
Brooks’s 1918 call for “creating a usable past” (337).  Influenced by Santayana, 
Brooks confronted American critics for championing only books that “have passed 
the censorship of the commercial and moralistic mind” (338). This filtering, Brooks 
suggests, is “why we Americans have so neglected Herman Melville that there is no 
biography of him” (340). Writing just a few years later, Melville’s first biographer, 
Raymond Weaver, makes clear from the beginnings of his book that Melville 
represents an alternative to an uncritical “Genteel Tradition.” “Melville,” he writes, 
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“sinned blackly against the orthodoxy of his time” (18). Likewise, Lewis Mumford, 
Melville’s second biographer, claimed that Melville “plunged into the cold black 
depths of the spirit” and “questioned the foundations upon which their [American’s] 
vast superstructure of comfort and complacency was erected” (Herman Melville xv). 
Melville thus emerged in the discourse of American criticism as a voice of 
opposition—as a deeply valuable resource for articulating one’s objections to 
American culture. 
 Crucial to this emergence are D.H. Lawrence’s extended readings of Melville 
in Studies in Classic American Literature (1923). Lawrence imagines Americans as having 
suppressed the most important dimensions of their own culture. Americans, he 
writes, see only “the democratic and the idealistic” in “the American utterance.” 
Thus, he reasons, “they dodge their very own selves” (14). Lawrence’s goal in writing 
the book is to “look through the surface of American art, and see the inner 
diabolism” (89).  According to Lawrence, the most celebrated “classic” American 
authors—Franklin, Cooper, Emerson, Whitman—have hidden and hidden from this 
diabolism. But Melville’s “writing is forever in revolt,” and he is thus “America’s 
greatest seer” (139). With Moby-Dick, Lawrence argues, Melville made one clear point: 
“Doom! Doom! Doom! We are doomed, doomed. And the doom is in America. [. . .] 
The Pequod went down. And the Pequod was the ship of the American soul” (169). 
More important than Lawrence’s apocalyptic reading of Moby-Dick is his use of 
Melville to designate himself—the literary critic—as the excavator of the dark, 
 38	  
suppressed side of Americanness.  Making explicit what Brooks, Weaver, and 
Mumford implied, Lawrence invests the interpreter of American literature with the 
prophetic power to see and articulate the “black,” suppressed dimensions of 
American identity.  
  This idea of Melville’s work as expressing a dark, suppressed, but profoundly 
valuable Americanness found its most foundation articulation in Matthiessen’s 
discipline-shaping book, American Renaissance (1941). From the very beginning of this 
immense study, Matthiessen commits himself to exploring the “possibilities of 
democracy,” and claims that the five writers he studies—Emerson, Thoreau, 
Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman—produced a “literature for our democracy” (ix, 
xv). Patriotic as “literature for democracy” sounds, Matthiessen argued that returning 
to this body of work—particularly Melville—can actually mitigate America’s national 
arrogance, which, Matthiessen writes, has “produced the blindest nationalism in art 
no less than in politics” (475).  Matthiessen also believes that the project of 
democratic criticism can work against another “major problem in our culture”—
namely, “the usual selfishness and indifference of our university men to political or 
social responsibility” (475). Countless Americanists over the past thirty years have 
rightly repudiated Matthiessen’s reduction of “literature for democracy” to a short list 
of white, upper-middle-class, Protestant New England men. For good reasons, we 
have critiqued Matthiessen’s exclusionary critical methodology and permanently 
exploded his hegemonic canon. But this revisionary work has been animated by 
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Matthiessen’s own conviction that American literary criticism should be an anti-
nationalistic, democratic practice—a conviction that continues to galvanize the radical 
ambitions of Americanists. 
 The democratic politics of American Renaissance emerge most distinctly in its 
book-length study of Melville. On several occasions, Melville’s work provokes 
Matthiessen to denounce the inequalities that mark the failures of American 
democracy. Most of Melville’s corpus, according to Matthiessen, is fundamentally 
committed to calling out the injustices of antebellum America: the exploitative 
practices of Christian missionaries in Typee and Omoo, the suffering of immigrants in 
Redburn, the flogging of sailors in White-Jacket. Matthiessen’s one objection to 
Melville’s politics is his brief, deeply unsatisfying reading of “Benito Cereno.” 
Matthiessen follows other critics of the thirties in suggesting that Melville symbolizes 
“evil in the African crew” (508). He then critiques the novella’s racial politics, arguing 
that it reflects “Melville’s failure to reckon” with “the fact that they were slaves and 
evil had thus been originally done to them” (508). Matthiessen’s interpretation of the 
slaves as “evil” is uncharacteristically imperceptive. But the point of the passage—
that symbolizing slaves as evil wrongly effaces the evil of slavery itself—is consistent 
with the project of democratic criticism. Whether championing or critiquing 
Melville’s writing, Matthiessen consistently uses it to articulate democratic political 
commentary.  
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 A key political concern of American Renaissance—perhaps the key concern—
drives Matthiessen’s extended reading of Moby-Dick. In the book’s final paragraph, 
which is all about Melville, Matthiessen describes this concern as “the tragedy of 
extreme individualism, the disasters of the selfish will” in conflict with “the Christian 
belief in equality and brotherhood” (656). In his reading, Moby-Dick dramatizes this 
tragedy. Ahab is “a fearful symbol of the self-enclosed individualism that carried to its 
furthest extreme, brings disaster both upon itself and upon the group of which it is a 
part.” He “is prophetic of [. . .] the empire builders of the New World” (459). 
Matthiessen identifies a utopic alternative to Ahabian individualism in “the 
Whitmanesque comradeship between Ishmael and Queequeg,” which, he argues, 
symbolizes “the transformative power of sympathy with another human being” (430, 
443). This Melville-inspired fusion of Christian brotherhood with what Grossman has 
called “the erotics of democratic affiliation” is American Renaissance’s boldest statement 
of Matthiessen’s career-spanning commitment to leftist politics and Christian 
socialism (“Autobiography” 54). 
  Matthiessen’s moments of democratic criticism, however, are buried in long 
chapters that are most concerned with issues of genre and form. Perhaps Matthiessen 
buried these moments in an effort to professionalize American literary studies by 
bringing it into line with the ostensibly more “scientific” concerns of the New 
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Criticism.14 But whatever the motivations, on a methodological level American 
Renaissance appears torn between political criticism and formal concerns “with what 
these books were as works of art,” to quote his introduction (vii). In this 
introduction—which is all that many of Matthiessen’s detractors cite—the project of 
democratic criticism sounds indistinguishable from the New Criticism’s 
preoccupation with “the enduring requirements of great art” (xi). As Grossman aptly 
puts it, American Renaissance is “(de)formed by uneasy contradictions” between 
historical experience and “the canonical eternal” (“Autobiography” 48). 
 In the decade after American Renaissance, a diverse array of postwar writers 
expanded on Matthiessen’s inchoate democratic criticism. These prescient but mostly 
ignored conversations about literature, democracy, and the office of the literary critic 
form the basis of the following three chapters. Each examines how Melville’s work 
facilitated rich, contentious dialogue among academic Americanists and those who 
for various reasons occupied the fringes of the literary academy. These critics, 
intellectuals, and artists follow Matthiessen in using Melville to think through and 
write about the political stakes of sexuality, class, and race. But unlike Matthiessen, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 14 To witness the New Criticism’s claim to scientific precision and disciplinary 
professionalism, see John Crowe Ransom’s widely influential essay, “Criticism, Inc.” 
(1937), published four years before American Renaissance.   
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they address these issues forthrightly and make them the center of their readings of 
Melville’s work. 
Chapters Ahead 
 Chapter 2 describes how Melville elicited a remarkably explicit transatlantic 
conversation about male homosexuality in a heteronormative society. During the 
postwar moment—which David Johnson has called “the Lavender Scare”—
homosexuals were aligned with Communists as dangerous threats to The American 
Way of Life, and exposure as a so-called “sex pervert” meant professional ostracism 
and criminal punishment. Under this heteronormative regime, Melville’s life and 
work—especially Billy Budd—became a means of negotiating complex relationships 
with state homophobia.  Even “the text itself” of Billy Budd was made to bear the 
marks of this moment in F. Barron Freeman’s bowdlerized publication of the story 
(1948). Freeman’s edition removed all of Billy Budd’s most sexually suggestive 
passages—a redaction that appears to have actually called the critical community’s 
attention to such passages. Less than a year later, Newton Arvin and Richard Chase 
became the first critics to discuss Melville’s homosexuality at length, and to argue that 
it is central to his work. Like Matthiessen, Arvin and Chase both write about the 
pleasures and political power of homoerotic relationships, especially in their readings 
of Moby-Dick, but they made explicit the homoeroticism that Matthiessen had only 
suggested. 
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 The perhaps liberatory moments of their analyses, however, coexist uneasily 
with their admiration for the central character of Billy Budd, Captain Vere. For Arvin 
and Chase, Vere’s execution of Billy, “the handsome sailor,” came to represent a 
virtuous sacrifice of homoerotic affection for the sake of professional duty and state 
loyalty—a sacrifice that exemplified the discipline demanded of postwar intellectuals 
like themselves. Yet these critics also document the affective and political costs of 
Vere’s cruel virtue: continuous self-torment, state violence, and yearning for 
redemption. This dissonance in Arvin and Chase’s reading of Vere rises to crescendo, 
so to speak, in Benjamin Britten and E.M. Forster’s collaborative opera of Billy Budd 
(1951). Britten and Forster dramatically exacerbate these critics’ sense of Vere’s 
emotional agony by extending his life into old age and recasting the narrative of the 
novella as Vere’s recurring flashback. Their opera also explicitly engages the politics 
of state heteronormativity by elaborately repurposing and queering the name of the 
ship from which Billy was impressed: “The Rights of Man.” Among these writers, 
Billy Budd thus became a sort of intellectual commons for exploring the emotional 
torment and punitive violence that state-enforced sexual repression demands. 
 Chapter 3 is about how C.L.R. James, just a couple years after this 
conversation about Billy Budd, utilized Moby-Dick in his effort to intervene in postwar 
American literary studies. James circulated his book about Moby-Dick, titled Mariners, 
Renegades and Castaways (1953), under extraordinary circumstances: he wrote and 
published it while imprisoned on Ellis Island awaiting deportation. He sent copies to 
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dozens of prominent literary critics and every U.S. congressman. As I’ve already 
mentioned, one of James’s motivations for writing the book was to exhibit his 
expertise on “the Great American Novelist” (as James called Melville) as part of a 
strategic plea for U.S. citizenship. But Mariners and the letters he circulated with it 
also betray James’s belief in the political importance of literary interpretation and his 
problems with the practices of postwar Americanists.  
 James was deeply concerned about the compliance of Americanists with what 
he saw as the snowballing totalitarianism of the U.S. government during the years 
after World War II—a totalitarianism that was evinced, he thought, by his own 
imprisonment. He does not mention Arvin or Chase’s valorizations of Vere’s dutiful 
conservativism, but on several occasions he compares postwar American intellectuals 
to Ishmael, suggesting that they complied with the U.S. government as Ishmael had 
complied with Ahab. This argument about Ishmael is part of James’s larger reading of 
Moby-Dick as prophetic of the most salient political problems of the twentieth 
century: totalitarianism is represented in Ahab, the exploitation of the transnational 
working class in the Pequod’s crew, and the acquiescence of intellectuals in Ishmael. 
  In Mariners and his letters to critics, James sought to theorize what 
Matthiessen—whom James admired as a leftist critic—had left incoherent: the 
relationship between literature and radical political criticism. As James collapses the 
distance between literary interpretation and political critique—or as he put it, 
“between criticism and life”—he draws heavily on Marxist critics like Georg Lukács, 
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but he primarily focuses on figures who were already important to his audience of 
Americanists: Aristotle, Hegel, and even New Critics like I.A. Richards. In both his 
theorizing and his readings of Moby-Dick, James sought to galvanize the critical 
community to fight the anti-democratic Cold War immigration laws under which 
James himself was being deported.  
 My final chapter is about Ralph Ellison, who also strategically used Melville to 
garner a powerful audience and lend authority to his critical and creative output. The 
hypercanonicity of Melville’s work in the postwar moment offered Ellison the 
opportunity to show that African Americans are integral to what he called “the 
tradition of American literature” and to carve out a place for himself within “that 
very powerful literary tradition” (“Initiation Rites” 525). Building on critical work by 
Sterling Brown and the clumsy racial politics of Matthiessen’s work, Ellison’s 
criticism and fiction use texts like Moby-Dick, “Bartleby,” and “Benito Cereno” to 
reveal that American literature is fundamentally concerned with and informed by 
issues of racial injustice and inequality. Using Melville and the writings of other 
canonical figures like Emerson, Thoreau, Twain, and Faulkner, Ellison argues that 
black characters in American literature function as a generative force of democratic 
agitation—a force of “blackness” that negates any sense that America has lived up to 
its democratic promises.  
 Embracing a white canon may seem like a counterintuitive means of exposing 
the importance of African Americans to American literary and cultural history, but 
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Ellison was well aware of this irony. Indeed, more so than anyone else I write about 
here, Ellison was rigorously reflective about his literary critical identity and its power 
dynamics. In his essays and both of his novels, Melville’s most subtle, tricky, and 
rhetorically skilled characters—Ahab, Babo, and the confidence man—become 
vehicles for critical self-reflection.  I argue that Ellison takes up this critical 
interrogation most clearly through copious allusions to these characters in his 
unfinished second novel, published in 2010 as Three Days Before the Shooting. 
From the Young Americans to the New Americanists  
 As it was in postwar discourse, the romance with Melville remains a powerful 
means of articulating the democratic aspirations of our field. It has persisted through 
the major reconfigurations of American literary studies since then, and its power and 
allure have not waned in the present critical moment. New Historicists have even 
further cemented Melville’s national representativeness, some by presenting his work 
as a prophetic condemnation of American imperialistic exceptionalism, others by 
condemning his work for perpetuating its hegemony.15 Many more sanguine critics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 15 Spanos’s recent reading of “Benito Cereno” exemplifies the former 
position. This text, he argues “is proleptic of America’s future. [. . .]The character of 
Amasa Delano [is] a symbolic figuration of American national identity[. . . and] the 
myth of American exceptionalism that [. . .] has by and large determined America’s 
national identity and its global role from the very beginning (American Calling 132). 
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have found that Melville’s writings explore hopeful visions of democratic futurity—
visions of racial egalitarianism16 and queer democratic sociality.17 Even though their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Several influential critics of the past couple of decades have made similar arguments 
about Delano.  James H. Kavanagh, for instance, claims that Delano exemplifies 
“imperial naiveté–one of the specific conditions of a peculiarly American 
imperialism” (275).  Similarly, H. Bruce Franklin argues that Delano is a 
“representative American of his own time, of Melville’s time, and of the time on the 
eve of our own century when the U.S. would achieve its ‘manifest destiny’ [. . .] and 
become a global empire” (203). The best examples of the latter position are Dimock 
and Powell, who both argue that Melville’s work actually furthers American 
imperialism by justifying its violent expansionism. “Melville’s authorial enterprise can 
be seen,” writes, Dimock, “as a miniature version of the national enterprise [. . .], a 
miniature version of Manifest Destiny—understood here not as a specific set of 
events, but as an informing logic of freedom and domination” (10).  
 16 See Toni Morrison’s  “Unspeakable Things,” which I discuss in my 
conclusion, and Carolyn Karcher’s Shadow over the Promised Land.  
 17 See Robert K. Martin’s Hero, Captain and Stranger, Castiglia’s Interior States, 
especially the chapter on “Alienated Affection, Queer Sociality, and the Marvelous 
Interiors of American Romance,” and Jennifer Greiman’s Democracy’s Spectacle, 
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political positionings are vastly different, these more contemporary romancers share 
with postwar Americanists a fundamental conviction about Melville: that his work 
signifies the fate of the nation and the possibilities of democracy.  
 By examining the history and critical genealogy of this conviction, I hope to in 
some sense mark the prevalent practice of bringing our questions of nation and 
democracy to the oracle of Melville. This widely practiced critical move calls our 
attention to the deep continuities across even the most contentious debates in our 
discipline’s history. But, as Americanists continue to treat Melville’s writing a key to 
understanding democracy in America, the deep history of this move—its 
participation in a hermeneutic tradition that extends back to Melville’s own literary 
milieu, its central role in our field since its beginnings—tends to go unacknowledged. 
By illuminating this history, this dissertation seeks to interrogate the genealogical 
lineaments of Americanists’ unique attachment to Melville’s writing, and the political 
ends we seek as we continue to return to these writings. In so doing, I also hope to 
mitigate the reductive, often tiresome, but nonetheless deeply ingrained professional 
trend of seeking to transcend the ostensibly corrupt politics of one’s critical 
predecessors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
especially the chapter on “Theatricality, Strangeness, and Democracy in Herman 
Melville’s The Confidence-Man.”  
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 Rather than critiquing the romance with Melville (or any other author) or 
calling for its end, I actually aim to enrich it by encouraging Americanists to practice 
the romance with a greater awareness and self-reflexivity concerning the history of 
this move and the desires that compel it. For the persistence of the romance sustains 
a privileged author function for Melville—a function with a long, politically 
multivalent history.  The continuance of the romance is thus a trace of shared 
concerns that run through the deep history of American criticism. Melville’s abiding 
allure for Americanists points to these buried continuities in this history—
continuities that pose challenging, productive questions. Who are we such that 
Melville continues to mean so much to us? What’s at stake in how we read and 
misread critical history? What kinds of criticism become possible if we read our 
critical predecessors in the spirit of care and empathy rather than the spirit of 
critique? I hope this dissertation will compel its readers toward such questions and 
open up an archive for exploring them.  
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Chapter 2  
“if books are to be written”:  
Bil ly  Budd  and the discipline of American literary studies 
 
the passive, hermaphrodite youth [. . .] must continuously be killed in the rite of sacrament if books 
are to be written or the man-of-war world sustained—or indeed, if life is to go on at all.  
-Richard Chase, 1949 
 Betray one’s self and lovers or betray the law and one’s career: this dilemma of 
homosexuals at midcentury brought into sharp focus Billy Budd’s depiction of erotic 
affection among men constrained by the harsh laws of a repressive state. During this 
moment, Melville’s incomplete, posthumously published story became a sort of 
intellectual commons for discussing the justifications and costs of homosexual 
repression. Editors working on the story’s manuscripts, critics F.O. Matthiessen, 
Newton Arvin, a young Richard Chase, and artists E.M. Forster and Benjamin 
Britten, who collaborated on opera of Billy Budd in 1951— Billy Budd gathered these 
men separated by nation, profession, and conviction into a shared conversation. The 
novella offered them ways to conceptualize their subjectivity within a 
heteronormative disciplinary regime, and to write about the personal and political 
costs that such a regime exacts on those living beholden to it. These commentators 
on Billy Budd openly explore the pleasures of homosexual love and its power as a site 
of personal fulfillment and political resistance, yet their conversation also bears 
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disturbing marks of repression: the circulation of bowdlerized texts, images of slain 
objects of desire (such as the one in my epigraph), violent acts of self-disciplining, 
and tenuous expressions of redemption.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 18As excellent work by several recent scholars has shown, the issue of 
homosexuality in American literature was a major concern for mid-century 
Americanists. Henry Abelove, Jay Grossman, Randall Fuller, and several others have 
revealed the profound importance of homosexuality to Matthiessen’s foundational 
work, American Renaissance (1941), as Martin, Castiglia, and Werth have done for 
Arvin’s influential books about Hawthorne (1929), Whitman (1938) and Melville 
(1950). Leslie Fiedler’s “Come back to the raft ag’in, Huck Honey” (1948) is easily the 
most widely discussed treatment of homosexuality from this decade, but this 
notorious essay is only tangentially important to the work of the Melville scholars I’m 
analyzing here.  Fiedler calls his topic “innocent homosexuality,” by which he means 
non-physical, non-sexual, affectionate male-male partnerships.  Christopher Looby 
suggests that Fiedler uses the term “homosexual” merely to “trade on the shock value 
of exposing the scandalous while insisting that the scandalous is actually innocent” 
(532).  For the critics I discuss here, homosexuality is certainly not “innocent.”  They 
understood homosexuality as a powerful threat to state loyalty, to masculinity, and to 
their careers as intellectuals.  Furthermore, Fiedler’s essay does not discuss either of 
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 All these renderings of Billy Budd emerged during the 1940s and early 50s—the 
beginning of what David K. Johnson describes as “the Lavender Scare.” In this 
moment, Johnson shows, homosexuals were aligned with Communists as dangerous 
threats to the American Way of Life, and exposure as a so-called “sex pervert” meant 
professional ostracism and criminal punishment.19 If the political propaganda of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the topics that form the basis for the conversation I am explicating, namely, sexual 
repression and Billy Budd.   
 19 In his acclaimed book, The Lavender Scare (2006), Johnson uses the term to 
describe “the Cold War persecution of gays and lesbians in the federal 
government”—persecution that, he argues, equals if not surpasses the 
contemporaneous persecution of Communists and Leftists (2-3).  Johnson shows that 
Democrat and Republican congress members began regularly expressing concern 
about homosexuals in public positions in 1947. Treating homosexuals as moral 
“perverts” and “security risks,” the federal government fired “nearly six thousand 
civil servants” over the next two decades (2). Beginning in the late 1940s, the U.S. 
government thus branded homosexuality as a dangerous professional liability.  
Though Johnson’s account of the Lavender Scare does not extend beyond the United 
States, the term could just as easily be applied to the state-sanctioned homophobia in 
Britain.  Until 1967, homosexuality was a criminal offense punishable by 
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moment promised that the repression of homosexuality would lead to civic stability, 
mainstream psychology complemented this deeply heteronormative culture by 
promising that repression would bring psychic peace. Leading postwar American 
psychoanalysts, according to Henry Abelove, promised to “cure” homosexuality. 20 
They believed “that homosexuality was an illness,” he writes, “and that it could often 
be cured” (Abelove 18). One such analyst, Charles Socarides, argued that the only 
treatment for this illness was to accept “heterosexual pairings,” the only sexual 
relations, he believed, that promise “cooperation, solace, stimulation, enrichment” 
(quoted on Abelove 18).21 Many of the participants in the postwar conversation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imprisonment in the UK, and it was illegal even to use the word on the BBC (Cooke, 
“Britten’s Billy Budd” 27). 
 20 Nathan G. Hale Jr. also argues that mainstream psychology in the U.S. at 
this time corroborated this culture of homophobia by “insist[ing] that homosexuality 
was inherently pathological, a deep disturbance of personality, and display[ing] a 
therapeutic zeal for its ‘cure’” (298). 
 21 This version of psychoanalysis is based less on Freud’s writing about 
homosexuality in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) and more on the later, 
“darker” Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930). Based on these texts, many American psychoanalysts believed that the 
primary goal of analysis was the bring the patient into accord with “the reality 
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about Billy Budd transparently subscribe to and even defend this heteronormative 
fantasy, and, as I will show, their faith in it animates their valorizations of Captain 
Vere. Yet they also unravel this fantasy: in their readings of Billy Budd, sexual 
repression leads not to peace or stability, but to tortuous self-disciplining and 
violence. 
 During the Lavender Scare, Billy Budd thus became a site for both affirming 
postwar heteronormativity and unraveling its promises—for exploring the attrition of 
a fantasy within which one remains stuck.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
principle.” Lionel Trilling, who was deeply influential for many of the figures I 
discuss in this chapter, applied this version of Freud to art in his 1940 essay “Freud 
and Literature,” which claimed that the primary function of art is “to reconcile men 
to the sacrifices they have made for culture’s sake” (Liberal 46). This is also the 
interpretation of Freud that Herbert Marcuse excoriated in Eros and Civilization (1955). 
Explicitly attacking Trilling, Marcuse claimed that the real “function” of art—of 
psychoanalytic theory—is “a critique of the established reality principle” and an 
“eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination” (133, 
145). 
 22 My language in this sentence borrows from Berlant’s subtle language of 
political agency in Cruel Optimism (7, 9, 21). 
 55	  
 Central to this conversation is Matthiessen’s reading of Billy Budd in American 
Renaissance (1941), which galvanized critics and artists in the U.S. and England to mine 
Billy Budd for insight about masculinity, repression, and the discipline demanded of 
academic literary intellectuals. Subject to a “regime of heteronormative disciplinarity,” 
Matthiessen, according to Jay Grossman’s compelling research, wrote about and 
experienced homosexuality as a fundamentally fractured subjectivity—an identity that 
is characterized by, as Grossman puts it, “the interfusion of ‘public’ demands and 
‘private’ propensities” (“The Canon” 824). Building on Grossman, Randall Fuller 
argues that Matthiessen was torn between his identities as “public intellectual and 
private homosexual”— neither of which he could comfortably inhabit (365, 368). 
Grossman and Fuller’s essays examine textual traces of Matthiessen’s fractured 
professional and sexual lives: his letters to his partner for twenty years, Russell 
Cheney; his homoerotic readings of Moby-Dick and Leaves of Grass; and his 
conspicuous avoidance of these texts’ most sexually powerful moments, “A Squeeze 
of the Hand” and “Calamus.”  
 Yet Fuller and Grossman do not discuss Billy Budd, which moved Matthiessen 
along with several of his contemporaries to comment explicitly on the tension 
between maintaining a professional, masculine public identity and the desire for 
homoerotic love. Unlike Moby-Dick, Whitman’s poetry, and the other texts that 
prompted post-war critics to write about homosexuality, Billy Budd centers on a 
character who consciously experiences a conflict between homoerotic affection and 
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professional duty: Captain the Honorable Edward Fairfax Vere. Melville describes 
Vere as a “conscientious disciplinarian”—a man who, even though he strictly adheres 
to his obligations as a captain in the King’s service, also remains reflective and 
“intellectual” about what he sacrifices to maintain discipline. During the trial of Billy 
Budd, “the Handsome Sailor” who strikes dead the villainous Master-at-Arms John 
Claggart, Vere demands that his officers subdue “the feminine in man” and go 
through with Billy’s execution. At the same time, as a man with “a marked leaning 
toward all things intellectual,” Vere remains aware of the injustice and tragedy of 
sending a fundamentally innocent man to the yardarm (111).  
 This tension between “the feminine” and disciplinarity, between Vere’s 
transparently homoerotic affection for Billy and his sense of professional obligation, 
deeply resonated for many postwar commentators on the story. As the burgeoning 
academic field of American literary studies took shape during this deeply 
homophobic moment, Vere’s “conscientious” fulfillment of his “duty” became a 
catalyst for critics and artists to write about what it means to live beholden to “a 
regime of heteronormative disciplinarity”—an issue that they do not address quite so 
explicitly anywhere else in their work.   
 In the strikingly violent reading of Billy Budd represented in my epigraph, 
Chase presents Vere’s execution of Billy as symbolic of a painful reality for 
professional writers: the writing of books, a project that he aligns with the 
maintenance of state power, demands the continuous killing of the “hermaphrodite 
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youth,” the feminine, childish part of the self that Chase believes produces desire for 
other men. For Chase, Matthiessen, Arvin, and F. Barron Freeman, who bowdlerized 
Billy Budd in a widely cited 1948 publication, Vere represented a role model for the 
professional intellectual. The honorable captain’s execution of Billy—his sacrifice of 
illicit love to professional duty and state loyalty—came to exemplify the discipline 
demanded of academic Americanists, a discipline that all these critics describe as 
tragic. For they also document the high costs of Vere’s cruel virtue: violence to 
others, violence to the self, and a yearning for redemption. These influential critics 
published their conflicted accounts of Billy Budd in widely read books (in Chase and 
Arvin’s case, published by trade presses) that at least in part inspired Britten and 
Forster’s opera. In their rendering of the story, the dissonance in the critical 
consensus on Vere rises to crescendo, so to speak. Looking at the Americanists’ 
approach to Billy Budd from afar—from across the Atlantic and from the perspective 
of artists, rather than professional critics— Britten and Forster exacerbated Vere’s 
emotional torment, and overtly called attention to his repression of “the rights of 
man.” If, as Sedgwick persuasively argues, Billy Budd is primarily concerned with “the 
operations necessary to deploy male-male desire as the glue rather than the solvent of 
hierarchical male disciplinary order,” then these postwar writers interrogate such 
operations and expose their personal and political costs through representations of 
Captain Vere (Epistemology 94).  
The “Testament of Acceptance” and the “Reassertion of the Heart” 
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 In his introduction to the second edition of Billy Budd (1928), Raymond 
Weaver, Melville’s first biographer, suggested a way of understanding Melville’s final 
tale that prevailed among Melvilleans until the late 1950s: Melville had raged against 
heaven and earth in his early novels, but “with Billy Budd he would justify the ways of 
God to Man" (li). A year later, Lewis Mumford would elaborate Weaver’s suggestive 
reading and argue that Billy Budd reveals that Melville had learned to “accept the 
world’s conditions: those universal articles of war on which our civilization rests” and 
that he finally found “peace, the ultimate peace of resignation” (249).  In 1933, E.L. 
Grant Watson crystallized this narrative of a rebellious young Melville grown world-
weary and wise in his influential article about Billy Budd, “Melville’s Testament of 
Acceptance.” “Melville is no longer a rebel,” Watson concludes from the novella 
(322). Matthiessen, Chase, and Arvin elaborate this “testament of acceptance” into a 
narrative of intellectual maturation, and they each unfold its unsettling implications of 
sexual repression.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 23 Variants of the “testament of acceptance” reading prevailed in Billy Budd 
criticism throughout the 1930s and 40s, but during the next decade, a strongly 
oppositional minority position took shape. In 1950, for example, Joseph Schiffman 
argued that Billy Budd was Melville’s “final attack upon evil,” and in 1953 Richard T. 
Stavig elaborated this position in his dissertation, which claimed that Melville’s last 
story was a “protest against injustice” (Schiffman 128; Stavig 2). Phil Withim 
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 Arguments for Captain Vere’s mature, rational virtue lie at the heart of the 
“testament of acceptance” reading, and Matthiessen articulates precisely this claim in 
American Renaissance. Despite the tension between Vere’s dutiful adherence to state 
authority and Matthiessen’s ardently leftist politics, not to mention his homosexuality, 
Matthiessen presents Vere as an exemplary man of intellect.  Indeed, Matthiessen first 
introduces Vere as a man with an “experienced and just mind”—a mind that is 
grounded in hard facts and moral right (508). Vere, Matthiessen continues, is “set 
apart from his fellow officers by ‘a marked leaning toward everything intellectual,’ 
especially for ‘writers who [. . .] honestly and in the spirit of common sense, 
philosophize upon realities’” (508). Vere’s astute intellect, Matthiessen suggests, 
results from his wise acceptance of “realities,” and it is this realistic intellect that 
demands that he suppress “the heart” and execute Billy.    
 As will become apparent, however, Matthiessen’s reading of Billy Budd is 
conflicted and uneasy. Vere’s execution of Billy appears to directly repudiate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
popularized this reading in 1959 in a direct response to Watson titled “Billy Budd: 
Testament of Resistance.” These oppositional positions were unavailable to Britten 
and Forster as they wrote the opera, but their critical depiction of Vere was 
influenced by William Plomer, whose 1946 introduction to a British publication of 
Billy Budd anticipated the “resistance” reading by claiming that the novella was 
Melville’s “final protest against the nature of things” (8).   
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“sympathy” and “comradeship” that Matthiessen found between Ishmael and 
Queequeg. “The one thing that would redeem ‘the wolfish world,’” Matthiessen 
writes in his reading of Moby-Dick, “was sympathy with another human being.  [. . . 
Melville] gave his full presentation of the transformative power of such feeling in the 
relation between Ishmael and Queequeg” (443).  For Matthiessen, “the 
Whitmanesque comradeship between Ishmael and Queequeg” represents a radical 
alternative to Ahab’s “self-enclosed individualism that [. . .] brings disaster both upon 
itself and upon the group of which it is a part” (431, 459).  The phrase 
“Whitmanesque comradeship” testifies to the deep continuity between male love and 
leftist politics in American Renaissance.24  Matthiessen’s reading of Ishmael and 
Queequeg presents homoerotic love as the basis for a utopic, egalitarian community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 24 As Grossman has pointed out, the leftist language of community, 
brotherhood, and “comradeship” that Matthiessen opposed to Ahabian individualism 
reiterates the language of “mutual sympathy” and “fellow feeling” that Matthiessen 
and his partner Russell Cheney use in personal letters to describe their homosexual 
relationship.  Matthiessen’s articulations of his leftist politics, in other words, were 
infused with the language of same-sex love (Grossman 52).  For discussions of 
Matthiessen’s connections with the left and the Popular Front, see Michael Denning, 
The Cultural Front, and Jonathan Arac, Critical Genealogies. 
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based on what Grossman eloquently calls “desire and the erotics of democratic 
affiliation”(53).  
 As Grossman observes, however, “American Renaissance is everywhere 
(de)formed by [. . .] uneasy contradictions,” one of which is its treatment of erotic 
love between men (48).  In some moments (such as his discussion of Queequeg and 
Ishmael), Matthiessen appears to treat such love as the basis for “democratic 
affiliation,” and in others, writes Grossman, he “seems to ventriloquize and circulate 
the broader culture’s phobic views of homosexuality” (AR refers to homosexuality as 
a “usual” stage of “boyhood,” but as “pathological” in adults) (Grossman 48, 53). 
Fuller perceptively suggests that Matthiessen’s larger project of cultivating national 
unity through the study of American literature led him to obfuscate both his sexuality 
and his more radical leftist commitments in order to “harmonize with rather than to 
challenge the nation’s dominant ideals” (Fuller 378).  This conflict between what we 
might call Matthiessen’s “homosocialist” ideals and his goals as a literary intellectual 
makes for what Fuller calls “the tragic role of the American Scholar”— a role 
Matthiessen most explicitly outlines (and occupies) in his reading of Billy Budd. 
 Matthiessen’s affirmations of “love,” “mutual sympathy,” and “the heart” in 
his concluding paragraphs about Billy Budd are so ebullient that one almost forgets 
that Vere does in fact go through with Billy’s execution.  Just a few paragraphs earlier, 
Matthiessen suggests that “the heart” is precisely what must be suppressed to execute 
Billy. He quotes Vere’s repudiation of the lower officers’ argument that Billy should 
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be spared: “the heart is the feminine in man, and hard through it be, she must be 
ruled out’” (509). If the heart is indeed “ruled out,” as Billy’s execution demands, how 
can we read the novella as Melville’s “Reassertion of the Heart,” as Matthiessen calls 
it in his chapter title? 
 It is only possible because of what Matthiessen calls Billy’s “holy act of 
forgiveness”—an act that “redeems” Vere and allows him, while on his deathbed, “to 
murmur the words, ‘Billy Budd,’ but not in ‘accents of remorse’” (512).  Billy’s act of 
forgiveness and Vere’s ostensible redemption allow Matthiessen to read Billy Budd as 
reconciling the “just mind” with “the fervid heart” (511). These two seemingly 
antagonistic key terms of Matthiessen’s analysis fuse in his final statement on Vere: 
“Without minimizing the justice of Vere’s stern mind, Melville could feel that the 
deepest need for a rapaciously individualistic America was a radical affirmation of the 
heart” (513). This destructive American individualism “lacks juices,” Matthiessen 
writes in his concluding sentences about Billy Budd, and “those juices could spring 
only from the ‘depth of tenderness,’ the ‘boundless sympathy’ [. . .] which Melville—
for the phrases are his—had found” in Billy and Vere’s relationship (514).   
 Matthiessen’s oddly embodied image of “juices” is his only suggestion of an 
erotic connection between Vere and Billy, but these “juices” that spring from mutual 
“tenderness” and “sympathy” appear to efface and replace those that might have 
flowed between living bodies. As Grossman insightfully points out, Matthiessen’s 
vaguely homoerotic reading of Moby-Dick also conspicuously effaces the material, 
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bodily juices—the tub of sperm—in which Ishmael and the crew squeeze hands and 
wash away their oath to Ahab (“Autobiography” 56). Despite this absence, 
Matthiessen’s reading of Moby-Dick at least dimly suggests the democratic possibilities 
of “the very milk of human kindness,” as Melville describes the tub of sperm (Moby-
Dick 416). But his reading of Vere and Billy’s so-called “affirmation of the heart” 
gravely compromises whatever political hope Matthiessen might have invested in 
Ishmael and Queequeg. For despite Matthiessen’s language of “love” and “heart,” 
this “affirmation” and its disembodied “juices” ultimately occur between an innocent 
“Handsome Sailor” and his disciplined executioner.  In his reading of Billy Budd, 
Matthiessen thus seems to sacrifice his more radical democratic ideals in order to 
valorize Vere’s—and by implication, Melville’s—acceptance of the harsh discipline of 
the man-of-war world.   
 Matthiessen was the first to suggest this tension between Vere’s homoerotic 
affection for Billy and the triumph of his virtuously disciplined intellect, and this 
tension is central to Arvin and Chase. Indeed, their readings of Billy Budd would 
unambiguously explicate the issues of same-sex desire, affective anguish, and punitive 
violence that Matthiessen’s analysis at once raises and obscures. 
 
“Baby Budd” 
 Before Arvin and Chase produced their overtly sexual readings of Melville’s 
work, F. Barron Freeman edited and published an edition of Billy Budd that at once 
 64	  
called attention to the pervasive homoerotic themes of the novella and corroborated 
the idea of Vere as an exemplar of intellectual virtue and disciplined desire. Freeman’s 
edition of Billy Budd was not published until 1948, but he had been working on the 
project as a dissertation at Harvard, where he studied with Matthiessen, since the late 
thirties (Hayford and Sealts 16).25 Freeman’s chief contribution to Billy Budd’s textual 
history is his “discovery” of “a twelve-thousand-word short story buried in the thirty-
six-thousand word novel” (vi). According to Freeman, Melville significantly and 
clumsily “expanded” Billy Budd in the years “just before his death,” and Freeman 
presents a text he calls “Baby Budd, Sailor” as the “original” (Freeman vi, 4, 67). This 
heavily redacted version of the story does not include the many passages of Billy Budd 
that call into question Vere’s virtue and the justness of Billy execution. The surgeon’s 
doubts about Vere’s sanity, the crew’s extolling of Billy after his death, and the 
narrator’s comparisons between Vere and Claggart are all absent in “Baby Budd.”  
Freeman’s edition also includes a full version of Billy Budd (similar to those published 
by Weaver in 1924 and 1928), but his book-length introduction to the text 
unambiguously advocates for “Baby Budd” as the authoritative version—a 
restoration of Melville’s original “artistic aim” (67). Ignoring the passages excluded 
from “Baby Budd,” Freeman’s introduction presents Vere as a representative of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 25 As we learn in a footnote (page 500, n. 1), Matthiessen had relied on 
Freeman’s then-unpublished editorial work in American Renaissance. 
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conscientious and measured mind: a “dignified and calm” “understanding arbiter,” 
who “loves books and all things intellectual” and “realistically studies the relation of 
man and his fellow man” (73, 94, 97). Matthiessen, Chase, and Arvin all resonate with 
Freeman as they present Vere as an exemplary intellectual who performs the 
discipline of professional conduct while remaining mindful of love and affection. 
 But the most important feature of Freeman’s “unexpanded” short story is 
certainly its complete omission of Billy Budd’s most sexually suggestive language.  
Gone is Claggart’s “touch of soft yearning, as if [he] could even have loved Billy but 
for fate and ban,” as is Vere’s desire to look upon Billy and his description of him as 
“a fine specimen of the genus homo, who in the nude might have posed for a statue of 
young Adam before the fall.” Freeman never acknowledges that Billy Budd’s most 
homoerotic passages are missing from “Baby Budd,” but their absence implies that 
he regarded them as late “expansions” and thus unimportant to Melville’s original 
“artistic aim.” It is worth noting here that later editors Harrison Hayford and Merton 
M. Sealts Jr. found Freeman’s editorial logic completely specious: “At no state of the 
composition of Billy Budd did Melville have a version constituting, corresponding to, 
or even approximating the text Freeman mistakenly presented” (17).  Bound by no 
discernible features of the manuscripts, Freeman’s decisions about which passages to 
elide powerfully demonstrate Billy Budd’s profound entanglement with the issue of 
homosexual repression in postwar American literary studies. 
 66	  
 Given the strong-handed coercion of the archive by which Freeman excises 
homosexuality from the text of Billy Budd, it seems surprising at first that his 
introduction includes a forthright and lengthy discussion of “the homosexual 
implications in Claggart’s relation to Billy” (83). Freeman argues that in the final edits 
to the manuscript, Melville adds hints of homosexuality to characterize Claggart, the 
Master-at-Arms whom Billy kills, as an “innately diabolic man with a twisted heart.”  
Claggart’s “natural depravity,” Freeman claims, derives from his “perverted desire for 
the boy whose downfall he plotted” (Freeman 96-97). This diagnosis of Claggart as a 
pathological homosexual closely resembles how other postwar critics portray him, 
and it reinforces a distinction between the “warped mind of Claggart” and the “just 
mind” of Vere, to quote Matthiessen (507, 508). But Freeman ultimately only brings 
up the issue of homosexuality in order to dismiss it as a late preoccupation of an 
elderly Melville whose artistic prowess had waned—a preoccupation that the 
scholarly community should suppress.  Even though Arvin and Chase rely on 
Freeman’s edition, neither of them would accept his suggestion that homosexuality is 
unimportant to the “artistic aim” of Melville’s final work.  For they seem less invested 
in eliding the issue of homosexuality, as “Baby Budd” does, than in actively 
demonstrating its repression through readings of Vere’s relationship with Billy.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 26 The most enthusiastic response to “Baby Budd” came from Charles Olson, 
who just a year before its publication had put out his own highly masculinist reading 
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Arvin, Chase, and the “anguish” of “manly excellence” 
 In their 1949 and 1950 trade press biographies of Melville, Chase and Arvin 
both tell a conflicted story of Melville’s gradual sexual and emotional disciplining—a 
story in which Melville’s later writing figures prominently, especially Billy Budd. They 
knew each other well and exchanged several letters about Melville, and their Melville 
books have many resemblances.27 Most importantly, these books were the first to 
argue that homosexuality is a constitutive problematic for Melville’s biography and 
his writing. Both also in many ways affirm the “Testament of Acceptance” consensus 
on Melville’s later years. Billy Budd, as Arvin puts it, is  “the work of a man who wishes 
to take his departure with a word of acceptance and reconciliation on his lips” (Arvin, 
Melville 292). But Arvin and Chase also color this sanguine reading with darker hues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Moby-Dick titled Call Me Ishmael (1947)—a book that, as Henry Abelove put it, 
argued that Melville’s best work has “nothing to do with homosexuality” (64). Call Me 
Ishmael dismissed Melville’s later work for its effeminacy and lack of “strength, ” but 
in a glowing review of Freeman’s book, Olson praises Freeman’s edition for allowing 
him to enjoy Melville’s last story more than ever before: “the very passages which 
have kept me from a toleration of the ‘novel,’” he explains, “are what Freeman lists as 
the ‘insertions’ and ‘drastic expansions’ of the last two years” (“David” 112).   
 27 For more about Arvin and Chase’s relationship, see Castiglia’s “Cold War” 
(223, 230-231). 
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of unresolved suffering and violence. They argue that writing about Vere’s “strength 
and integrity,” to quote Chase, actually inspired Melville’s to “accept” sexual 
discipline. Even more overtly than Matthiessen, they both present this discipline as a 
virtuous model for intellectuals to imitate (Chase, Melville 295). But both also leave us 
a Melville (and a Vere) who dies a conflicted, anguished man—a man who wishes to 
accept the harsh laws of the world, but who continuously suffers under them.28  
 Their stories of Melville’s homosexuality both begin with the special affection 
Melville felt toward Hawthorne, which Arvin narrates in great, albeit mostly 
imagined, detail. Upon first meeting Hawthorne, Arvin wrote in his biography of 
Hawthorne, Melville felt as though he had met “the one human being to whom he 
could utter his deepest intentions and betray his secretest fears” (Hawthorne 168). 
Several biographers had noted Melville’s “deep intimacy” with Hawthorne—his 
feeling of having found “the affection of a sympathetic mind,” to quote Mumford 
(Melville 133-134). But Arvin was unique in his unqualified celebration of Melville’s 
erotic affection with Hawthorne. Arvin quotes Melville’s imagery of penetration in 
his emphatic review of Hawthorne’s Mosses from an Old Manse: “He expands and 
deepens down the more I contemplate him,” Melville writes of Hawthorne; “further 
and further, [he] shoots his strong New England roots into the hot soil of my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 28 Unless otherwise noted, all parenthetical citations in this section refer to 
Arvin’s Herman Melville (1950) or to Chase’s Herman Melville: A Critical Study (1949). 
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Southern Soul” (Melville, “Hawthorne” 1167). “It is an astonishingly sexual image,” 
Arvin writes, “but probably only such an image could adequately have expressed 
Melville’s feeling of receptiveness in the acceptance of impregnation by another 
mind” (Melville 138). 
 Arvin goes on to argue that this affection inspired Melville’s homoerotically 
charged masterpiece, Moby-Dick. He then elaborates an overtly sexualized reading of 
Ahab, Ishmael, and Queequeg—a reading that extends Matthiessen’s arguments, 
making explicit what American Renaissance had vaguely suggested. Ahab’s vicious 
individualism, Arvin argues, ultimately derives from his repressive response to “a 
profound sexual injury,” “an injury to the capacity for heterosexual love” 
(symbolized, Arvin thinks, by the loss of his leg to Moby Dick) (174). His 
impassioned hunt for the phallic white whale symbolizes his agonizing and 
destructive attempt to regain masculine potency—his “independent male principle,” 
or “basic maleness,” in Arvin’s terms (172). As Arvin narrates Ahab’s violent efforts 
to attain a lost masculinity and his destruction of himself and everyone around him in 
his futile quest, Ahab comes to embody the perils of sexual repression. 
 As an alternative to Ahab’s self-denial and isolation, Arvin looks to what he 
calls “the creative dependency of fraternal emotion” in the erotic affection between 
Ishmael, Queequeg and the Pequod’s crew. Arvin’s Ishmael also “suffers” from an 
“injury” to his heterosexuality, but he responds by embracing rather than repressing 
it, and he “preserve[s] his capacity for selfless love even though it is directed toward [. 
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. .] his own sex” (174). Ishmael begins the story like the repressed Ahab: “solitary and 
embittered” (174). But he learns to “yield to the outgoing affectionateness” of 
Queequeg and the crew:  
It is love that Ishmael deeply feels toward Queequeg, and it is the 
imagination of an even more comprehensive love that comes to him as 
he sits before a tub of cooling spermaceti, squeezing its congregated 
globules back into fragrant fluid, and washing his hands and heart, as he 
does so, of ‘our horrible oath.’ (181, 174) 
Ishmael thus represents an “alternative to Ahab’s egotism”—an alternative that fuses 
homoeroticism with a politics of “love,” “affection,” and community (181).   
 Arvin’s boldly outspoken affirmations of same-sex sociality form the basis for 
Christopher Castiglia’s recent celebration of Arvin’s Melville biography as a 
“manifesto” for “queer socialism,” and clearly Arvin’s emphatic embrace of queer 
political sociality warrants such enthusiastic claims (“Arvin” 178). But Arvin’s 
personal and political celebrations of homosexual love coexist uneasily with other 
passages that diagnose “homosexuality as an injury or illness,” to quote Robert 
Martin (“Newton Arvin” 310). As the passages quoted above demonstrate, this 
language of “injury” made its way into even the most sexually progressive moments 
of the book. Arvin narrates a dark ending to the homoerotically inspiring intimacy 
that Melville felt for Hawthorne. Melville, he writes, felt “a sense of being somehow 
rejected” (206). According to Arvin, this sense of rejection left Melville with the 
 71	  
painful feeling that his affection for Hawthorne had been inappropriate and 
immature. Hawthorne’s coldness, Arvin writes, brought Melville “to a despairing 
acceptance,” as he began “to believe that his passionate need [was] a merely delusive 
one” (208, 256). 
 Arvin argues that it was not until he wrote Clarel—over twenty years after the 
height of his intimacy with Hawthorne—that Melville “came to accept the painful 
wisdom” of Hawthorne’s rebuke (256). Arvin’s point here is based in the episode 
between the poem’s eponymous narrator and Vine, an alluring but reticent character 
who, according to Arvin, “is Hawthorne.” In Arvin’s description, Clarel is a young 
American traveling in the Holy Land and “seeking some fulfillment of his emotional 
needs.” When he meets Vine, Clarel responds as Melville did to Hawthorne. He feels 
“a bond of quick sympathy,” which Arvin reads as “a memorial of Melville’s ancient 
need” (206). Like Hawthorne, Vine does not reciprocate Clarel’s affection. Vine’s 
“unspoken rebuke” to Clarel’s advances, Arvin writes, teaches Clarel that “there is 
something amiss about such intense emotions in a man who is already, as Clarel is, 
engaged to be married” (208). Chase concurs with Arvin about Vine’s lesson in 
masculine heterosexuality. “This rebuke,” Chase writes, is “part of Clarel’s education, 
and “leads him to ask himself how he could have found place in his heart” for such a 
“feminine, passionate desire” (247). 
 For Arvin and Chase both, Captain Vere embodies the virtuous but cruel 
discipline that Melville learns in his mature later years. Arvin notes that Vere feels “a 
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spontaneous affection” for Billy and that he is “drawn emotionally” to him, as 
Melville had been drawn to Hawthorne (296). Arvin also quotes a few passages that 
Freeman had removed to evidence Vere’s attraction to Billy: he notes that Vere is 
keen on Billy’s “physical beauty,” and he quotes Vere’s suggestive claim that “in the 
nude” Billy would resemble a “young Adam before the fall” (294). Arvin actually cites 
the narrative of “Baby Budd” growing into Billy Budd, but, contrary to Freeman, he 
praises the “expansions” as “enriching its inner interests” (292). For Arvin, these 
“inner interests” of the story are its explorations of the tension between deviant 
sexual desire and the obligations of intellectual life, rationality, and professional 
duty—a tension that Arvin traces throughout Melville’s life and work. Earlier in the 
biography, Arvin had argued that Melville had experienced a “revulsion” from “the 
culture of Europe and America,” due to this culture’s “literate rationalism 
outstripping and losing touch with its emotional and imaginative needs” (54). Arvin’s 
term “literate rationalism” evokes the life of the literary intellectual, and in this 
context it suggests that such a life was hostile to the sensuality and homoeroticism 
that Melville had experienced while at sea. This tension between intellectual life and 
homoerotic affection becomes paramount in Arvin’s reading of Billy Budd. 29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29 As Arvin wrote about Billy Budd during the late 1940s, this tension between 
the professional intellect and same-sex desire manifested itself in Arvin’s own life. 
Away from Smith College (where he taught) and the world of professional criticism, 
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Arvin seems to have enjoyed relatively open relationships with men, particularly 
around the elite Yaddo artist community where he served on the board of trustees 
and was a “director in residence” (Werth 92). Having taught for several years and 
already published acclaimed books about Hawthorne (1929) and Whitman (1937), 
Arvin seemed to hold a secure position in the academy.  But in 1949, it was revealed 
that Yaddo was under investigation by the FBI for housing Communists, and that 
undercover agents had already infiltrated the community (Werth 114). As Arvin’s 
biographer Barry Werth recounts, Arvin became deeply fearful of being exposed as a 
Communist sympathizer, and, much worse, a homosexual. “After a perilous brush 
with exposure and blame,” Werth writes, Arvin felt “that he had no choice but to go 
on living and working in shadow” (117). After the investigations began at Yaddo, 
Arvin distanced himself from his then lover, Truman Capote, and again submitted 
himself to psychiatric treatment for homosexuality (Werth 113-115). Arvin, as Martin 
writes, understood that “his job, his reputation, perhaps even his friendships 
depended upon the absence of any public recognition of his homosexuality” 
(“Newton Arvin” 313).  Arvin’s abiding efforts to conceal his homosexuality came to 
a nightmarish end in 1960, when “obscene” materials (muscle magazines, mostly) 
were found in his apartment and he was prosecuted in a high-profile trial for 
possession of pornography and “lewdness.” Two other Smith faculty members who 
exchanged the erotic materials with Arvin were also arrested, and Arvin testified 
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 When Arvin first introduces Vere, he appears to subscribe to Matthiessen’s 
argument that Vere effectively synthesizes the “heart” and the “just mind,” but this 
synthesis quickly frays. Initially Arvin presents Vere as a virtuous alternative to the 
malicious Claggart. Arvin notes that “intellectually, [Claggart] is a man of marked 
superiority,” but “neither goodness nor love,” Arvin writes, “can flourish in a nature 
‘dominated by intellectuality,’ as Claggart’s is” (298). Yet Vere, also “‘a man with a 
leaning toward everything intellectual’ and passion for books and learning,” appears 
to represent the possibility of bringing together the intellect and the heart: he is said 
to demonstrate that “love” is “not irrevocably at war with the life of the mind” (298). 
Vere, Arvin writes, “is an image of the high virtue in which the sternest sense of 
severe and painful duty is united to a capacity for the purest and tenderest love.” But 
in going through with Billy’s execution, Arvin writes, “Vere must suppress the heart 
within him”; for he “does not turn aside from his duty, anguishing though it is.” 
Shortly after the execution, Vere dies in “agony,” Arvin writes, “with Billy’s name on 
his lips” (296). Arvin’s repeated returns to Vere’s agony and anguish up until his 
death ultimately unravel the synthesis between love and intellect that Vere had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
against them both. All three lost their teaching positions. For detailed accounts of 
Arvin and the others’ trials and dismissal from Smith, see Robert K. Martin’s 
“Newton Arvin, Literary Critic and Lewd Person” and the last few chapters of Barry 
Werth’s excellent biography of Arvin, The Scarlet Professor. 
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appeared to embody. This synthesis promised “love” and “peace” to those who fulfill 
their “painful duty,” but Arvin’s dismal narrative of Vere’s suffering and death 
suggests that this promise is a cruel fantasy.  
 As it is for Arvin, homosexuality is central to Chase’s understanding of 
Melville’s life and writing. Chase too tells a story of Melville painfully learning to 
control his homoerotic urges. But even more than Arvin, Chase articulates a tortuous 
narrative of violent self-disciplining. Melville, according to Chase, struggles with 
homosexual desire throughout his adult life. Like Arvin, Chase several times refers to 
same-sex desire as a “malady,” “an abiding neurosis,” that must be conquered (293).  
As a married man trying to live in accord with his world, Chase’s Melville suffered 
great “sickness and confusion”: “[he] suffered bitterly from his inevitable sense of 
being celibate, the more so because he was apparently a man of powerful erotic 
urges.” Despite the power of these urges, Melville models how to repress them, for 
“Melville’s strain of homosexualism was entirely subdued” (295).30 But Chase does 
not shy away from the anguish and violence of the work of repression, as his reading 
of Billy Budd makes painfully clear. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 30 The word “homosexualism,” which Chase uses a number of times, presents 
same-sex desire as a dangerous ideology that threatens America—a threat comparable 
to the other subversive “isms” of his book (“Communism,” “liberal progressivism,” 
and “Stalinism”). 
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 The larger project of Chase’s book is to argue that Melville’s mature 
“acceptance” of “the man-of-war world,” as he puts it in his reading of Billy Budd, can 
form the foundation of the increasingly centrist, pro-American politics of the New 
York intellectuals at mid-century.31 In his first paragraph, Chase claims that the goal 
of his book is to articulate a “New Liberalism” that will “ransom liberalism from the 
ruinous sellouts, failures, and defeats of the thirties” (vii).  A generation younger than 
the leftists of the 1930s—like Matthiessen and Arvin—Chase began his career as a 
critic just as intellectuals in the U.S. were abandoning Communism. In 1943, he 
received his Ph.D. from Columbia, where he worked with one the most well-known 
representatives of leftist disenchantment, Lionel Trilling. Chase’s Melville biography 
was his first book with a major press, and in it he clearly sets out to repudiate the 
“liberal progressivism” of the thirties, which he characterizes as an impossibly 
idealistic moral perfectionism that sacrifices family and community for a false ideal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 31 Phillip Rahv documented this intellectual movement away from radicalism 
in a 1952 special issue of the Partisan Review. Speaking of the intellectual culture 
surrounding the journal, he wrote, “the mood has gradually shifted from opposition 
to acceptance. Intellectuals have become more open to the persuasions of actuality.” 
Partisan Review XIX (May-June 1952): 304. For a detailed historical account of this 
shift toward conservative “acceptance,” see Richard H. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a 
Conservative Age: The American Intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s. 
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an egalitarian society. Echoing Trilling, Chase argues that this “progressive” liberalism 
can lead to “Communist Totalitarianism,” and, intentionally or not, it ultimately 
bolsters Stalinism (vii). While the New Liberal accepts the unchangeable 
“imperfections of life,” the progressive liberal fights fiercely and futilely against them, 
violently fracturing civilization into chaos (viii). Appealing to a Hobbesian 
conservatism, Chase presents the progressive liberal as “lopping and cutting and 
severing the great body of the Leviathan until all life is hacked out” (302). New 
Liberalism, a counterintuitive synthesis of state loyalty and what Chase calls “heroic 
democracy,” exhorts us to accept “the American way of life”—to “love Leviathan,” 
and embrace heterosexual family life, devoted citizenship, and communal unity.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 32 Chase does not name any “liberal progressives” of the thirties, but his 
language clearly implicates Granville Hicks, Arvin’s earlier writing, and, most of all, 
Matthiessen—all of whom were directly involved with various dimensions of the 
American Communist Party throughout the thirties. Chase’s dismissal of 
Matthiessen’s leftist politics is most clear in his claim that liberal progressivism 
naively romanticizes a false ideal of “a well meaning ‘common man’ extending his 
hand in brotherhood.” In American Renaissance, Matthiessen had argued that “the 
literature for democracy” produced by America’s best writers was characterized by a 
concern to portray “the common man in his heroic stature” (xvi). For Chase, the 
“heroic common man” was a myth of Stalinist propaganda, and thus a threat to the 
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 Chase presents Melville’s writing as a sort of moral compass of masculine 
virtue that can guide young American men through a dangerous world. Melville is “a 
profound and prophetic critic of liberal progressivism,” argues Chase, and his body 
of work dramatizes the virtues of the New Liberal and the temptations that could 
beset him (xi). We learn that Melville’s work is characterized by a lost figure, an 
Ishmael, searching for the “American Man”—a masculine “heroic personality” to 
guide the young American through a world that threatens to “unman” him.  To 
provide such guidance, Melville presents a figure Chase calls “the True Prometheus”: 
a representative of “strength, wealth, authority, majesty, and intellect” (35, my 
emphasis). This image of virtue appears dimly in the narrator of “Bartleby” and in 
Bulkington, the heroic member of the Pequod’s crew, but it is most perfectly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
democratic state. In an immensely helpful article, Geraldine Murphy argues that the 
political differences between Matthiessen and Chase manifested themselves in their 
characterizations of Billy Budd: Matthiessen regarded him as a heroic, Christ-like 
common man, while Chase describes him as emasculated (“unmanned”) and 
childish—“a pathetic naïf and psychological misfit,” in Murphy’s paraphrase (362).  
Murphy perceptively claims that Chase’s work on Melville and New Liberalism 
betrays an “anti-Communist machismo” (375). I would merely add that Chase’s 
writing on homosexuality ought to be read as intensely interrelated with this New 
Liberal masculinity.  
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embodied by Captain Edward Fairfax Vere.  These characters, Chase argues, 
exemplify human grandeur, uphold “the standards of manly excellence,” and affirm 
loyalty to community and state. They are thus models for citizenship in what Chase 
calls “a heroic democracy in which man would be free, frank, and proud” (283).   
 Unlike Matthiessen and Arvin, about whose homosexuality much has been 
written, little is known about Chase’s sexual identity, other than that he was married. 
What is clear is that Chase seems painfully aware that the virtue of “manly 
excellence” exacts profound costs on its exemplars. It cannot be attained, Chase 
writes, “without great suffering and without overcoming the hazard of false seductive 
images which seek to unman him” (278). One “seductive image” Chase seems 
particularly concerned about is the “hermaphrodite youth,” who haunts Melville’s 
writings in the forms of Harry Bolton, the sailors around the tub of sperm, and Billy 
Budd.   
 Chase understands much of Melville’s fiction as dramatizing the painful work 
of repressing “the hermaphrodite youth.” His readings often emphasize men resisting 
this dangerous figure. Redburn is attracted to the effeminate and weak Harry Bolton, 
Ishmael shares a “blissful bed” with Queequeg, the Pequod’s crew squeeze “liquid 
sperm and accidently squeeze each others’ hands,” Clarel is attracted to Vine, Vere 
loves and desires Billy—these relationships, Chase says, all bear witness to Melville’s 
lifelong struggle with desire for men. But these characters’ tragic severances from 
each other teach an important lesson: such relationships are merely “fantasies of 
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attachment” that can exist only within “illusions of isolation” from the realities of the 
man-of-war world (288-89). Bolton, “the homosexual youth who was doomed,” is 
“crushed to death between a ship and a slain whale”; Ishmael and the crew are 
destroyed in the vortex of Ahab; Clarel is “rebuked” by Vine; and, in Melville’s “final 
statement” on the matter, Billy is executed by Vere, who comes to exemplify New 
Liberal masculine citizenship (9, 247, 268).  
 According to Chase, these stories of homoerotic love rejected and destroyed 
represent the fruits of Melville’s life of austere repression. Such stories, especially 
Vere’s, “enabled him to pass through” the depression of his “celibate” adulthood 
with his wife and family. “Captain Vere,” Chase writes, is “the image of strength and 
integrity which Melville kept before him in the years of sickness and confusion” 
(295). Like Melville, Vere has a “vein of fantasy,” a phrase which in Chase’s lexicon is 
clearly homoerotic. But Vere is also a “realist,” Chase says. Despite his “fantasies of 
attachment” with other men, Vere remains “a man committed to the ways of the 
world,” who “knew the social necessity of forms” (297-298). A man who loved and 
desired other men, but who understood his duty to his community and executed its 
laws—“such was this speaker of truth with whom Melville identified himself” (298). 
For Chase, Billy Budd becomes the story of a Handsome Sailor who is “rebuffed and 
sacrificed” by “a respectable man,” and as such, a guide to help Melville’s readers 
“pass through” the trials of repression. 
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 Chase more than once uses striking language of self-mutilation and tormented 
violence to describe the repression of the “hermaphrodite youth.” Here is Chase’s 
symbolic reading of Vere’s execution of Billy: “Vere, heroic as he is, must repeatedly 
return to his own childhood to feed on it and murder it. For him there is no other 
way of supporting, or nourishing, the structure of consciousness, order, authority, 
and legality which constitutes the man-of-war world.” This idea of repeatedly killing 
an immature, homoerotically-inclined part of the self to fortify state power recurs in a 
parallel passage about Melville himself (from which I draw my epigraph).   
Melville is overwhelmingly moved with pity for the passive, 
hermaphrodite youth, an image of himself, who must continuously be 
killed in the rite of sacrament if books are to be written, or the man-of-
war world sustained—or indeed, if life is to go on at all. (277) 
  These passages make it clear that Chase finds no “affirmation of the heart,” 
no redemption for Vere, and no late-found serenity in “acceptance” for Melville. 
Chase’s adverbs—repeatedly, continuously—suggest that the painful work of subduing 
“the hermaphrodite youth” is never complete. His language of “rite” and 
“sacrament” implies the necessity of ritually sacrificing this dangerous homoerotic 
figure. This passage’s conditional, “if books are to be written,” suggests that the 
hermaphrodite youth threatens even the work of intellectuals, who seem especially 
important to Chase’s militarized state. Melville’s composition of Billy Budd becomes a 
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model for what all writing should do: namely, to elaborate what Chase calls “the 
painful acts of will” mandated by “the man-of-war world.” (277).33   
  Like Matthiessen, Arvin and Chase both valorize Vere’s execution of the 
Handsome Sailor, producing what seems to be precisely the kind of writing that 
Chase’s man-of-war world demands. Despite important political differences between 
these critics, they each appear to affirm postwar fears of homosexuality. More than a 
few moments of their analyses identify same-sex desire as an “injury” to the self and 
as a threat to the state. And they both present Vere as a role model for the painful 
work of repression—a role model especially important for intellectuals like 
themselves. But against the grain of this surface, these critics—especially Chase—give 
voice to the anguish and violence that attend sexual repression, and the stubborn 
persistence of same-sex desire, such that it must be subdued continuously. Arvin and 
Chase did not critique heteronormativity, but their body of criticism antagonizes the 
postwar fantasy that same-sex desire can be successfully repressed and that its 
repression would promote a stable democratic nation of healthy citizens. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 33 Chase echoes this politically conservative reading of Billy Budd in his well-
known book, The American Novel and Its Tradition (1957), though here he does not 
mention “homosexualism” at all.  Billy Budd, he writes, “dramatizes the conservative 
idea that society must follow a middle way of expediency and compromise” (American 
Novel 114).  
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Bil ly  Budd  and “The Rights of Man” 
 Chase’s explication of Vere’s involvement in state violence and his intense 
emotional suffering resonates throughout Forester and Britten’s opera, which revises 
Billy Budd to amplify these very issues. The question of Vere’s relationship with 
democratic values represents a primary concern of Britten, Forster, and Eric Crozier’s 
1951 opera of Billy Budd, which repeatedly stresses the name of the merchant ship 
from which Billy was impressed into His Majesty’s service: The Rights-of-Man.34 
Surprisingly, Chase and the other critics had completely ignored this allusive name. 
Given their numerous affirmations of “literature for democracy,” one cannot help 
wondering: why did these democratically-minded critics never even mention 
Melville’s obvious reference to the central document of the French Revolution? Any 
answer to this question would be speculation, but the opera’s elaborate repurposing 
of the phrase “rights of man” is suggestive. For the opera implies that Billy’s 
symbolic relationship with “the rights of man” cannot be stressed without implicating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 34 Letters between Britten, Crozier, Forster and their correspondents show 
that the three of them worked together on establishing the basic sequence of the 
events in the opera. Forster, as “primary librettist,” wrote the lines as Crozier, in his 
own words, “provided technical fodder.” Britten set their work to music (Letters from a 
Life 496-98).     
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Vere in the suppression of the democratic values that Matthiessen, Chase, and Arvin 
all wish to affirm. 
 The importance of “the Rights of Man” to the opera’s plot marks a significant 
departure from the novella. In Melville, Vere’s officers show only the slightest 
concern about Billy shouting, “Goodbye, Rights-of-Man,” as he joins them on the 
Indomitable (140). The opera augments the significance of Billy’s farewell by repeatedly 
reminding the viewer that the British, loyal to their king, are at war with the 
revolutionary French. The officers express deep concern about “the young chap who 
shouted ‘rights o’ man’”—a “dangerous one,” they call him. “He needs to be 
watched. ‘Rights of Man’ indeed!” (17). And Claggart, when he accuses Billy of 
mutiny, claims that he has been “spreading the infamous creed of ‘the Rights of 
Man’” (Britten 53). Within the world of the opera, Billy (unbeknownst to him) comes 
to embody the “rights of man,” and his execution becomes an explicit quashing of 
this “infamous creed.” 
 For the concerned officers, especially Claggart, the subversive power of “the 
rights of man” largely derives from the homoerotic energy that they associate with 
Frenchness, Billy, and his effect on the other crew members. The officers’ warning to 
Vere of Billy’s danger emerges from their larger fear of French ideas undermining 
their authority on the Indomitable. “Don’t like the French,” they repeat in a patriotic 
conversation with Vere about the imminent threat of their enemy. “Their notions 
don’t suit us nor their ideas. Nor their hipity skipity ways.” These dangerously “hipity 
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skipity” ways stand in stark contrast with their own nation’s masculine alternative: 
“British brawn and beef”(Britten 26). This demeaning emasculation of Frenchness, 
which the librettist put in the mouths of Vere’s officers, resonates with Martin’s 
comment on Arvin’s use of French in a journal about his lovers: “French was in the 
1950s a kind of gay language [. . .] that of Marcel Proust, André Gide, and Jean 
Cocteau” (298, “Arvin”). 
 The threat that Billy and the rights of man pose to the masculine power 
structure of the Indomitable is elaborated at length by Claggart. The brooding master-
at-arms appears to realize Billy’s danger as he becomes aware of his own attraction to 
Billy. Claggart witnesses Billy successfully defend himself against another sailor’s 
assault, and after he breaks up the fight, Claggart compliments Billy with a phrase 
lifted directly from Melville: “Handsomely done, my lad, and handsome is as 
handsome did it too.” In the novella, Claggart uses this phrase ironically to mock 
Billy for spilling his soup, but in the opera Claggart seems earnestly impressed by 
Billy’s performance as a pugilist. He follows Billy back to his hammock after the 
fight, repeating the phrase, “Handsomely done, my lad, handsome indeed,” and he 
eventually repeats it slowly and softly into Billy’s ear as he lingers just over his 
shoulder (Britten 32-33). As Claggart returns to the deck, he commits himself to 
Billy’s destruction in a tortured aria: 
beauty, handsomeness, goodness, would that I never encountered you!  
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[. . .]Having seen you what choice remains to me? None! None! I’m 
doomed to annihilate you. I’m vowed to your destruction [. . .] I, John 
Claggart, Master-at-Arms of the Indomitable, have you in my power and I 
will destroy you. (Britten 33-34) 
The aria makes explicit what Melville had only intimated: Claggart is painfully 
conscious of his sexual desire for Billy, and he understands that this desire subverts 
the order of the man-of-war. In the final line of the aria (quoted above), Claggart 
invokes his position as master-at-arms, the officer responsible for maintaining order 
and preventing mutiny, to fortify his commitment to Billy’s destruction. Having 
understood that Billy and the “rights of man” he comes to represent are absolutely 
irreconcilable with the masculine order of the man-of-war, Claggart realizes, you 
might say, that the hermaphrodite youth must be killed.35 
 The erotic character of Billy’s threat to the Indomitable lies just beneath the 
surface of Claggart’s warning to Vere about the “the Handsome Sailor” who is 
mutinously “spreading the infamous creed of the rights of man.” As he does in the 
novella, Vere immediately rebukes Claggart’s accusations. Yet Claggart persists: “He 
is deep,” he warns, “you do but note his outwards, the flower of masculine beauty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35 It is worth nothing that Claggart’s aria, which contains the most palpably 
homoerotic lines of the opera, was deleted from a broadcast of Billy Budd on 
American television in 1952 (Reed, “Billy Budd on television” 152).   
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and strength. [. . .] A mantrap lurks under those ruddy-tipped daisies” (Britten 50). 
When prefaced by an expression of Billy’s “beauty and strength,” Claggart’s use of 
“mantrap,” usually applied to a woman who ensnares men, suggests that it is precisely 
Billy’s appeal to Vere and the other sailors that makes him so dangerous. As the 
mutinous instigator of both homoerotic affection and the rights of man, Billy must 
hang.  
 Claggart’s accusations outrage Vere: “John Claggart! Beware! I am not so 
easily deceived,” he sings in a triumphant major key (Britten 52). But after Billy 
strikes Claggart dead, Vere, as one Britten critic put it, grows “every bit as destructive 
as his less ambiguously gay (and evil) master-at-arms” (Brett 113). The librettists 
make this point explicit as Vere, just after Billy lays his deadly blow, sings the very 
words of Claggart’s foreboding aria: “Beauty, handsomeness, goodness, coming to 
trial” (Britten 54). During the trial, Vere remains silent with his head bowed as the 
officers decide to execute Billy without much ado—unlike in the novella, in which 
Vere pushes the officers toward executing Billy—a revision that emphasizes Vere’s 
moral weakness and his inability to act on his convictions. Vere reluctantly “accepts 
their verdict,” and again repeats the refrain of Claggart’s vow to kill Billy: “Beauty, 
handsomeness, goodness, it is for me to destroy you” (Britten 59). The opera thus 
stresses that Vere, despite his initial repudiation of Claggart, ultimately carries out the 
master-at-arms’ vow to suppress the rights of man. 
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 The theme of the repressed, suffering homosexual male, unable to act on his 
convictions and desires, was an abiding concern for Britten, as his operas of Peter 
Grimes (1945) and Death in Venice (1973) testify.36 Britten was himself a homosexual in 
a long-term but closeted relationship with tenor Peter Pears, who played Vere in Billy 
Budd’s debut. According to Brett, Britten’s concern with this theme was largely 
inspired by W.H. Auden, who was a close friend to Britten in the 1930s. Firmly 
convinced “of the evil effects of repression and self-control,” Auden, Brett shows, 
encouraged a young, prudish Britten to embrace his sexuality (Brett 193). “To my 
friend, Benjamin Britten, composer,” Auden writes in Letters from Iceland (1937), “I 
beg / That fortune send him soon a passionate affair” (quoted in Brett 193). Even 
though they were out of touch as Britten wrote Billy Budd, Auden’s progressive 
sexuality, according to Brett, inspired Britten’s interest in writing about the “evil” and 
suffering in the lives of repressed homosexuals like Claggart and Vere.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 36 For instructive analyses of Britten’s exploration of homosexual repression in 
his operas, see Brett’s essays, “Sex, Politics, and Violence in the Librettos of Peter 
Grimes,” “Britten’s Dreams,” and “Pacifism, Political Action, and Artistic Endeavor” 
in Music and Sexuality in Britten. 
 37 Auden briefly mentioned homosexuality in Billy Budd in his book The 
Enchafèd Flood: the Romantic Iconography of the Sea (1950). I do not write about this book 
here because Auden’s comments on Billy Budd are unfortunately brief and his 
 89	  
 A more immediate influence on the opera’s exploration of repression was the 
sexually-inflected, democratic politics of Forster, whose essay “What I believe” 
(1939) discusses the same tensions between human connection and state loyalty 
addressed in Billy Budd. Here Forster articulates his tentative commitment to 
democracy (“Two cheers [for democracy] are quite enough: there is no occasion to 
give three”) along with his more robust belief in “personal relationships” (70, 67).  
According to the essay’s impressionistic logic, Vere is faced with a democratic 
dilemma: betray his personal connection and conviction, or betray his duty to His 
Majesty and the man-of-war world. Forster believes that the affirmation of such 
“personal relationships” among “the sensitive, the considerate, and the plucky” 
represents “the one permanent victory of our queer race over cruelty and chaos” (73).  
Though he doesn’t mention sexuality explicitly, he does say that the personal 
relationships he believes in demand that people not “thwart their bodies, since bodies 
are the instruments through which we register and enjoy the world” (74). Forster had 
wanted to write about homoerotic relationships more explicitly: when he began 
working on the opera in the 1940s, he had not written fiction since 1924, due to his 
“weariness of the only subject I both can and may treat—the love of men for women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mentioning of homosexuality is confined to a short footnote about Claggart (see page 
146).    
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and vice-versa” (quoted in Oliver, Britten 140).38 Billy Budd offered Forster a 
homoerotic context in which he could explore the emotional and political 
repercussions of betraying the “personal relationships” that he so deeply valued. 
 In a BBC interview, Forster, Britten, and Crozier all express dissatisfaction 
with the pervasive approval of Vere’s actions among Melville critics. They do not 
name the critics with whom they disagree, but they do quote Raymond Weaver to 
sum up the “testament of acceptance” school, which, Crozier says, holds that 
“Melville set out to justify the ways of God to man” (“Discussion” 205).  
Summarizing their discontent with this reading, Forster says that any account of Billy 
Budd that “justifies” Vere’s actions is “much too smug an account of it” 
(“Discussion” 205). Their own position on the novella, Crozier says, resembles that 
of William Plomer (poet, novelist, librettist, and close friend of Britten’s), who in 
1946 had published an edition of Billy Budd in England.39 Crozier quotes Plomer’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 38 By this time Forster had, in fact, already written explicitly about 
homosexuality his novel Maurice (written between 1913 and 1914; published in 
1971)—a text that he would not allow to appear in print until after his death. 
 39 Plomer’s edition did not make significant changes to Weaver’s 1924 and 
1928 versions, but it is important to Billy Budd’s textual history because it was the first 
publication of the text as a separate volume. Britten and the librettist relied on it as 
they worked on the opera, and they even invited Plomer to help them with the 
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claim that that Billy Budd “was Melville’s final protest against the nature of things” 
(Plomer 8; quoted in “Discussion” 205). None of them explains precisely what this 
“protest” reading means. But the BBC interview does register their opposition to the 
overwhelming critical praise for Vere, and it reveals that they understood their opera 
as working against the “testament of acceptance” consensus. 
 Despite their discontent with the critics who “justify” Vere’s actions against 
Billy, Britten, Forster, and Crozier are not wholly unsympathetic to Vere as a 
character, and they seem to share Matthiessen, Chase, and Arvin’s interest in him as a 
conflicted intellectual. In the BBC interview Britten says that “it was the quality of 
conflict in Vere’s mind [. . .] which attracted me” to Billy Budd (“Discussion” 207).  
Stressing this intellectual conflict was apparently one of the major goals of the opera: 
“we surely humanized him,” Crozier says of Vere, “and made him much more aware 
of the human values that were involved” (“Discussion” 206). They wanted their story 
to pivot on a thoughtful man “who finally had to stick by his code but [. . .] feels that 
in the final resort he must have been wrong to do so” (“Discussion” 207). Vere’s 
conflicted mind drew Forster, Britten, and Crozier to Melville’s story, and their 
revisions to it were meant to call attention to his mental turmoil and exacerbate his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
libretto. Crozier writes that when he first joined Forster and Britten to work on the 
opera, “they handed me a small black-jacketed volume—Plomer’s 1946 edition of 
Billy Budd—and left me alone with it” (quoted in Reed 47).  
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consciousness of guilt. Martin, the only Melvillean who has written seriously about 
the opera, aptly suggests that Britten and the librettists want to portray Vere as a 
“tormented intellectual” (“Saving Vere” 55). 
 The most significant revision the opera makes is the addition of a prologue 
and epilogue in which an elderly Vere reflects on Billy’s story; in the novella, Vere 
dies shortly after Billy’s execution. This revision more than any other intensifies what 
we might call Vere’s Forsterian dilemma. As Brett writes, “The Prelude-Epilogue 
frame [. . .] places the dramatic emphasis firmly on his moral choice and predicament, 
which is precisely that of choosing between loyalty to a fellow man and the authority 
of the state” (180).  
  The frame provides the “final resort” in which the tormented intellectual 
appears manifestly conscious of his wrongdoing. In the prologue he repeats, “What 
have I done? What have I done?” over a distressing accompaniment of strained, high-
pitched strings and militaristic drums and trumpets (Britten 7). Vere asks, “Who has 
blessed me? Who has saved me?” and the story of the Handsome Sailor begins as a 
flashback (Britten 7). His words suggest that he looks back to Billy for consolation, 
but his tense voice and the dissonant orchestral background give the impression of a 
deeply disturbed man fingering an old wound. 
 In the epilogue, Vere declares his salvation and peace of mind as he thinks of 
Billy. “He has blessed me and saved me. [. . .] I am an old man now and my mind can 
go back in peace” (Britten 64). Martin takes this proclamation at face value and 
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argues that the opera’s extension of Vere’s life into “a dignified old age” provides him 
with an “assurance of eternal peace and content” (“Saving” 51). Martin goes on to 
denounce the opera, arguing that it manipulates Billy Budd into an apology for Vere’s 
repression.  “By allowing Vere to live,” Martin writes, “the librettist inevitably made 
Vere a hero” (“Saving” 51). But his analysis of this revision ignores the tone of Vere’s 
voice and the accompanying music, elements of the opera that lead Britten scholars 
to doubt Vere’s words of self-assurance.   
 Brett notes that Claggart’s martial musical motif accompanies Vere in the 
epilogue, and that his “confidence in his salvation is undermined by the throbbing 
pulse of the militaristic music” (113). Arnold Whitall argues that the music over 
which Vere assures himself restores the “dissonance that set the entire opera in 
motion” and renders his claims of peace “distinctly hollow” (167). The recurrence of 
the prologue’s strain and dissonance, writes Whitall, “reinforce[s] the impression of 
Vere [. . .] as unable to die and forced to relive the experiences he recounts in a 
hellish kind of endless present” (168). In other words, the parallels between the 
prologue and epilogue suggest that Vere is locked into a cycle of grasping at salvation 
and sinking back into despair. As he returns again and again to Billy’s execution, the 
opera’s Vere vividly animates the agony of Chase’s sense that the Handsome Sailor 
must be killed continuously. 
 Many of the opera’s first reviewers shared these contemporary critics’ sense 
that Britten and the librettists portrayed Vere as less than honorable and virtuous.  
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Some of the reviewers even seemed to notice the disparity between the opera and the 
critics’ versions of Vere. As though expecting Vere to be better than he acts in the 
opera, one reviewer writes, “We find it hard to recognize in Vere the idolized leader, 
the man of action” (quoted in Letters from a Life 687). In the same spirit, another 
review says that “the much hero-worshiped and nice-minded arbiter” turns out to 
appear “rather as a sanctimonious, not to say priggish, character” (quoted in Letters 
from a Life 693). This last review may refer to Freeman’s description of Vere as an 
“understanding arbiter,” and it seems to allude to the all-but-ubiquitous academic 
lionization of Vere in the 1940s and early 50s. According to these reviewers, the 
opera replaced this fair-minded, heroic Vere with a morally weak and self-righteous 
man.  
 The opera’s critical interrogation of Vere in many ways laid the foundation for 
the seminal anti-homophobic Billy Budd readings of the mid to late 1980’s. Accenting 
Vere’s suppression of the eroticized “rights of man,” the opera heightens what Eve 
Sedgwick calls the “double entendre in this book [Melville’s Billy Budd] between the 
mutiny question and the homosexuality question” (Sedgwick 103). Britten and 
Forster’s rendering of Vere also anticipates Martin’s claim that Billy Budd 
demonstrates “that the state, in its benign form of justice (Vere) or its malign form of 
police power (Claggart), could only perceive [same-sex] love as a threatening force” 
that must be repressed (Hero 124). Sedgwick and Martin both present Vere as a 
fundamentally vicious representative of state repression, and the opera’s placement of 
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Claggart’s words in Vere’s mouth effects an analogous rendering of Vere as an 
instrument of suppression and violence.   
 Yet Britten, Forster, and Crozier—like Matthiessen, Arvin, and Chase—were 
ultimately more sympathetic to Vere than these more recent critics. They seem 
invested less in denouncing Vere than in exploring the weakness of his conviction, 
his enduring self-torment, and the possibility that he could and should have done 
otherwise. The issues stressed by the opera—love and desire between men, 
homosexual repression, state loyalty, and the possibility of Vere’s redemption after 
Billy’s execution—reveal its deep sympathy with the concerns of the postwar 
Americanists. Indeed, the opera retrofits Billy Budd to address these critics’ interests 
even more directly than Melville’s story. But as it does so, the opera also exacerbates 
Vere’s unending personal agony and explores the anti-democratic repercussions of his 
actions, and it suggests that these troubling consequences are also in store for those 
who valorize him.  
--- 
 In the postwar moment, Vere thus came to represent a way of living in accord 
with a masculinist, homophobic society, and, at the same time, the tortuous self-
disciplining and the punitive violence that accompany that very way of living. From 
inside the burgeoning discipline of American literary criticism—an institution which, 
as Arvin’s career shows, was unambiguously hostile to open homosexuals as late as 
1960—Billy Budd effected uniquely explicit reflections on the academic critic’s 
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subjection to a powerful institutional entanglement of professional and sexual 
discipline. Matthiessen, Chase, and Arvin’s readings of Billy Budd reveal that these 
critics were not only subject to such disciplinarity (as Grossman, Fuller, Martin, and 
others have shown), but that they were, much like Vere, reflective about their 
complicity in it and conscientious of their complicity’s costs. Britten and Forster were 
inspired by the intimate questions that critics brought to Vere’s story but troubled by 
their conclusions. Perhaps due to their distance from professional academic criticism, 
Britten, Forster, and Crozier more fully explore the continuous personal torment and 
anti-democratic ramifications of Vere’s execution of Billy.    
 To conclude, I want to return to one the central arguments of this 
dissertation: that attending to the postwar reception of Melville unsettles what 
Jennifer Fleissner has called “a certain narrative of progress conjoining ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
American Literary Studies” (“After” 186). Part of what this “self-congratulatory 
narrative” has produced is an account of postwar Americanists as wholly committed 
to furthering the purposes of the Cold-War state and as perpetuating the hegemony 
of heteronormative masculinism (Fleissner, “After” 174). Yet I have shown that 
during this moment, Billy Budd elicited a remarkably explicit conversation about the 
emotional torment of such masculinism and about the state violence mandated by 
heteronormative professional and legal protocols. In this sense, the work of the 
postwar Americanists I’ve discussed anticipates the concerns of Queer Theory. 
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 But Matthiessen, Arvin and Chase certainly did not articulate an anti-
homophobic project like Sedgwick’s, as their valorizing Vere’s repression makes clear. 
Forster and Britten’s opera was similarly non-combative: rather than denouncing 
Vere’s actions, it dramatized his suffering and implied the anti-democratic 
repercussions of Billy’s execution through narrative and musical accompaniment. 
These complex renderings of Billy Budd represent a mode of ideological engagement 
other than critique—a mode that explores the ramifications of the sexually repressive 
state without condemning it. We cannot overlook the fact that Matthiessen, Arvin, 
and Chase praised personal and political repression by embracing Vere, and I think 
Castiglia and Fleissner’s avoidance of their tortured readings of Billy Budd is a 
weakness of their “reparative” approach to critical history. Rather than celebrating or 
condemning the postwar Americanists, I want to suggest that we follow Britten and 
Forster in recognizing that the questions about sexuality, disciplinarity, and violence 
that critics like Chase brought to Billy Budd made this text available for the more 
overtly anti-homophobic work of the opera, and for critics like Martin and Sedgwick. 
The postwar renderings of Billy Budd that I’ve discussed certainly bear witness to our 
field’s history of homophobic masculinism. But they also elucidate that masculinism’s 
affective damage to those who uphold it, and they expose the violent reciprocity of 
repressing homosexuality and repressing “the rights of man.” 
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Chapter 3 
C.L.R. James’s “active, integrated humanism”:  
Moby-Dick  and mid-century intellectual life 
 
The divorce between criticism and life haunted me. Over the years I have bridged the gap. Melville 
and my audience did that for me. 
- James to Jay Leyda, 1953 
 In 1938, Cyril Lionel Robert James came to the U.S. at the behest of Leon 
Trotsky with the mission of stirring the revolutionary potential of working class 
immigrants and African Americans. Before coming to the U.S., James had moved to 
London from Trinidad (where he was born and raised) in 1932 to become a novelist, 
but soon got involved with the British Trotskyists and began writing books about 
third-world liberation and revolution, the most famous of which was his account of 
the Haitian Revolution, The Black Jacobins (1938). In the U.S., James organized and 
reorganized a number of socialist activist groups and published several criticisms of 
both Stalin and Trotsky’s versions of Marxism. He also toured the U.S. to foment and 
organize the anti-capitalist sentiments of autoworkers and sharecroppers and to 
lecture to these oppressed groups about Marx, Hegel, Whitman, and Melville.40 After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 40 For more on James’s activist work during the 1940s and 50s, see 
Christopher Taylor’s excellent article, “C.L.R. James and Southern Agrarian 
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almost fifteen years of this work, James, not surprisingly, was arrested in 1952, at the 
height of the Red Scare. He was imprisoned on Ellis Island—that symbolic icon of 
welcome to immigrants that during the Cold War had been converted into a 
detention center— and deported back to England less than year later. While on Ellis 
Island, James did not spend his remaining time in the U.S. trying to commutate with 
the oppressed workers with whom he had worked, as one might expect, but 
scrambling to write a book about Melville, which he titled Mariners, Renegades and 
Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In (1953). When he 
finished the book, he got a loan to self-publish it and mailed copies to every member 
of the U.S. Congress as well as several prominent literary critics.  
  James’s perhaps surprising turn to Melville and Melville studies during his last 
months in the U.S. poses a difficult, but perhaps illuminating question: why would a 
radical Marxist activist spend his final months in the U.S. explicating a difficult novel 
and exchanging letters about it with academics? I say this question is difficult because 
it points to a theoretical conundrum at the heart of our field’s history—namely, the 
relationship of the aesthetic, the imaginative, and the literary to the political, the 
economic, and the social. I say it is perhaps illuminating because James seeks to 
theorize and articulate a synthesis of these two often-opposed forces without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Movements,” Paul Buhle’s biography of James (chapter 3, “American Bolshevik”), 
and Anthony Bogues’s Caliban’s Freedom (chapter 4, “The American Years”). 
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reducing one to the other. For the answer to this question lies in James’s strikingly 
optimistic, perhaps even quixotic, faith in the immense political power of what he 
called “a great work of imagination.” 
 James’s profound faith in the power of the literary manifests itself in the 
conclusion to Mariners, Renegades, and Castaways, where James makes clear that the 
Melville book is part of his (failed) campaign for U.S. citizenship. James appears to 
have believed that he could use Moby-Dick to persuade cultural and state authorities 
that to deport him would be an anti-democratic act of injustice. He also seems to 
have believed that his knowledge of Melville would prove his loyalty to American 
values and demonstrate that his “desire to be a citizen is not a selfish nor a frivolous 
one,” as a quotation featured on the first edition’s back cover bluntly put it (Mariners 
166).  
 But there is more to the story than James’s strategic bid for U.S. citizenship. 
Indeed, James believed that literature and especially the institution of literary 
interpretation have a primary role to play in the empowerment of the oppressed. 
  My title alludes to James’s name for his synthesis of the literary and political: 
“an active, integrated humanism” (American 276). James’s humanism does not appeal 
to a universal community of “the human”; it involves no sense that every individual 
possesses a timeless “human nature,” nor does it try to bring all peoples under the 
banner of the great family of “humanity.” The letter from which I draw my epigraph 
vividly illustrates James’s unique brand of “humanism.” Leyda, compiler of the widely 
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cited Melville Log and recipient of an unsolicited copy of Mariners, wrote back to James 
to criticize Mariners, claiming that Melville “was interested mainly in the human 
condition and not in political prophesy or economic relations” (“Letters” 234). 
James’s response is that any one who would divorce “the human condition” from the 
political and the economic “shows merely that they have a very superficial conception 
of politics and economics” (“Letters” 234). James does not mean that “the human 
condition” can be reduced to politics and economics. What he means is that a richer, 
truer conception of politics and economics involves thinking about emotion, personal 
relationships, imagination, and, therefore, “great works of imagination” (Mariners 
115). According to James’s “active, integrated humanism,” literature and literary 
interpretation therefore play a crucial role in both political self-consciousness and 
political action.41 
 James’s interest in the literary and the imaginative has been for the most part 
ignored or obscured by much of the most influential scholarship on his American 
writings. Many scholars who celebrate James’s other, more straightforwardly Marxist 
work have denounced James’s writing about Melville—the acceptance of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 41 James never cites the rich tradition of Marxist humanism—perhaps for 
strategic reasons—but he clearly he draws heavily on theorists such as Georg Lukács. 
For a survey of Marxist Humanism, see Erich Fromm’s volume, Socialist Humanism: an 
International Symposium (1966). 
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hegemonic canon, the trafficking in bourgeois humanistic values—as a betrayal of his 
radical political commitments. For Paul Buhle, Mariners is “the least representative of 
his major works” and his exchanges with the critics “more nearly approached an 
apologia for social life under capitalism than at any other time before or since” (106, 
110). On the opposite side the spectrum, Donald Pease has argued on several 
occasions that James’s reading of Moby-Dick introduces a seminal critique of Cold-
War American nationalism—an ideological force that, according to Pease, dominated 
postwar Americanist discourse. Critics like Matthiessen and Chase, Pease argues, had 
converted Moby-Dick into “one of the planetary agents responsible for the global 
hegemonization of American values” (“Extraterritoriality” 205). But James’s work 
“dismantles” this “Cold-War consensus” by reconfiguring Moby-Dick into a political 
critique on behalf of “the mariners, renegades, and castaways whose catastrophic 
deaths had been justified by the Americanist interpretive community” 
(“Extraterritoriality,” 206).  
 This account is certainly more compelling than the Marxist critique of James, 
but Pease and his followers’ effort to present James as a “pioneering practitioner of 
postnational American studies,” to quote Christopher Gair, leads them to focus only 
on the political dimensions of James’s work that resonate with contemporary 
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Americanists’ critique of national boundaries and state power (Gair 1).42 This 
emphasis on such issues—in both James’s detractors and supporters—has led 
scholars either to dismiss or overlook James’s repeated insistence on the 
inextricability of his politics from what he somewhat paradoxically called “strictly 
literary problems” (“Letters 237). 
 Pease’s almost exclusive privileging of national identity and ideological critique 
in his writing about James bears witness to a longstanding tension between politics 
and “strictly literary problems.” This tension is painfully obvious throughout the 
most influential critical work of the era, Matthiessen’s American Renaissance.  Indeed, in 
the introduction on “Method and Scope,” Matthiessen explicitly opposes “the nature 
of literature” and the political.  Here Matthiessen remarks that the moment of the 
American Renaissance could lend itself to “different kinds of investigation” (vii). You 
might consider “sources in our life,” and write about its “economic, social, and 
religious” causes and ramifications (vii). Or you might be “primarily concerned with 
what these books were as works of art.” Matthiessen, of course, sets out to conduct 
the latter inquiry (“concerning the function and nature of literature”), and he thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 42 James’s position on the efficacy of state politics vs. transnationalism is 
actually inconsistent and quite complicated. As Michelle Ann Stephens puts it, issues 
of nationality and transnationality present “a particularly thorny contradiction” 
throughout James’s American writings (260). 
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renders his own explicitly anti-capitalist readings of Moby-Dick theoretically 
inexplicable.   
 In Mariners and his prison letters to the critics, James set himself the ambitious 
task of synthesizing these methods of inquiry that Matthiessen theoretically divorces 
but yet could not keep apart in his textual analysis. Drawing on a diverse array of 
sources—Marxist literary theory from Georg Lukács to Theodore Adorno, Hegel, 
Aristotle, even one of the founders of the New Criticism, I.A. Richards—James 
sought to theorize the inextricability of literature and social life. “Serious literary 
criticism,” James repeatedly insists, “is serious social criticism” (“Letters” 233). As 
James reiterated on several occasions, it was vitally important for him to keep “the 
text”—Moby-Dick—from fading “into the background,” from becoming “a mere 
expression of social and political ideas.” Rather, he sought show how such ideas 
could be “embodied in” —without wholly consuming—imaginative representations 
of “human personalities”—their “emotion,” their “clash of passions,” and their 
“struggle for happiness” (Mariners 115). And yet James also fiercely opposed any 
effort to “isolate” such “literary” qualities from “the social movement” (“Preface” 
258). His analysis rigorously links these qualities with what James saw as the most 
pressing political problems of the twentieth century—totalitarianism, the oppression 
of the “stateless” working class, and the intellectuals caught wavering between these 
two forces. 
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 Perhaps James had in mind the near ubiquitous valorization of the intellectual 
Captain Vere and his “acceptance” of state power—and perhaps Chase’s exhortation 
to “love Leviathan”—when he warned that postwar Americanists had not sufficiently 
set themselves against the totalitarian tendencies of Cold-War America. Using Moby-
Dick as his primary source of evidence, James sought to persuade postwar 
Americanists to return to a leftist intellectual tradition of the field and to mobilize 
against the silencing and imprisoning of “alien subversives” like himself. This 
tradition runs from Van Wyck Brooks’ call for a “usable past” that would mitigate 
America’s “hectic individualism” and bring about “that sense of brotherhood in 
effort and in aspiration,” through the work of Lewis Mumford, and culminates most 
visibly in F.O. Matthiessen’s conflicted, but nonetheless patently political writing.43 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 43 In his splendid book on the American left in the first half of the twentieth 
century, The Cultural Front, Michael Denning convincingly locates Brooks, Mumford, 
and Matthiessen’s literary critical values within the political agenda of the Popular 
Front.  Denning describes the Popular Front in a way that elucidates James’s interest 
in this tradition: “the Popular Front became the attempt to unify [. . .] millions of 
industrial workers with the middle-classes—white-collar workers, professionals, and 
shopkeepers—in powerful urban alliances [. . .].  Under the sign of “the people,” this 
Popular Front public culture sought to forge ethnic and racial alliances, mediating 
between Anglo-American culture, the culture of ethnic workers, and African 
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All of these critics had eloquently criticized capitalist individualism in their readings 
of Moby-Dick, and James extends and radicalizes their work by linking it to the 
American’s totalitarian exploitation of its “stateless” immigrants. Moby-Dick, in 
James’s hands, became a text that challenged postwar Americanists to oppose the 
injustices of postwar American immigration policy—specifically, The McCarran Act 
(also known as the Subversive Activities Control Act), the enforcement of which had 
landed James on Ellis Island.  
 
“an active, integrated humanism”  
 In the years leading up to his arrest and deportation, James’s political vision 
for the United States relied increasingly on “the role of human agency” in the 
organization and resistance of the masses—a shift that, according to Anthony 
Bogues, marked a significant “rupture” with more orthodox Marxists, spurring 
James’s departure from Trotskyites and his criticisms of the American Communist 
Party (Bogues 100, 115, 129). Profoundly optimistic, James on several occasions 
expressed a belief in the emerging intellectual and humanistic aspirations of the 
American working class. If there ever had been “a passive subordinate mass,” James 
believed that it was “undergoing liquidation in the very action of the mass which,” in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
American culture, in part by reclaiming the figure of ‘America’ itself, imagining an 
Americanism that would provide a usable past for all workers” (446). 
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the moment of the early 1950s, was in the process of “creating a totally new society, 
an active, integrated humanism” (my emphasis; American 276). 
 Why call this emergent historical force “humanism,” an undeniably bourgeois 
term that is laden with bland universalities, artistic hierarchies, and class elitism? 
Because, James argues, it is not merely that the masses are demanding social and 
economic justice; it is that “hundreds of millions of cheap books are now sold, and 
hundreds of thousands are reading Flaubert, Dostoyevsky, and Dreiser, taking them 
to the factory in the paper-bound editions” (American 272). Melville was especially 
important to James’s own efforts to nurture this emergent humanism.  James 
acknowledges that Melville has never drawn a popular audience, but, as he writes in 
the introduction to Mariners, “In the course of lecturing upon Melville in many parts 
of the United States, I have discovered that, once of the veil of bookishness is torn 
away, his characters are instantly recognizable”—recognizable not only to 
intellectuals, but to the sharecroppers and autoworkers whom James spent the 
majority of his time in the U.S. working with (Mariners 3). The emerging “active, 
integrated” humanism of these oppressed peoples, James believed, created a new role 
for intellectuals, a role that demands their “integration” with the masses. In the case 
of literary intellectuals, whom James seems particularly concerned with in the early 
50s, the work becomes doing what James claims to do in his lectures on Melville:  
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making characters “recognizable,” making them speak to the emotional, political, and 
economic conditions of the present.44 
 James first began developing his humanistic departures from conventional 
Marxist theory based on his experiences working with African Americans throughout 
the forties.45  James believed that both the American Communist Party and 
Trotskyites had made the mistake of treating African Americans as a distinct 
nationality seeking national self-determination.  In James’s notes from his 1938 
conversations with Trotsky on “the Negro question,” it becomes clear that James 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 44 James’s idea of the integration of intellectuals and mass movements has 
deep resonances with Antonio Gramsci’s writing about “the organic intellectual.” 
Gramsci famously compared the organic intellectual to the “traditional” intellectual—
writers, artists, and philosophers whose intellectual work was detached from any 
specific social group or institution. The organic intellectual, by contrast, is “an active 
participant in practical life,” “the thinking and organizing element of a particular 
social class” (Gramsci 10, 1). Despite these resonances, it is highly unlikely that James 
had read Gramsci’s work. Gramsci composed the documents that make up The Prison 
Notebooks between 1929 and 1935, but they were not published until 1948, and they 
were not translated into English (from the original Italian) until the 1970s.   
 45 See Bogues’s Caliban’s Freedom (77-98) and McLemee’s “The Enigma of 
Arrival.”  
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believed this nationalism was imposed onto African Americans by the Party, and that 
it did not reflect the grass-roots needs and desires of the black community.  “The 
basis of the organization must be the struggle for the day-to-day demands of the 
Negro,” James writes; and “the Negroes [ . . .] are and have been in every sense of the 
word, Americans” (“Documents” 70).  The implication, James argues, is that Marxists 
must recognize that the “the Negro struggle” will not be for an independent nation, 
but will be “waged under the banner of democratic rights” (“Revolutionary” 183).  
“The Negro struggle, the independent Negro struggle,” James writes, has a vitality 
and validity of its own. “ [. . .] We challenge directly any attempt to subordinate or 
push to the rear the social and political significance of the independent Negro 
struggle for democratic rights” (“Revolutionary” 183).  James’s insistence on terms 
such as “the day-to-day demands of the Negro” and “the independent Negro 
struggle” represent early reflections of his conviction that radical movements must be 
based on the organically arising demands—the “human agency”-- of the oppressed, 
even when those demands conflict with revolutionary Marxism. 
 James’s “reformist” as opposed to “revolutionary” (to borrow Bogue’s terms) 
position on “the Negro question” echoes throughout his writing about culture and 
literature while he was in the U.S. James believed, probably rightly, that the vast 
majority of Americans, working class and otherwise, shared the black community’s 
commitments to patriotism and democracy. In an essay titled “The Americanization 
of Bolshevism” (1944), he argued that Marxist movements in the U.S. must be 
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“rooted in the economic and social life, history, and tradition of the nation” 
(“Americanization” 283). Committed to the values of the people he was working 
with, James increasingly utilized a pro-American, pro-democracy liberal vocabulary, a 
trajectory that culminates in his unfinished (and posthumously published) American 
Civilization and his book about Melville, both of which, James believed, could appeal 
to a Cold-War, anti-Communist American “general public” (American 26). 
 James therefore eschews the language of revolt and revolution, opting instead 
to articulate his opposition to capitalism in the Tocquevillean terms of “free 
association,” or by emphasizing the “comradeship and unity” among the interracial 
crew of the Pequod (Mariners 28). James’s “reformist” political strategy becomes 
apparent in his reading of Moby-Dick: he enthusiastically praises the crew for 
prioritizing “their everyday doing of work” over revolting against Ahab (Mariners 28). 
“Melville took great pains to show that revolt was no answer to the questions he 
asked,” and the same could be said of James’s politics in American Civilization and 
Mariners. My point here is not that James was or wasn’t theoretically committed to a 
working class revolution. James’s position on this issue appears to have shifted 
throughout his life, as he adapted himself to different political circumstances.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 46 For instance, after James returned to Europe, he vehemently supported the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Bogues provides a compelling discussion of James’s 
complex, shifting attitude on revolutionary politics (153-169). For information 
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Rather, my point is that his fundamental commitment to the “human agency” of the 
masses leads him to accept and appeal to the values of the people he viewed himself 
as working for in the U.S. These people, James believed, demanded rights and 
recognition through democracy in America, not through the revolutionary formation 
of a new state.47   
 In American Civilization, James presents antebellum abolitionists as modeling 
this service to the values and demands of the oppressed. James portrays the 
abolitionists as an educated, powerful organization that took up the cause of the 
oppressed and articulated their demands through powerful media channels. Figures 
like Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison, James believed, were the “highest 
peak reached by United States intellectuals” (American 92).  According to James, these 
abolitionists exemplified the chief intellective virtue of service to the specific 
demands of a grass-roots political movement: they were “intellectuals whose 
intellectual, social, and political creativity was the expression of precise social forces” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regarding James’s involvement with the Hungarian Revolution, see Buhle’s biography 
of James (James 121-136). 
 47 According to Stephens,  “James’s ultimate insight on the Negro question 
was that the desire for a black nation within a nation, black self-determination, was 
itself not a move for segregation, independence, or autonomy, but rather a push for 
the Negro’s full integration in the American state” (228). 
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(American 85).  As a result of their “constant contact with the mass,” James writes, 
“they were the means by which a direct social movement expressed itself, the 
movement of the slaves and free Negroes for freedom” (American 85).  This 
idealization of the abolitionists, of course, overlooks Douglass’s infamous critique of 
John Collins and Garrison for insisting that he merely “give us the facts [. . .] and 
we’ll take care of the philosophy” (Douglass 367).  Douglass’s point here is that 
abolitionist leaders, in fact, did not fully submit themselves to the specific ideas and 
demands of African Americans—a point that Ellison reminds his readers of in 
Invisible Man by comparing the abolitionist movement to the oppressively controlling, 
top-down infrastructure of the Brotherhood. But James’s goal here is not historical 
accuracy. It is to theorize a corrective intellectual identity using a well-known 
movement in American history. For James understood that this account of the 
abolitionists—distorted, or at least selective, as it may be— was an important model 
for intellectuals during the moment of the emerging “human agency” of the masses.  
 The duty of intellectuals in the postwar moment, James believed, is to nurture 
this emergent humanism and its attendant demands for social equality and economic 
justice and to articulate these demands in dominant media channels. Especially 
important to this emergent humanism is James’s faith in the rising demand for 
literature and literary knowledge among the oppressed. And the emergent literary 
intellect of the masses, according to James, demands a new political role for the 
expert mediator of literature, the literary critic. Indeed, James explicitly draws out the 
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relationship between this budding “active, integrated humanism” and literature in an 
explicit challenge to his literary critical contemporaries:  
Modern criticism has to reckon with the fact that modern man, the 
ordinary everyday citizen, feels that he requires to know his past in 
order to understand his present.  This knowledge he can only learn in 
art, and above all in literature.  So that criticism today has a popular 
function to perform. (“Popular” 252).  
Literature becomes a vitally important historical force: it is the special means by 
which “the ordinary, everyday citizen” can become reflective concerning her place in 
larger historical and political currents. Turning the story of Toussaint L’Ouverture 
and the Haitian revolution into a play, lecturing to autoworkers and sharecroppers on 
Melville, spending his final days in the U.S. struggling to finish and publish a book 
about Moby-Dick and “the world we live in”—all of these endeavors testify to James’s 
own effort to realize this “popular function” of the literary. And his conviction about 
the purpose of modern criticism must have—at least in part—galvanized James’s 
efforts to intervene in postwar Melville studies, a powerful emergent field that James 
perhaps believed could continue his literary-political project in the U.S. after his 
deportation.  
“aesthetic foundations” 
 Urgent, rushed, and frantic as James’s situation on Ellis Island must have 
been, his engagement with postwar Americans is nonetheless rhetorically poised and 
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theoretically sophisticated. Appealing to Aristotle, Hegel, and the values of New 
Criticism, James developed a complex theory of the relationship between literary text, 
“popular audience,” and the mediating figure of the literary critic. Much of this 
theoretical work was done in the year or two just after he was deported from the 
U.S., but these concerns first appear in James’s writing as he was working to engage 
the postwar literary academy. Before diving too deeply into his extended reading of 
Moby-Dick, I want to elaborate the theoretical apparatus—the “aesthetic foundation,” 
as he called it—that informed James’s interactions with postwar Americanists 
(“Letters” 231). 
 James cites Aristotle and Hegel as his primary theoretical influences on a 
number of occasions. He understands both of them as fundamentally committed to 
the social power of literature—the power to represent problems that interest and 
compel a specific community.  “Modern critics” do not understand Aristotle, James 
writes, because “they do not root their criticism in the world in which they live” 
(“Preface” 256).  James argues that Aristotle’s emphasis on the power of a play to 
affect its audience synthesizes literary form and popular reception. This synthesis, he 
writes, is “the indispensible foundation of any serious reorganization of 
contemporary criticism” (“Preface”256).  Aristotelian literary criticism, according to 
James, analyzes a text’s power to reveal to its audience a “situation in which they feel 
themselves to be profoundly involved” (“Preface” 256).  Literature that is “artistically 
superior,” therefore, is literature that engages a community’s most basic concerns, 
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literature that, to quote James, “makes the whole nation feel that it was involved” 
(“Preface” 256). 
 This conceptualization of “the whole nation” as the communal audience of 
the literary text is crucial to James’s critical agenda, and it marks his close proximity to 
the national concerns of postwar Americanists. James believed that the primary 
means by which a literary text appeals to a “popular audience” is by representing “the 
history of a nation at a certain point in its development” (“Preface” 257). James’s 
work in Mariners applies this version of Aristotelian literary criticism to Melville by 
asking his readers to recognize a “crisis of state” in Moby-Dick—a democratic crisis 
manifested in James’s own imprisonment on Ellis Island. 
 Even more important than Aristotle to James’s criticism is Hegel’s idea of the 
work of art as the best encapsulation of a culture’s present, past and future. Art 
criticism from a Hegelian perspective is thus of “central relevance for the analysis of 
society and culture,” as it studies “the center of a society’s philosophical and cultural 
self-reflection” (Fluck 158, 141). James treats Melville as what Hegel calls a “World 
Historical Individual”—a figure capable of, as Hegel says, seeing in “the very truth of 
their age and their world, the next genus, so to speak, which is already formed in the 
womb of time” (38-39).  James thus emphasizes characters as embodiments of a 
moment in history, but also as anticipations of social and political movements to 
come.   
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 James’s sense of what counts as “great writing” is directly informed by his 
Hegelian understanding of the relationship between art and the succession of 
historical eras. “The very greatest of writers,” James writes in reference to Melville,  
seem to be those who come at the climax of one age, but this is 
 because the new age has grown up inside the old and they are watching 
both. [. . .] The greatness of a writer is revealed by the fact that peering 
and probing until he finds what he considers the fundamental types in 
his own period, he portrays what we in later years can see are the 
ancestors of what exists in our own world.48 (American 76) 
James utilizes this Hegelian literary aesthetics to construct a sort of grand narrative of 
the rise and demise of the character type that most concerned him—namely, “the 
isolated intellectual.” Given birth through Hamlet’s “free individualism” and his 
“polarization of action and thought,” this “type,” James believes, is sent to the grave 
in Melville’s representation of the isolation, depression, and powerlessness of Ishmael 
and Pierre (“Letters” 233). As I’ll show below, James argued that Melville’s characters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 48 James cites Hegel—a familiar philosopher for postwar Americanists— as 
the source of this idea, but it is fairly obvious that he is also drawing heavily on 
Lukács’s work. Lukács argues that “classic” artworks are fundamentally “concerned 
with the creation of types,” which embody “the lasting features in a people” and 
“endure over long periods” (Lukács 47). 
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embryonically anticipate the problems faced by American literary intellectuals in the 
1950s. 
 The key concept that James draws from both Aristotle and Hegel is the idea 
that literature—when read or mediated correctly—has a unique power to make its 
readers conscious of their most pressing historical and political conditions, conditions 
that might otherwise remain unarticulated. James also elaborates this same idea 
through the work of the proto-New Critic I.A. Richards, a figure who even more 
than Aristotle or Hegel had made an immediate impact on the values of 
Americanists.49 In American Renaissance, Matthiessen had theorized the culturally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 49  For an excellent analysis of James’s relationship with the New Criticism, see 
Pier Paolo Frassinelli’s work. In analyzing James’s writing about Shakespeare, 
Frassinelli argues that James’s approach to literature represents “an alternative both 
to the misguided Communist prescription of ‘art for the masses,’ and what he 
perceived as the retreat into the clique or coterie of high modernism” (16). James 
rejected both what he regarded as the Communist Party’s reduction of art to political 
propaganda and the political disengagement of New Criticism. The former’s 
promotion of propaganda “on behalf of the proletarian class struggle,” James writes, 
“is a way to produce party resolutions, not great literature”; and the latter’s effort “to 
defend the work itself from all alien influences,” he says, “isolate[s] it from the social 
movement and [. . .] destroy[s] it” (“Popular” 253, “Preface” 258).   
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enriching, communal effect of literature through Richards’s work. As Matthiessen 
quotes, Richards wrote that literary art is the means by which “our will is collected, 
our powers unified,” and by which “the infinitely divergent strayings of our being are 
brought into balance” (quoted on 645).  James’s own summary of what he regarded 
as Richards’ most valuable idea actually appears to be based on the same passage 
quoted by Matthiessen. “Mr. I.A. Richards,” James writes, “another critic who years 
ago discovered the popular audience, aimed to emancipate it [the popular audience], 
not by the abolition of private property, but by using literature as a means of bringing 
some order and balance into the chaos of its impulses” (“Preface” 258).  This vision 
of literary art as ordering and making articulate the radical humanism of the masses, a 
humanism that he firmly believed would lead to their social and political 
empowerment, is obviously different from Richards’ and Matthiessen’s Arnoldian 
idea of literature as providing structure and coherence to a secularizing Western 
culture. Nonetheless, James’s radical elaboration—or appropriation, one might even 
say—of (Matthiessen’s) Richards allows him to engage the values of the field and to 
voice his own theory of the political power of literature in the language of an 
authoritative critic who played a formative role in postwar American literary studies.  
  James brings all this theorizing to bear on the field of American literary 
criticism most directly in his long, articulate, and confrontational letter to Jay Leyda, 
which circulated among numerous other critics. This important document in the 
history of American criticism represents the most comprehensive statement on 
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literary critical methodology that James produced while in the United States.  From 
its very first paragraph, it reveals the rhetorical importance of James’s rigorously 
theorized “aesthetic foundations.” For James begins the letter by repudiating Leyda’s 
suggestion that his book about Melville has more “drive” than “logic” (“Letters” 
231). Citing his basis in Aristotle, Hegel, and Richards, James argues that Leyda is 
wrong to believe that Mariners’ arguments were based on “my ‘feelings’ because of my 
imprisonment” rather than on a methodologically sound approach to the literary text. 
“I insist that you must have a basis for criticism,” James says; “I am perfectly aware 
of the aesthetic foundations on which my criticism is based” (original emphasis; 
“Letters” 231).50   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 50 In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said articulates a broader colonial context 
into which Leyda’s criticism of James should be placed. Said claims that there is a 
tendency among Western academics to “impugn” third-world intellectuals as merely 
“wailing for sympathy”—“to dismiss them as the emotional and subjective cris de coeur 
of strenuous activists and partisan politicians” (258). This, Said argues, is why it is so 
important for intellectuals like James to “set themselves the critical task of dealing 
frontally with the metropolitan culture, using the techniques, discourses, and weapons 
of scholarship and criticism” (241). Said cites James’s rigorous historical work in The 
Black Jacobins as an example of such work. I would argue that the theoretical rigor of 
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 “The divorce between criticism and life haunted me,” James goes on to say. 
He then claims that his own approach to Melville “has bridged the gap” (“Letters” 
231).  “Rooted in Aristotle and Hegel,” James claims, his methodology “illuminate[s] 
the text” by revealing its entanglements with the political problems of the past, 
present, and future.  Throughout the letter, James insists on the importance of 
theoretically synthesizing politics and literature. This synthetic work, he repeats, does 
not take the critic away from “the text itself.” Indeed, his methodology, he writes, 
represents “a social criticism which will illuminate the text” and that enables him “to 
pose and solve literary problems” (“Letters” 234, 237). Several times during the letter 
James repeats his most important theoretical conclusion: “Social criticism and literary 
criticism are indistinguishable” (“Letters” 233).    
 While elaborating this point to Leyda, James lays out his Hegelian “theory of 
characters in great fiction” (“Letters” 231). He argues that “each character is rooted 
in his own age,” but also that “changes and social developments are reflected in 
them” (“Letters” 231-32).  The implication is that to understand these “characters in 
great fiction,” the critic must not only understand their engagement with the author’s 
“own age,” but also analyze their reflection of political issues of the past and future.  
The social and political resonance of these characters is both “horizontal, covering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mariners and James’s letter to Leyda are also efforts to accomplish this “critical task” 
of the minority intellectual. 
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the known world” of the author, and “vertical, bringing as they do imaginative 
conceptions of history which they boldly place in the contemporary world” (“Letter” 
232). James thus synthesizes a formal textual element—character—with the authors’ 
synchronic entanglement in their own moment in history, and their (conscious or 
unconscious) diachronic engagement with deep transhistorical trends that run 
through their work and into “the contemporary world.” A literary text, its world, and 
the world of the contemporary reader are fully enmeshed in aesthetic experience. And 
the task of the critic, James believed, is at once to describe a text’s relationship with 
its own moment and to articulate its relevance to social and political problems of the 
critic’s present. 
 Not surprisingly, the political issue that James most explicitly addresses is the 
dilemma of “the intellectual, the individualist”—an issue that he believes is 
“fundamental to modern criticism” (“Letters” 233). Throughout the letter to Leyda, 
James exemplifies his synthesis of social and literary criticism by applying his 
Hegelian “theory of character” to Ishmael, “the isolated intellectual.” James briefly 
articulates his arguments about Ahab and the crew as respectively embodying “the 
totalitarian type” and the modern transnational working class, but he elaborates at 
length on Ishmael’s “vertical” continuities with and challenges to the individualist 
intellectualism of Melville’s past and future. “The intellectual of free speculation,” 
James explains to Leyda, first emerges with clear distinction in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
a play committed to “tracing the intellectual type” and defining its strengths and 
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weaknesses (“Letters” 233). James argues that Hamlet marks the “beginning of a great 
historical career” for “the modern intellectual,” and that “his greatest period is the 
17th and eighteenth century” (sic), meaning that during this time “the intellectual of 
free speculation” was important to the development of democratic human rights 
(“Letters” 233).   
 But by the nineteenth century, James argues, “his isolation begins,” and 
“Melville completes his collapse” (“Letters” 233).  In characters such as Ishmael, 
Pierre, and the narrator of “Bartleby,” “Melville chronicled their decline”: “He sent 
them to the bottom of the sea” (“Letters” 233).   And it is precisely this dimension of 
Melville’s work that makes it so relevant to the practice of literary criticism in the 
middle of the twentieth century. The “decline” of “the intellectual of free individual 
speculation,” according to James, “is in every line of Moby-Dick,” and for this reason 
“it belongs to the twentieth century” (“Letters” 233).  James understands Melville’s 
writing as calling for the integration of the intellectual with the working class—as 
anticipating James’s own demand that literary intellectuals align themselves with the 
masses: “Melville heralded the age when once more the individual had to be 
integrated with society” (“Letters” 235).  
  Near the end of the letter, James directly applies this demise of the isolated 
intellectual to literary criticism in the twentieth century. Writing as a critic addressing 
an audience of critics, James argues that 
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We have to begin with the social ideas. [. . .] This is the mental 
framework of our age. The critic who ignores it will find himself [. . .] 
out of contact with anything or anybody, other than his own coterie.  I 
cannot go into it here except to repeat (with Melville) that the age of 
individualism is over.  The intellectual must once more be incorporated 
with the universal.  It is a profound subject today. (emphasis original; 
“Letters” 236). 
Here James clearly demonstrates his synthesis of social and literary criticism. He 
identifies the character type of the present that he sets out to challenge in century-old 
writings by Melville. He then performs a reading of the canonical author’s texts that 
places this figure within a narrative of historical demise—a narrative that he presents 
as a warning to his audience of literary intellectuals.  
 James does not use the prominent New Critical image of “organicism” in his 
literary writings, but this idea nicely ties together the two core, seemingly conflicting, 
threads of James’s literary critical methodology: first, that the critic should primarily 
aim to “illuminate the text,” and take care not to reduce it to a social or economic 
formula; and second, that the critic should read the literary text as encapsulating 
powerful historical forces (“germs,” in the Hegelian lexicon) that grow into social and 
political prominence. The concept of organicism, in other words, unifies the Hegelian 
historiography that informs James's claim that Melville can "prophesy" future states of 
historical being and the theory of textual unity that informs his claim that the demise 
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of the isolated intellectual "is in every line of Moby-Dick." James thus draws on while 
at the same time radically transforming the New Critical idea of the text as an organic 
whole. What the organic wholeness of the literary text really means, James suggests, is 
that text, context, and readers; aesthetics, economics, and politics; and even past, 
present, and future—all of these are living components of a single organism.    
 
“the story of Herman Melville and the world we live in” 
 The depth of James’s commitment to the political importance of literary art is 
nowhere better demonstrated than in his frantic effort to write, publish, and circulate 
Mariners before being deported.  This unique text “organically” brings together a 
sustained reading of Moby-Dick with a case for the relevance of literature to political 
life, an explicit call for its readers to oppose Cold-War immigration policy, and an 
eloquent plea for U.S. citizenship. “What Melville did,” James explains, “was to place 
within the covers of his book a presentation of a whole civilization so that any 
ordinary human being today can read it in a few days and grasp the essentials” 
(Mariners 115). Here James again betrays his profound optimism in the humanistic 
capacity and interest of the masses. But more importantly, he expresses his belief that 
Melville’s corpus, when read properly, encapsulates “the whole history of the past, the 
significant experience of the world around him, and a clear vision of the future” 
(Mariners 115).  For James’s analysis in Mariners, this vision of the future is paramount. 
Moby-Dick and Pierre, in James’s rendering, reveal the power dynamics between the 
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three most politically important “types” of the mid-twentieth century: the totalitarian, 
the transnational or “stateless” worker, and the intellectual.  Throughout Mariners, 
James articulates these three types through readings of Melville to make two primary 
points: that democracy in America is fundamentally broken due to the plight of 
immigrants and workers, and that intellectuals, especially literary critics, must be more 
active on behalf of the oppressed in order to fulfill their own claims to practice a 
democratic criticism.  
 James’ sense of the present moment of the 1950s, which is the future he reads 
Melville as envisioning, echoes Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism and “the 
problem of stateless people” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951)—a text that shares 
James’ concern with the history of totalitarianism in the West.  In a chapter called 
“The Decline of the Nation-state and the End of the Rights of Man”—a title that 
certainly would have appealed to James’s interests in the early 50s—Arendt argues 
that there is a direct relationship between the emergence of totalitarianism in Europe 
and the increasing number of “stateless peoples”—groups of people who are inside a 
state’s boundary, and thus subject to its laws and customs, but are not full citizens 
and not recognized as part of the national community. Arendt presents overwhelming 
historical evidence, and her argument is too complex for me to do justice to it here. 
For the purpose of understanding James’s work on Melville, however, Arendt’s most 
important point is that the nation-state’s denial of human rights to stateless peoples 
represents a fracture in the foundation of democracy. It is a denial of the inherent 
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equality of humans and the universality of human rights.  “The problem of stateless 
peoples,” she argues, is that they reveal that “humans,” in the modern world, are not 
inherently equal and not universally found deserving of human rights:  
The conception of human rights, based on the assumed existence of 
human beings as such, broke down at the very moment when those 
who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with 
people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific 
relationships—except that they were still human.  The world found 
nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human. (299) 
Once the “principle of equality before the law has broken down,” she continues, the 
formerly democratic nation “dissolves into an anarchic mass of over-and-under 
privileged individuals” (290). Totalitarianism—the “total power” of a government 
over its people—thus emerges in the wake of the state’s denial of human rights to the 
stateless.  When James applies this logic to the U.S. as he synthesizes his own 
treatment on Ellis Island with the experience of the Pequod’s crew, Mariners becomes a 
prophetic Jeremiad, calling America back to its democratic foundations of universal 
human equality, lest it go the way of German and Russian totalitarianism.   
 Donald Pease’s groundbreaking work on Mariners has compellingly articulated 
James’s intervention in postwar politics.  He argues that James uses this authority to 
attack the McCarran Act as a betrayal of American democratic values—as “law-
breaking rather than norm-preserving” (“Emergence of Transnational” 72).  By 
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correlating the oppression of alien subversives under the McCarran Act “with the 
traumatic events that the Pequod’s crew had been compelled to undergo under the 
governance of Ahab,” Pease claims that James symbolically transformed Ellis Island, 
a place that “had been consecrated in the American imagination as the port of entry 
through which immigrants, exiles, and political refugees passed on their way to 
becoming natural citizens,” into “a scene of social death”—“a historical correlative 
for the catastrophic shipwreck at the conclusion to Melville’s novel” (“The Narrative 
Testimony” 34-35). 
 Pease’s argument here illuminates James’s quick—at times abrupt—
oscillations between his close-readings of Melville’s work and his condemnations of 
Cold-War American politics. On several occasions, James pauses in his close readings 
to argue that the U.S. government’s denial of democratic rights to minorities, 
immigrants, and workers represents a hypocritical departure from the principles of 
human equality upon which the country is ostensibly founded.  “This,” James writes, 
referring the McCarran Act, “is not what had made the U.S.” (Mariners 160).  For this 
Act is premised upon a fundamentally anti-democratic “racial doctrine,” which holds 
that “the national race, the national stock, and national blood is superior to all other 
national races, national stocks, and national bloods” (Mariners 13).  The act is thus 
“permeated with the doctrine of racial superiority” (Mariners 13).  James concludes 
that “the United States Department of Immigration is today in its policy-making 
echelons riddled with national arrogance”: “for them an alien is not a human being” 
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(Mariners 140).  Like Arendt, James argues that it is precisely in this denial of human 
rights to one who is an “alien”—not of “the national stock”—that the United States 
betrays its democratic principles and approaches totalitarianism.  This critique of 
democracy in America seamlessly interweaves with James’s representation of Ahab 
and the Pequod’s crew of nation-less “isolatoes.”  As “the most representative writer of 
modern civilization,” Melville prophesied the totalitarian denial of human rights to 
the stateless through his depiction of Ahab’s exploitation of his transnational crew of 
“mariners, renegades, and castaways” (123). 
 But, as I said earlier, Pease’s exclusively political analysis of Mariners does not 
account for this complex text’s reliance on what James calls “aesthetic foundations.” 
Despite the overt political radicalism inherent to James’s understanding of Melville, 
he repeatedly insists that the superior aesthetic quality of Moby-Dick is integral to its 
relevance to the totalitarian oppression of the stateless and the failures of intellectuals 
in the twentieth century. Moby-Dick does not merely describe how “men would 
sooner or later behave.” “Being a creative artist,” James writes, Melville “had seen in 
terms of human personality and human relations” (Mariners 13). It is this “human” 
quality that allows Melville to reveal “the intimate, the close, the logical relation of 
madness, to what the world has hitherto accepted as sane, reasonable, the values by 
which all good men have lived” (Mariners 13).  The aesthetic quality of the text is thus 
what allows Moby-Dick to make the subtle, more meaningful political point that 
totalitarianism grows within ordinary humans who subscribe to accepted values.   
 129	  
 James explicitly acknowledges the “danger” of his own highly politicized 
hermeneutics: he worries that “the book, as a work of art, fades into the background, 
and it becomes a mere expression of social and political ideas” (Mariners 115).  
Reducing a literary text to its political position is “fatal because the social and political 
ideas in a great work of imagination are embodied in human personalities, in the way 
they are presented, in the clash of passions, the struggle for happiness, the avoidance 
of misery” (Mariners 115).  Without such imaginative and humanistic qualities, a 
literary text remains lodged in its own moment in history—perhaps a compelling 
critique of political exploitation, but unable to speak beyond its moment in time.  
James (unconvincingly to most modern readers, including this one) attacks Benito 
Cereno as precisely such a text. It rightly exposed the “blindness and stupidity” of “an 
advanced civilization,” so it articulates a productive political critique.  But, James 
argues, ultimately it is “a propaganda story, [ . . .] written to prove a particular point” 
(Mariners 122-123). Since the story’s politics are less humanistic, it is less applicable to 
the twentieth century than an aesthetically superior text like Moby-Dick. Artistic or 
imaginative quality and transhistorical political relevance are thus fully entangled and 
mutually complementary elements of the aesthetic theory that informs James’s 
analysis in Mariners. 
 In American Civilization, letters to critics, and Mariners, James links the literary 
past with the political present through a subtle redefinition of “symbolism”—a term 
that had become all but ubiquitous among Americanists who wished to distance 
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themselves from what they perceived as the overly politicized criticism of the thirties 
and early forties. Charles Feidelson Jr.’s book Symbolism and American Literature (1953) 
exemplifies this trend of postwar criticism, as it argues that focusing on “symbolism” 
will allow Americanists to productively move beyond “the sociological and political 
bent of studies in American literature” (3). Feidelson specifically attacks Matthiessen’s 
focus on “the possibilities of democracy” to argue that the real issue in the works of 
Hawthorne, Emerson, Whitman, and Melville is “the possibilities of symbolism” (4). 
The multivalence and “ambiguity” of the symbol, versus “the pat moral and 
simplified character” of allegory, according to Feidelson, represented “a new subtlety 
of achievement” in literary aesthetics in America (15). Chase also praised symbolism 
for its ability to explore  “disagreement about truth,” and, not unrelatedly, Chase also 
attacked Matthiessen for reading Melville as an advocate for “liberal progressivism” 
(American Novel 82, Herman Melville vii).   
 James echoes this privileging of symbolism over allegory (and repeats the term 
“symbol” and “symbolism” dozens of times), but to a very different purpose than 
Fiedelson and Chase. Allegory “concretizes and imprisons the universal,” James 
writes, and Melville’s use of symbolism “offers the widest variety of reference and 
interpretation” (American 70). But rather than depoliticizing the multivalence of the 
symbol, James deploys precisely this aspect of symbolism to explain how Melville can 
be read as portraying the political problems of the mid-twentieth century.  
Emphasizing what he calls “the political structure of his symbolic presentation,” 
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James, for example, argues that in Ahab’s hunt for Moby-Dick, “the conquest of the 
air, mastery of atomic energy, all of these are symbolized” (American 70). The “variety 
of reference and interpretation” of the symbol enables Moby-Dick to collapse the 
distance between past and present, and, in the hands of a Jamesian critic, make a 
“popular audience” in the twentieth century conscious of their position in the 
political dynamics of history. The “political structure” of Melville’s symbolism thus 
becomes the burden of the critic, who, in James’ view, must use the multivalent 
power of Melville’s symbols to articulate the problems of contemporary politics. 
 James begins his analysis “of the relation of the great American [Melville] to 
the present conditions in the country which produced him” by expanding and 
strengthening Mumford and Matthiessen’s anti-individualist, anti-capitalist arguments 
about Ahab (Mariners 115). James’s reading of Ahab links their critical exposition of 
Ahab’s “self-enclosed individualism” to both American Cold-War immigration policy 
and global totalitarianism, and thus links the failures of democracy in America with 
Stalinism and Nazism. Mumford and Matthiessen both essentially argue that Melville, 
to quote Matthiessen,  “created in Ahab’s tragedy a fearful symbol of the self-
enclosed individualism that, carried to its furthest extreme, brings disaster both upon 
itself and upon the group of which it is a part” (American Renaissance 459). James 
affirms this leftist reading of Ahab in arguing that Ahab’s pursuit of absolute 
individual freedom precludes the individual human rights of those around him.  But 
James expands Ahab’s symbolic resonance for the mid-twentieth century by linking 
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his monomaniacal self-interest to the absolute “management of men” and 
“management of things” that characterizes “the modern totalitarian type” (Mariners 
15).  James claims that “Melville really saw the executives, the managers, the 
administrators, the popular leaders, and their development into the totalitarian type,” 
and that this prophetic vision inspired his characterization of Ahab (Mariners 15).   
 James describes Ahab’s exploitation of the rights of others using the language 
of the “management” of men and things. He uses similar terms in his theoretical 
political writing to argue that the continuity between American Fordism, Stalinism, 
and Nazism is that all three utilize “the plant, the scientific apparatus, the method, the 
personnel of organization and supervision, [and] the social system which sets these 
up in opposition to the direct producer” (“The Class Struggle” 198). Ahab’s symbolic 
relevance to the twentieth century, in James’s account, reveals the totalitarian 
continuities between industrial capitalism, American immigration policy, Stalinism, 
and Nazism. All of these, like Ahab, deprive individuals of human rights on the basis 
of promoting the supposedly more important interests of the venture capitalist, the 
Communist party, or “the national stock.”   
 The Cold-War exploitation of workers and immigrants, who in James’s 
account are symbolically synthesized in the Pequod’s crew, forms the basis of James’s 
American Jeremiad against the McCarran Act.  For James, the “human dignity” and 
“comradeship” of the international crew represent the radical democratic 
potentialities of American democracy—“the universal republic of liberty and 
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fraternity” (28, 78 Mariners). As he draws out the democratic implications of the crew, 
James stresses Melville’s description of them as an “Anacharsis Clootz deputation,” a 
collective embodiment of the “Universal Republic” envisioned by Clootz.  
Matthiessen had pointed out Melville’s allusion to Clootz, but he did not elaborate its 
political implications; he says only that the allusion to Clootz indicates Melville’s view 
of humanity as the diverse passengers of “a ship on its passage out” (American 
Renaissance 410). But James deploys the allusion to Clootz to support his claim that 
Melville demands that his readers attend to the political implications of life aboard 
the Pequod. Recalling his former writing about the French Revolution, James writes 
that Clootz 
was a Prussian nobleman who embraced the French Revolution of 
1789. Clootz’s ideas went far beyond those of his fellow 
revolutionaries. He was known as the Orator of the Human Race, was 
an ardent advocate of the Universal Republic, and he called on the 
National Assembly to establish the brotherhood of all men. (Mariners 
19) 
By calling attention to Melville’s alignment of the Pequod’s crew with the 
“representatives of all nationalities” gathered by Clootz, James demands that his 
readers be conscious of the parallels between Ahab’s exploitation of the crew and the 
oppression of secondary and non-citizens—those considered “aliens” to “national 
stock”—in postwar America.  The “citizens of the world” who are imprisoned with 
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him on Ellis Island represent a modern day “Anacharsis Clootz deputation,” 
subjected to the “national arrogance” of the United States Department of 
Immigration, just as the Pequod’s crew is subjected to Ahab’s exploitative self-interest. 
“The whole world is represented on Ellis Island,” James writes, and his list of the 
nationalities represented there evokes a Clootzian deputation: “Germans, Italians, 
Latvians, Swedes, Filipinos, Malays, Chinese, Hindus, Pakistanis, West Indians, 
Englishmen, Australians, Danes, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Canadians, representatives of 
every Latin American country” (151).  James’s analogy between the transnational 
crew of the Pequod and the “citizens of the world” detained on Ellis Island allows him 
to portray Moby-Dick as a prophetic warning to postwar American intellectuals and 
political leaders: continue down the path of exploiting the stateless, and Ahabian 
totalitarianism and self-destruction is your destiny. 
 The dialectical relationship between those without full representation in the 
state and totalitarianism is obviously integral to both James’s political theory and his 
understanding of Melville, but the most impassioned and forceful arguments in 
Mariners focus on the relationship between Ishmael, Pierre, and the “individualist 
intellectuals” in the twentieth century. James’s reading of Ishmael and Pierre 
represents Mariners’ most direct confrontation of postwar literary intellectuals.  
 Michelle Ann Stephens has argued that James’s reading of Ishmael and the 
Pequod’s crew “envisioned new forms of social relations between the First World and 
Third World subject” (243). James, she writes, challenges postwar intellectuals  “to 
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enter into hands-on working dialogue with colonial intellectuals of color” and to align 
themselves with the political empowerment of transnational workers (245-46). 
Stephens eloquently articulates James’s challenge to postwar intellectuals, but she 
mistakenly argues that Ishmael represented a model intellectual, and that James 
identified Ishmael’s relationship with the crew as “a new basis for community” (246). 
This optimistic reading of Ishmael and the crew ignores James’s harsh criticisms of 
Ishmael and obscures his challenge to Ishmael’s twentieth-century progeny. For 
James argues that the Ishmael “type” represents an “intellectual Ahab” (41). He 
acknowledges that Ishmael is hesitant about Ahab’s coercive power over the crew, 
just as he acknowledges and praises the tradition of leftist activism among 
Americanists.  But James claims that Ishmael ultimately “follows Ahab, as the guilt-
ridden intellectual of today, often with the same terror, finds some refuge in the one-
party totalitarian state” (41).   
 “It is the twentieth century, our own,” James writes, “which has Ishmaels on 
every city block.” James subtly links his idea of “the intellectual Ahab” with American 
intellectuals and educators, as he generalizes about the Ishmaels of the twentieth 
century: “he is a member of a distinguished American family, is well educated, and 
has been a teacher.”  In James’s account, Ishmael anticipates two possible pitfalls for 
the modern intellectual: clinging to totalitarian powers, or, just as bad in James’s view, 
romantically feeling “himself to be one of the ‘people’” and “joining the working 
class movement” (37).  
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 At first glance, it seems that “joining the working class movement” is precisely 
what James demands of intellectuals in his theoretical writings, American Civilization, 
and in his letters to literary critics. What James identifies in Ishmael and Pierre, 
however, is the narcissistic attempt of intellectuals to purge their depression through 
a shallow, appropriative identification with the oppressed.  In a chapter of Mariners 
called “Neurosis and the Intellectuals,” James argues that “Ishmael and Pierre are sick 
to the heart with the modern sickness”(114).  Like “the intellectuals of our time,” for 
both of them “life is [. . .] a wasteland of guilt and hopelessness” (114).  In both 
characters, James writes, we see a typical trajectory of the modern intellectual in the 
United States: “a young American, rejecting the official world he has known, goes 
toward the meanest and lowest in the land” (97).  Both, in other words, seek to end 
their depression and alienation by identifying with “the poor and humbled”—Ishmael 
with Queequeg and the crew, and Pierre with his disowned half-sister Isabelle, whose 
immigrant mother had an affair with Pierre’s father (104). In both cases the 
intellectual’s relationship with “the meanest and lowest in the land” is fundamentally 
selfish, and for that reason, James argues, it is inevitably manipulative, shallow, and 
short-lived. Ishmael and Pierre, in James’s reading, model the ramifications of 
narcissistic attempts to identify with the oppressed. They also suggest a prophetic 
warning to the modern leftist intellectual: commit to serving the needs of the 
oppressed and not your own theoretical agenda, or end up either susceptible to 
totalitarianism, as Ishmael was, or drawn to suicide, as was Pierre.   
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 Mariners models James’s theoretical synthesis of literature and politics—the 
inextricability of literary and social criticism, as he puts it in his letter to Leyda. Moby-
Dick, when read by James, becomes an eloquent explication of the political power 
dynamic between totalitarianism, the stateless working class, and intellectuals. It also 
becomes a powerful instrument for condemning the democratic failures of the 
United States in its exploitation of the transitional working class. But the most 
immediate message of Mariners comes in the final pages, where James directly 
challenges his audience of “intellectuals and liberals” to transcend any abstract, 
Ishmael-esque resistance to oppression and to actively oppose the totalitarian 
“national arrogance” of Cold-War U.S. immigration policy. He extols them to 
“respect all humans, citizens or aliens, who are proud of their country’s traditions and 
ready to make great sacrifices to maintain them” (167). As a first step in this 
direction, he asks them to help him in his fight “to be a U.S. citizen” by donating 
money for his attorney fees and for the publication of Mariners and by writing 
politicians about his value as a critic and citizen (166-167). Only through their effort, 
James adds in the penultimate sentence of the book, can the institution of literary 
criticism “meet the perils of the future” by performing its two fundamentally 
inextricable purposes: “to advance both the understanding of literature and the cause 
of freedom” (Mariners 167). 
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 The mere fact that James was so interested in the field of American literary 
studies and that he worked so hard to interact with it unsettles the familiar account 
(promulgated by Pease, Shumway, and others) of postwar American literary studies as 
monolithically pernicious and of James’s work in Mariners as an absolute repudiation 
of its corruption.  If the field of American literary studies had been absolutely 
hegemonic, it is hard to believe that it would have attracted James and compelled his 
sustained attention in his final months in the U.S. That James prioritized his dialogue 
with the Americanists suggests that this field was already doing important cultural 
work that complemented James’s political project, and that he believed it perhaps 
could extend this project in his absence.  
 In the previous chapter, we witnessed Matthiessen, Arvin, Chase—whose 
work James knew well—using Melville’s writing to negotiate and interrogate the 
highly politicized issue of sexuality, and to conceptualize “homosocialist” alternatives 
to capitalist individualism and postwar heteronormativity. Clearly such political uses 
of the literary resonate with James’s “active, integrated humanism,” but this is 
certainly not to say that James had no objections to the politics and reading practices 
of postwar Americanists. James does not mention the postwar consensus on the 
disciplined virtue of Captain Vere, but he was obviously concerned about American 
intellectuals’ increasing “acceptance” of what he saw as the ascending totalitarianism 
of the U.S. government. James’s point was not that postwar Americanists were 
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totalitarians or hegemonic nationalists. Rather, it is that a nationalistic totalitarianism 
and a burgeoning “humanistic” demand for social justice are very real, alive forces in 
America, and that intellectuals need to take a more actively oppositional stance on 
behalf of the latter. James believed that as powerful, institutionally sanctioned 
mediators of literary meaning, American literary critics were in a unique position to 
challenge the anti-democratic practices of Cold-War America. Given his profound 
faith in the political power of the literary, it is not surprising that James made this 
case to the Americanists by way of that powerful “work of imagination,” Moby-Dick. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140	  
Chapter 4 
Ralph Ellison’s Melville Masks 
Whatever else his works were ‘about,’ they also managed to be about democracy. 
-Ellison on Melville, 1953 
 From the first page of Invisible Man, which opens with an epigraph 
from “Benito Cereno,” Ellison overtly inscribes his abiding fascination with 
Herman Melville. Throughout both of his novels and in several essays and 
interviews, Ellison includes dozens of hardly less subtle allusions to Moby-
Dick, “Benito Cereno,” and The Confidence-Man. At least part of Ellison’s 
motivation derives from the prestige that Melville had acquired by the time of 
Ellison’s own emergence as a novelist in the early 1950s. During this 
moment, Ellison understood that allusions to and readings of Melville would 
garner a powerful audience and lend authority to his creative and critical 
output. In this sense, Ellison’s use of Melville resembles how James wrote a 
book about Moby-Dick to capture the attention of Americanists and to 
perform his loyalty to American values.51 As it did for James, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 51 John Wright notes that Ellison and James actually knew each other and 
exchanged ideas while living in New York in the 1940s. The subject of nineteenth-
century American literature, Wright says, would have “provided the two of them with 
[a] point of common critical reference, Melville in particular.” James’s book about 
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hypercanonicity of Melville’s work in the wake of the “Melville Revival” 
offered Ellison unique access to cultural power. 52 This access allowed Ellison 
to show that African Americans are integral to what he called “the tradition 
of American literature” and to carve out a space for himself within “that very 
powerful literary tradition,” as Ellison put it in an essay not coincidentally 
titled “On Initiation Rites and Power”  (525). But Melville was also integral to 
Ellison’s intensive interrogations of precisely this sort of strategic power 
negotiation, particularly in the manuscripts of his unfinished second novel.  
 Melville’s notable presence in the second novel project has gone 
unexamined—not surprisingly, since it is buried in only recently published 
manuscript pages—but Ellison’s earlier allusions to white American writers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Melville, Wright continues, “had grown out of public lectures and private musings 
that he had shared with Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison during the 1940s.” More 
research needs to be done on the details of this fascinating relationship (163-164). 
 52 I borrow the term “hypercanonical” from Jonathan Arac, who uses it to 
describe a text or author who “monopolize[s] curricular and critical attention” and 
becomes identified “not just with a nation, but with the goodness of the nation” (Idol 
and Target 133, 14).  
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have stirred a rich conversation about the racial politics of canonicity.53 This 
conversation figures Ellison as a democratic “joker” who affirms the canon 
only to repudiate the racially exclusionary hermeneutic practices of postwar 
Americanists.54 Alan Nadel, for example, presents Ellison as a “trickster 
critic” who deploys allusions to writers like Melville, Emerson, and Twain to 
“revise the interpretive assumptions that structured the canon” (62). These 
allusions, Nadel argues, are designed to appeal to the racial prejudices of 
postwar Americanists, but they also create a subversive racial “subtext” that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 53 Thanks to the herculean efforts of Adam Bradley and John Callahan, a large 
portion of the second novel was published in 2010 as Three Days Before the Shooting. 
The Melville allusions that I refer to here—and discuss extensively below—were not 
included in Juneteenth, a much smaller sampling of the second novel that Callahan 
published in 1999. 
 54 My quotations around “joker” allude to work by Ross Posnock, 
who elaborates and advocates for what he calls Ellison’s politics of “the 
joker.” This Ellisonian “joker,” Posnock writes, “achieves identity through 
improvised pastiche” and “playful acts of assemblage.” By assembling 
multiple identities and “insisting on the primacy of the performative as the 
unstable grounds of identity,” Posnock believes that Ellison “liberates the 
cosmopolitan energies of democracy” (“Joking” 1,5,7; Color 206).  
 143	  
“critiques and alters the tradition in which they function” (147). Similarly, 
John Wright argues that Ellison’s commitment to canonical white writers 
represents neither opportunism nor “simple accommodationism,” but instead 
is the result of Ellison’s “concept of cultural synthesis as a subversive strategy 
of empowerment” (22). Nadel and Wright build on Houston Baker’s 
argument that Ellison donned a “Western critical mask,” which allowed him 
to infuse white American literature “with the captivating sound of flattened 
thirds and sevenths”—to modulate the canonical standards into a dissonant, 
jazz-inflected key by emphasizing racial prejudice and slavery (199). What all 
these critics share is a sense that Ellison theorized and practiced a strategic 
public identity that empowered him to appropriate and “blacken” white 
American literature. For these critics, Ellison’s canon-based criticism is the 
work of a pioneer theorist of the subversive, democratic power of strategic 
racial performativity.  
 This is by and large a compelling account of what Ellison was trying 
to do with Melville in Invisible Man and throughout his critical essays. Ellison 
repeatedly alludes to the racial masquerades of Babo and the confidence-man 
as he explores “invisibility” as an empowering strategy “to take advantage of 
the white man’s psychological blind spot” (Ellison, Essays 344). In Invisible 
Man, Babo and the confidence man, both protean tricksters who manipulate 
stereotypical assumptions about blackness, become models for negotiating 
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and subverting the power dynamics of American racism. Ellison also wrote 
several essays about Melville, Twain and other white authors that praise and 
affirm the American canon, while at the same time eloquently criticizing the 
racial negligence of postwar Americanists. In so doing, they exemplify the 
practice of the “trickster critic,” who, in Ellison’s words, “simultaneously 
cooperates and resists, says yes and says no” (“Initiation” 496).  
 Yet this subtle simultaneity of acceptance and rejection was lost on the 
prominent literary critics and radical black intellectuals who were reading and 
reviewing Ellison’s work in the 1960s and 70s. These groups repudiated or 
ignored the racial dimensions of Ellison’s writing about Melville. Both 
understood him, the former with praise and the latter with condemnation, as 
an uncritical advocate of a white American canon—as cooperating and saying 
yes rather than resisting and saying no. During this same period, Ellison 
labored at his apparently unfinishable second novel, a text that in many ways 
resonates with Ellison’s unfortunate public reception as it takes up problems 
of cultural and racial boundary-crossing, strategic performativity, and political 
misrecognition. I argue that these manuscripts gravely question the political 
efficacy of the “guerilla action,” as Ellison once called it, of his earlier work 
(“The World,” 169). 
 Indeed, the second novel—especially its plethora of Melville 
allusions—erodes any stable distinction between strategically subverting and 
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unintentionally strengthening a hegemonic discourse. The novel’s 
protagonist, Bliss, attempts to practice a mode of ideological engagement that 
closely corresponds to Ellison’s idea of “saying yes, saying no.” A black 
church community raises Bliss, but he grows up to pass as white and 
eventually becomes a race-baiting U.S. senator who calls himself “Adam 
Sunraider.”  As Sunraider, Bliss self-consciously appeals to the racism of the 
American electorate during the 1950s to establish and maintain his power. All 
the while, he tells himself that he is working to subvert the racism of his 
constituents: “Extend their visions until they disgust themselves,” he tells 
himself (Three Days 392). But no one else seems to get his joke. Sunraider is 
embraced by the racists he aims to undermine and hated and feared by the 
African Americans he aims to help, one of whom eventually guns him down 
on the Senate floor.  
 Despite the avowed commitment to racial equality that lies behind his 
racist performances as Sunraider, Bliss ultimately becomes indistinguishable 
from the racist discourse he desperately tries to subvert.55 His too-subtle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 55 The structure of my argument about Bliss is in part inspired by W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s reading of Spike Lee’s controversial film Bamboozled. This film follows a 
frustrated African American television writer who proposes a minstrel show to 
satirize the racism of American television viewers.  When the minstrel show becomes 
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strategy of cultural critique betrays his own democratic intentions. As Ellison 
imagines the African Americans who are hurt and horrified by Bliss, this 
ostensibly democratic joker transforms from a subversively ironic Babo figure 
into to an exploitative, destructive, and delusional “mammy-made Ahab,” as 
one character calls Bliss. The second novel project thus marks a stark 
departure from the protean politics of invisibility in Invisible Man.  
 This departure takes the shape of a deep skepticism toward the 
political hope in racial hybridity and performativity expressed by critics like 
Posnock, Nadel, Wright, and Baker. The momentous number of pages and 
drafts that Ellison devoted to Bliss shows that he remained deeply attached to 
and compelled by the democratic possibilities of the racial “joker.” But the 
second novel also explores the darker possibilities of this alluring figure: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a hit, the writer abandons his original satirical intentions, outrages African Americans, 
and is eventually murdered by a black member of his own staff. As Mitchell 
compellingly paraphrases the film, “satire descends into tragedy” (229). As it does so, 
he argues, “the movie thoroughly deconstructs” the writer’s “satirical alibi” because 
“it shows the satirist destroyed by the very weapons of stereotype and caricature that 
he has unleashed” (302).  Bliss is not exactly a satirist, but he does unleash obscenely 
racist rhetoric with the intention of sabotaging that rhetoric’s power, and like 
Bamboozled’s protagonist, he is destroyed by the very weapons he attempts to deploy. 
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possibility of failing to be understood, and of becoming just as deranged and 
devastating as Captain Ahab. Ellison’s career-spanning relationship with 
Melville, I argue, betrays a messier, darker account of Ellison’s complex 
relationship with the politics of “saying yes and saying no” than Ellisonians 
have yet provided. I want to suggest that the second novel reveals an Ellison 
who is more challenging and perhaps more valuable to contemporary 
Americanists, who, as one critic has aptly argued, tend to place “all hopes for 
cultural resistance” in “the idea of multiple or hybridized identities” (Fluck 
78-79). 
 
The Politics of Invisibility 
 Wright refers to Ellison’s stylized intellectual positioning as a result of 
his “Melvillean ironic temper,” and Invisible Man substantiates the accuracy of 
Wright’s phrase with its many allusions to Melville’s shrewdest tricksters—
Babo and the confidence man (190).56 Ellison uses Melville’s tricksters to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56 Several critics have written about thematic parallels between Melville’s work 
and Invisible Man, variously noting shared investments in “confusions of illusion and 
reality” (Omans), images of lightness and darkness (Schultz), literature and democracy 
(Gray), con games (Leblanc), and inter-textual allusiveness (Arac). But these 
comparative accounts leave one with the impression that Invisible Man’s parallels with 
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describe characters and images that embody the performativity of racial 
identity and exemplify the subversive power that such performativity can 
bring.57 Learning from these figures, the narrator ultimately embraces his 
“invisibility,” not only as a necessary condition of living in a culture so laden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Melville’s fiction are almost incidental. They do not explore the depth of Ellison’s 
fascination with Melville and Melville scholarship.  One exception to this comparative 
trend is Alan Nadel’s insight that Invisible Man uses allusions to Melville to criticize the 
racism of postwar American literary studies, an insight that I discuss at length below. 
 57 Matthiessen notoriously describes Babo and the mutinied African crew as 
symbols of “evil,” and a decade later Arvin would echo this view and call Babo “a 
monster out of Gothic fiction at its worst” (Matthiessen 508; Arvin 240).  Since the 
first biographies of Melville, scholars have read The Confidence-Man as evidence of 
Melville’s descent into depression and bitterness.  Arvin called it “nihilist, morally and 
metaphysically,” and Chase agreed, writing that “the frightening thing about the 
confidence man is that he is not a man; the perpetually shifty mask never quickens 
into the features of a human being” (Arvin 251; Chase 188).  Ellison’s early embrace 
of these characters whom his contemporaries seemed to fear anticipates the work of 
contemporary scholars such as Geoffrey Sanborn and Jennifer Greiman, who 
celebrate Babo and the confidence-man as modeling strategic and theatrical identities 
which productively challenge racial essentialism. 
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with racist stereotypes that “people refuse to see me,” but as an 
“advantageous” “political instrument” (Invisible Man 3, 491). Using this 
instrument, the narrator becomes what Hortense Spillers calls “a figure of 
subversion,” who can “undermine, systematically, all vestiges of the 
established order that has driven him underground” (Spillers 80).   
 Invisible Man’s epigraph borrows a line from Benito Cereno that calls 
attention to the figure of Babo and his haunting power over the white 
characters in the story: “‘You are saved,’ cried Captain Delano, more and 
more astonished and pained; ‘you are saved: what has cast such a shadow 
upon you?”  The answer to the question, which Ellison elides in the epigraph, 
is “the negro,” referring to Babo, who has concealed a slave revolt from 
Delano by wearing the mask of a humble, deferent, and docile servant of the 
supposed captain of the slave vessel, Benito Cereno. Babo surreptitiously 
controls Delano’s every movement by studiously affirming his belief that 
“there is something in the negro which, in a particular way, fits him for 
avocations about one’s person.” (716).  When Delano gets uneasy about the 
behavior of the other “slaves” or begins to worry that Cereno is acting 
suspiciously, Babo reassures Delano by tending to his “master”: 
Sometimes the negro gave his master his arm, or took his 
handkerchief out of his pocket for him; performing those and 
similar offices with that affectionate zeal [. . .] which has gained 
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for the negro the repute of being the most pleasing body 
servant in the world. (680) 
The climax of Babo’s performance comes after another “slave” strikes a 
white sailor with impunity.  Babo shrewdly responds to Delano’s 
consternation by inviting him to watch Cereno be shaved. When Delano sees 
“the colored servant, napkin on arm, so debonair about his master, in a 
business so familiar as that of shaving, too, all his old weakness for negroes 
returned” (717).  
 Ellison links Bledsoe, the cynical president of his fictionalized 
Tuskegee College, to Babo through their shared capability to establish power 
over the white people around them by performing the humble offices of a 
bodily attendant. The narrator of Invisible Man recalls that Bledsoe “was the 
only one of us I knew—except perhaps a barber or a nursemaid—who could 
touch a white man with impunity” (112, my emphasis).  Bledsoe makes a 
career out of performing a servile, humble identity for the college’s white 
trustees, who share many of Delano’s expectations for black identity. This 
paradoxical power becomes clear to the novel’s narrator as he watches 
Bledsoe manipulate the trustees while they are on stage during a chapel 
service: “The honored guests moved silently upon the platform, herded to 
high carved chairs by Dr. Bledsoe with the decorum of a portly head waiter” 
(112).  Rotund, humbly dressed, and smiling, Bledsoe directs the movement 
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of the trustees just as a shepherd herds a flock of sheep. From a “posture of 
humility and meekness,” Bledsoe can “exercise a powerful magic” over the 
trustees in much the same way that Babo exercises power over Delano (112-
113).    
 Invisible Man’s two most explicit allusions to The Confidence-Man are 
figures that in some sense symbolize Bledsoe’s Babo-esque identity: the “very 
black, red-lipped and wide-mouthed” “Jolly Nigger Coin Bank” and the 
“confidencing son of a bitch,” Bliss Proteus Rinehart (480).  When the 
narrator discovers the bank while staying in Mary Rambo’s boarding house, 
he is disgusted by it and furious that Mary would allow such an artifact of 
racism into her rooms.  In an exchange of letters about The Confidence-Man 
with Albert Murray, Ellison reveals that “the bank image in Invisible was 
suggested by the figure of the Black Guinea.  That son of a bitch with his 
mouth full of pennies” (79).  Here Ellison cites a scene in Melville’s novel in 
which the confidence man, calling himself “Der Black Guinea,” appears as a 
“grotesque negro cripple” who begs for coins (Melville, Confidence 10). The 
Black Guinea “would pause, throwing back his head and opening his mouth [ 
. . .]; when, making a space before him, people would have a bout at a sort of 
pitch penny game, the cripple’s mouth being at once target and purse” (11).  
The coin bank found by Invisible Man’s narrator physically materializes the 
obscenely degrading stereotype performed by Melville’s confidence man. 
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 The narrator first notices the coin bank as other residents in the house 
pound the pipes in the rooms to protest Mary’s frugal use of the heating 
furnace (312).  Enraged by what he calls their “cottonpatch ways,” the 
narrator protests their protest by smashing the iron bank against the pipes in 
his room.  Eventually he shatters the bank only to discover that he cannot get 
rid of this image of blackness that he hates, even after he has destroyed it. 
The minstrel coin bank remains in the narrator’s briefcase, and he eventually 
realizes that even within the Brotherhood—Ellison’s allegorization of the 
American left, from abolitionism to the American Communist Party—he 
cannot escape the degrading stereotypes of blackness that it represents (312-
325). 
 The narrator learns that he can ironically perform racist stereotypes to 
subvert their power only after he discovers Bliss Proteus Rinehart, who like 
Melville’s confidence man tactically transforms his appearance to establish 
“confidence” with various audiences.  In an interview a few years after the 
publication of Invisible Man, Ellison claims that Rinehart is a “descendent of 
Melville’s ‘Confidence Man’” because he “is living a very stylized life” and 
“can act out many roles” (Conversations 75-76).  Rinehart is simultaneously a 
pimp, lover, gambler, numbers runner, and evangelical preacher at a 
storefront church. Rinehart opens the narrator’s mind to the instability of the 
surfaces and depths of one’s identity—between one’s “rind and heart” 
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(Invisible Man 490).  “What is real anyway?” Rinehart causes him to wonder.  
“He was a broad man, a man of many parts who got around.  Rine the runner 
and Rine the Gambler and Rine the briber and Rine the lover and Rinehart 
the reverend. [. . .] The world in which we live is without boundaries” (490, 
my emphasis).  
 After his initial enthusiasm, the narrator momentarily resists Rinehart’s 
“multiple personalities” and repudiates the fluidity of his identity as a retreat 
into cynicism. But he returns to Rinehart’s political “possibilities” in the 
Epilogue, and presents Rinehart’s “many parts” as a “political instrument” 
for achieving democratic equality.58  Invisible Man dismisses the stable, 
authentic personal identity that he has sought for most of the novel: 
I’ve come a long way from those days when, full of illusion, I 
lived a public life and attempted to function under the 
assumption that the world was solid and all the relationships 
therein.  Now I know that men are different and all life is 
divided and that only in division is there true health. (Invisible 
Man 567) 
At this point, Rinehart’s self-division–his “multiple personalities”–becomes 
an appealing model for political subjectivity: “whence all this passion toward 
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conformity?–diversity is the word.  Let man keep his many parts and you’ll 
have no tyrant states” (567, my emphasis).  Rather than opposing 
“conformity” to an ostensibly Emersonian “self-reliant” individual, Ellison 
opposes it to “diversity”—not of the socio-political community, but of the 
self. The performance of “many parts” becomes an effective mode of 
political resistance for those who are rendered “invisible” by a society’s 
prejudices: “The negro’s masking,” Ellison writes elsewhere, represents “a 
profound rejection of the image created to usurp his identity” (“Change” 
109).  By theatricalizing—“yessing”—a racist culture’s assumptions and 
expectations, one practices what Ellison calls “a sort of jujitsu of the spirit,” 
“a denial and rejection through agreement” (“Change” 110).   
 Invisible Man presents the strategic racialized performativity “suggested 
by” Babo and the confidence man as an effective means “to collaborate with 
[a racist society’s] destruction of its own values”—to “agree ‘em to death and 
destruction,” as the narrator’s grandfather puts it (Conversations 76, Invisible 
Man 16). Indeed, Melville’s tricksters seem inextricable from Ellison’s effort 
to theorize a democratic politics of “invisibility.” Rinehart’s “multiplicity in 
ceaseless motion,” according to Kevil Bell, “embodies” this politics by 
“undermining every certitude, destabilizing every authority, concealing the 
"truth" of his character by performing its proliferation in public” (31, original 
emphasis). Bell—like Posnock and the others I cite in my introduction—
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leaves his account of Ellison’s “joking” at praising him as a pioneer theorist 
of the subversive trickster. But following Ellison’s abiding relationship with 
Melville into the 1960s and 70s reveals the limitations and partiality of this 
optimistic version of Ellison’s politics of invisibility. For Ellison’s Melvillean 
critical mask and the tricksters of his second novel undermine the binaries 
that Bell describes between the truth of one’s character and its performances, 
between destabilization and authority—binaries without which the subversive 
power of the trickster becomes practically indistinguishable from complicity 
with power.  
 
Ellison’s “Western Critical Mask” 
 Between the mid 1950s and the 70s, Ellison developed a highly 
intellectual and stylized academic identity that largely depended on his loyalty 
to and knowledge of Melville, Twain, and other white authors of the postwar 
American canon. In many ways Ellison’s “Western Critical Mask” exemplifies 
Invisible Man’s paradoxical synthesis of collaboration with and destruction of 
racism. Ellison says yes to the white canon only to repudiate the racially 
negligent reading practices of postwar critics.  
 The link between Ellison’s literary critical performances and 
“confidencing” becomes explicit in a letter to his close friend Albert Murray. 
Murray asked Ellison about his time at Princeton University in 1953, where 
 156	  
he was listening to talks by Edmund Wilson and lecturing on American 
literature to luminaries such as R.W.B Lewis, Alfred Kazin, R.P Blackmur, 
and Saul Bellow (Rampersad 268, 279). “They’ve got the old rabbit back in 
the patch, wearing a black robe and trying to outdo ole Barbee,” Ellison 
writes in response, comparing himself to the trickster rabbit of black folklore 
and to Reverend Homer A. Barbee from Invisible Man, who theatrically 
recounts the founding mythic narrative of Bledsoe’s college to elicit students’ 
devotion to the school (Trading Twelves 39). Ellison signed the letter “Rhine,” 
suggesting that the academic identity he performed at Princeton was in some 
sense inspired by the “confidencing son of a bitch.”59 Several times 
throughout his letters with Murray, Ellison refers to the intellectual setting of 
the university as “my old briar patch”—a setting, he writes, that demanded 
“briarpatch cunning”  (131, 116.) 
 Ellison’s arguments about Melville, nation, and democracy were 
integral to his “cunning” appeal to the postwar literary academy. As Paul 
Lauter has argued, in the decades leading up the publication of Invisible Man in 
1952, “Melville climbs the canon” and becomes an icon of national identity in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 59 As Adam Bradley has documented, Ellison’s spellings of Rinehart are 
inconsistent, oscillating between “Rine,” “Rhine,” “Rinehart,” “Rhinehart,” 
“Rineheart,” and “Rhineheart” (130). 
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American literary studies–a “characteristic” representative of “American 
genius,” or in Richard Chase’s phrase, “the grandest expression of the 
American imagination” (Lauter 6, Chase 91).  Throughout a series of essays, 
lectures, and university courses during the fifties and sixties, Ellison affirmed 
Melville’s hypercanonical status and utilized several other tropes of 
exceptionalist critical discourse—a white canon centered on “classic” 
nineteenth-century literature, an emphasis on national identity, and a 
preoccupation with what F.O. Matthiessen called “the possibilities of 
democracy” (xv). Yet even as he collaborated with postwar Americanists, 
Ellison eloquently criticized these critics for overlooking the importance of 
race and slavery to the American literary imagination. 
 For this critical project, Melville presented Ellison with a particularly 
viable “symbol of authority,” to borrow a term from Ellison’s close friend 
Kenneth Burke (Burke 169).60 On the one hand, Melville’s writing presents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 60 In short, Burke argues that the effective social critic must strategically 
deploy a discourse’s “symbols of authority,” and regard them as “as real a vein to be 
tapped into as any oil deposit in Teapot Dome” (169). Brian Crable has described 
Burke’s influence on Ellison in ways that illuminate Ellison’s relationship with 
Melville and Melville criticism: “Ellison studied Burke’s writings intently, and as he 
later wrote Burke, these writings supplied the foundation for his own perspective: ‘That 
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multiple black characters, characters who self-consciously perform versions 
of blackness, and a sustained attention to the social and political dynamics of 
interracial relationships. And on the other hand, decades before Ellison began 
his effort to “blacken” Melville, the “Melville revivers” had praised his work 
for its unsettling, illicit (albeit nonracial) “blackness.” Raymond Weaver 
claimed in the first pages of the first Melville biography that “Melville sinned 
blackly against the orthodoxy of his time” (18). A few years later Lewis 
Mumford claimed that Melville “plunged into the cold black depths of the 
spirit” and “questioned the foundations upon which their [Americans’] vast 
superstructure of comfort and complacency was erected” (Herman Melville xv). 
Weaver and Mumford’s language of blackness alludes to Melville’s praise for 
Hawthorne’s writing, which most Melvilleans interpret as a comment on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is why I really feel indebted to you. Essentially the Negro situation is irrational to an 
extent which surpasses that of the rest of the world—though God knows that sounds 
impossible.  Your method gave me the first instrument with which I could orient 
myself.’ [. . .] Using the resources he found in Burke’s writings, Ellison crafted his 
perspective on race and identity in America.  For Ellison, this perspective 
represented, quite literarily, a counter-statement—an opportunity to lean against the 
prevailing American discourse surrounding race, and thereby gain equilibrium” (2-3). 
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Melville’s own aesthetic. “It is that blackness in Hawthorne,” Melville writes, 
“that so fixes and fascinates me”—“a blackness ten times black” 
(“Hawthorne” 1158-59). None these articulations of Melville’s black aesthetic 
made explicitly racial claims, but perhaps they speak to why Ellison would 
have been drawn to Melville as a site for critical contestation. For Melville 
offered Ellison the opportunity to engage a critical discourse on literary 
“blackness” and enrich it by integrating political valences of slavery, racial 
exploitation, and the failures of American democracy. 
 Ellison began his integrative critical project with Invisible Man, which 
directly engaged American literary studies through allusions not only to 
Melville, but also to Melvilleans like Mumford. As Nadel has shown, Ellison’s 
most obvious critical target is Mumford’s “study of American literature and 
culture” The Golden Day (1926), the title chapter of which culminates in a 
reading of Melville’s fiction.  Mumford’s “Golden Day” names the “climax” 
of American literary expression that occurred just before the Civil War, and 
as evidence of this exceptional moment, Mumford presents Emerson, 
Thoreau, Whitman, Hawthorne, and Melville—the very same writers who 
fifteen years later would constitute Matthiessen’s widely influential “American 
Renaissance” (43). Nadel writes that 
Golden Day is an appropriate target for Ellison [. . .] not because 
it was the most significant book of its type but because it was 
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one of the earliest and most typical: one that represents a typical 
whitewashing of American history. (94) 
 In Invisible Man, “the Golden Day” is the name of a bar that sits just 
off the campus of Ellison’s fictionalization of Tuskegee. The narrator brings 
Norton, the white, northern college trustee, to this bar after visiting 
Trueblood.  Ellison populates this “Golden Day” with angry, disillusioned, 
and highly articulate black World War I veterans who, when they returned to 
the U.S., were denied access to the professional careers for which they were 
trained during the war.  In Ellison’s “Golden Day,” black voices confront 
Norton’s ignorance of the discrimination and exploitation faced by blacks 
with precisely the kind of professional education that his money funds, and 
they scrutinize the inefficacy of his benign liberalism.  For Ellison, the 
“Golden Day” thus becomes a site where black characters confront white 
ignorance about the failures of American democracy.  “The Golden Day had 
once been painted white,” Ellison writes; “now its paint was flaking away 
with the years, the scratch of a finger being enough to send it showering 
down” (Invisible, 197). 
  Ellison dedicated many of his essays to scraping white paint off of 
American literature and calling attention to the exclusionary reading practices 
of Americanists. Ellison’s 1959 essay “Society, Morality, and the Novel” 
represents his most forthright criticism of the hermeneutics of whitewashing. 
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By applying “the bright pure light of their methods,” Ellison argues, 
Americanists have obscured the most democratically valuable concerns of 
nineteenth-century American fiction—namely, racism and slavery (“Society” 
698).61 Ignoring these issues, he writes, “reduces the annoying elements to a 
minimum” and blunts “the moral intention of American prose fiction by way 
of making it easier for the reader” (724).  
 The “moral cutting edge” of American fiction that critics suppress, in 
Ellison’s account, is its representation of African Americans as “the human 
factor placed outside the democratic master plan” (“Twentieth” 85).   Despite 
their inept twentieth-century interpreters, according to Ellison, nineteenth-
century writers—Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Crane, and especially 
Twain and Melville—used black characters to mark the failures of American 
democracy. The exception to Ellison’s claim about the suppression of race in 
twentieth-century literary discourse is William Faulkner, who Ellison argues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 61 Ellison rarely names the critics who he thinks have corrupted the American 
canon, but the title of his essay “Society, Morality, and the Novel” alludes to Lionel 
Trilling’s “Manners, Morals, and the Novel” (published in 1950 as a chapter of The 
Liberal Imagination), which argues that “American writers of genius have not turned 
their minds to society” and points to the metaphysical flights of Melville as an 
example. 
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“brings us as close to the moral implications of the Negro as Twain or 
Melville” (“Twentieth” 98). Ellison argues that “the novel is a moral 
instrument, possessing for us an integrative function,” because in its best 
manifestations, it brings white and black Americans together and depicts 
them in the unfolding drama of American democracy.  By ignoring race, 
Ellison argues, American critics “evade as much of [the novel’s] moral truth 
as possible” (original emphasis; “Society” 718). 
 Ellison often speaks in “sweeping generalities” about American 
literature, as one interviewer put it, but in an essay about legal discrimination 
Ellison uses “Bartleby the Scrivener” and Benito Cereno to perform a concrete 
example of integrative criticism (Conversations 224).  Ellison argues that 
legislative and judiciary racism dates back to the nation’s foundation, when 
the Founding Fathers “committed the sin of racial pride” and “designated 
one section of the American people to be the sacrificial victims for the 
benefit of the rest” (“Perspective” 781).  African Americans thus become 
“the exception” to democracy in America (“Perspective” 777).  But because 
of this exceptional status, Ellison writes, “the Black American was endowed 
linguistically with an ambivalent power—‘the power of the negative’” 
(“Perspective” 782). Ellison argues (as he does on many occasions) that 
African Americans represent a stinging nettle in the side of American 
democracy, a negation of its claims of “liberty and justice for all”: “He 
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became a keeper of the nation’s sense of democratic achievement, and the 
human scale by which would be measured its painfully slow advance toward 
true equality” (“Perspective” 782). 
 Ellison reads Benito Cereno and “Bartleby” as dramatizing this “power 
of the negative” possessed by the “exceptions” to American democracy.  
Both texts, he argues, center on a socially and economically established white 
character—“a representative of law and thus of order”—who benefits from 
America’s selectively applied democracy. The narrator of “Bartleby,” he 
writes, is “a Wall Street lawyer who, for all his good will, is as imperceptive in 
grasping the basic connotation as Captain Delano of Benito Cereno is unable to 
grasp the human complexity of the Africans who believed, like himself, so 
much in freedom that they would kill for it” (“Perspective” 775).  The “basic 
connotation” that both characters (and their twentieth century interpreters) 
miss is that their beneficent democratic ideals are shattered by the characters 
who confront them during the story.   
 Ellison argues that Melville endows Bartleby with the same “power of 
the negative” possessed by African Americans, and that he functions in the 
story withinin the same symbolic order that blacks do in American political 
culture—as an “exception” to an otherwise functionally democratic and 
progressive state.  “In reading the story,” Ellison writes, 
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one has the sensation of watching a man walking backward 
past every boundary of human order and desire saying “I 
prefer not to, I prefer not to,” until at last he fades from sight 
and we are left with only the faint sound of his voice hanging 
thinly in the air, still saying no.  Bartleby’s last remaining force, 
the force which at the very last he is asked to give up, is the 
power of the negative. (776) 
But “Bartleby is never forced or persuaded or cajoled to agree” (776).  He 
maintains his “obstinate negativism,” and in Ellison’s reading, he effectively 
challenges the structure of a society that would abuse and imprison him in 
the same way that, Ellison argues, African Americans negate the efficacy of 
American democracy.  Bartleby, according to Ellison, becomes symbolic of 
the resilient, haunting, and sobering voices of repudiation that African 
Americans bring to American political discourse.62  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 62 Ellison’s argument here in many ways anticipates Toni Morrison’s 
demand in 1988 for “the examination and reinterpretation of the American 
canon, the founding nineteenth-century works, [. . .] for the ways in which 
the presence of Afro-Americans has shaped [. . .] the meaning of so much 
American literature” (11). Perhaps due to Ellison’s often demeaning attacks 
on the Black Arts Movement, she does not cite his writing about American 
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 As his emphasis on national identity, “possibilities of democracy,” and 
white canonical male authors demonstrates, Ellison’s literary criticism to a 
significant degree ingratiates the exceptionalism of postwar Americanists. 
And Ellison’s appeal to their literary and national values won him their favor. 
As Wright aptly argued, white literary critics embraced Ellison “as a quiet 
counterpoint to the discordant literature of Black Power,” and they “evaded 
Ellison’s attack on racist ideology” (16, 17).  R.W.B. Lewis, Ellison’s close 
personal friend, epitomized the literary academy’s relationship with Ellison in 
a 1964 essay on Ellison’s literary criticism.  Lewis argued that Ellison’s work 
surpassed the writings of other black authors because it moved beyond the 
idea of the black artist as a “wounded warrior,” obsessed with the “struggle 
for racial justice.” Not coincidently, Lewis also praised Ellison for writing 
about and working within the tradition of white canonical authors like 
Emerson, Melville, Twain, and Faulkner (46).  But, Lewis notes, Ellison 
establishes his relationship with these canonical authors in the “beguilingly 
specialized terms” of race—terms that Lewis repudiates.  “I am not quite 
convinced,” Lewis writes, “that slavery and the Negro were as central to the 
imagination of Whitman, Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, and Mark Twain as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
literature. But, as I discuss in my conclusion, she too bases her claim in a 
reading of Melville. 
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Ellison makes out” (47).  Celebrating Ellison’s writing as a repudiation of 
black radicalism and an endorsement of the white cannon, Lewis embraces 
the most conservative dimensions of Ellison’s work without taking seriously 
his integrative arguments about race and democracy.  
 The sharp edge of Ellison’s cultural criticism was also disregarded and 
misunderstood by participants in the Black Arts Movement, who repeatedly 
identified Ellison as a traitor to the cause of racial equality.  Throughout the 
sixties, many black radicals began to castigate Ellison for his allegiance to 
cultural institutions traditionally controlled by whites.  In an essay called 
“Philistinism and the Negro Writer,” Amiri Baraka claimed that the white 
institution of academia had “silenced” Ellison, and consigned him to 
“fidgeting away in some college” (Anger 53).  In 1970, Black World, a major 
journal of the Black Arts Movement, dedicated an entire issue to berating 
Ellison, in which Ernest Kaiser called him “an Establishment writer, an 
Uncle Tom, an attacker of the sociological formulations of the Black freedom 
movement.”  Later in the same issue, Clifford Mason wrote that “what might 
have been an instructive allusion to white writers in the 60s is Tomism in the 
70s” (quoted in Bradley 57). 
 Ellison reveals his frustration with how his work was understood by 
both white and black intellectuals in an early-seventies letter to Irving Howe, 
with whom Ellison had sparred years before over the obligations of black 
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writers to produce “protest art”—an exchange that led to Ellison’s acclaimed 
essay, “The World and the Jug” (1964-65). In the letter, Ellison appears 
exasperated—almost despairing—about living in a moment “when our best 
minds fail to trace the connections between the black community and the 
white, historically, morally, and culturally.” Drawing out such connections is 
precisely what writing about Melville had allowed Ellison to do, but he 
appears deeply frustrated that no one would take his work seriously. 
“Denounced by young black militants” and surrounded by white critics like 
Lewis who “have given up completely on the task of critical evaluation of 
efforts at art—or thought—coming from anyone who is not white,” Ellison 
felt “isolated” and worried that nothing he could write “would do any good.” 
“What does one do,” he asks, “now that the culture of the U.S. is referred to 
so glibly as ‘white culture’ and ‘black culture’?” In such a racially divided 
world, the work of integrative criticism becomes impossible (50/11).63  
  Jackson argues that by the mid seventies Ellison “seemed to 
embrace” his conservative academic identity, and judging by Ellison’s 
numerous lectures and course syllabi on white canonical authors and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 63 Citations of material from the Ellison papers at The Library of Congress—
such as this letter to Howe—list the box and folder in which the cited documents can 
be found. 
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belittling attacks on the Black Arts Movement, Jackson seems right 
(“Integration” 174).64 But at this same moment Ellison was struggling to 
finish a novel about a psychologically troubled, delusional, and destructive 
character who also attempts to deploy a racist discourse strategically, yet 
ultimately becomes indistinguishable from it.  The manuscripts of his second 
novel seem written by a more self-critical Ellison than Jackson describes—an 
Ellison who doubts the efficacy of his own “invisible” mode of cultural 
criticism. 
 
The Invisibility of Politics 
 The unfinished second novel reveals that Ellison’s interests in Melville 
and the politics of invisibility persisted throughout his career, but it also 
betrays grave doubts regarding Invisible Man’s Rinehartian conclusion and 
Ellison’s Rinehart-inspired “Western critical mask.”  If Invisible Man 
concludes with what Jackson calls “the permanent acceptance of and critical 
engagement with Rinehart,” Ellison’s second novel picks up where his first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 64 On several occasions Ellison demeans black radicalism.  He accuses its 
adherents of “rejecting intellectual discipline” and subscribing to irrational 
mystifications of black identity that Ellison refers to as “blood magic and blood 
thinking” (“Indivisible” 370; “Little Man” 509). 
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one left off— with another “confidence man” named Bliss, who is much 
more fully fleshed out than his predecessor. 65  In the immensity of pages 
Ellison dedicated to Bliss, one witnesses his transition from a theatrical young 
preacher into a “confidence man,” his emergence as a powerful “race-
baiting” politician, and the hurt and outrage he brings to African Americans. 
In many ways, Bliss faces problems of misrecognition similar to those Ellison 
faced as a literary critic. As a senator who wears the racist mask of Adam 
Sunraider with the intention of entering the U.S. political system and 
subverting its racial injustices, Bliss in many ways practices an exaggerated 
version of Ellison’s own shrewd exceptionalism and canon-based literary 
criticism.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 65 Bradley presents conclusive archive evidence that the second 
novel’s “Bliss” represents a direct continuation of Invisible Man’s Bliss Proteus 
Rinehart: 1) he points to a deleted passage from Invisible Man in which a 
Brother from the Harlem office describes Rinehart as a “boy preacher who 
had grown up and passed for white and became . . . a reactionary writer on 
politics—with none but a few negroes the wiser”; 2) he examines a notebook 
of Ellison’s titled “Novel: Opus II” in which a character who is raised by a 
black preacher and eventually passes as a racist politician is referred to 
throughout as “Rhinehart” (Bradley 125). 
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 The effusive manuscripts of Ellison’s second novel seem pulled in 
conflicting directions concerning the political possibilities and implications of 
Bliss. He is characterized both as a shrewd advocate of racial equality and as 
an Ahabian, self-obsessed demagogue who unleashes his American audience’s 
deep-seated racism. Several characters, including Bliss himself, espouse an 
Ellisonian optimism about the subversive potential of cultural hybridity and 
skilled theatricality. While Bliss’s public political identity is obscenely racist, 
he privately articulates beliefs about democracy and racial justice that mirror 
Ellison’s arguments about the brokenness and hypocrisy of a “democratic” 
society that excludes segments of its population from the political 
community.  But as the manuscripts tell the stories of dozens of black 
characters who are hurt and enraged by Bliss, the Ahabian portrait 
overwhelms more sympathetic characterizations. The subversive Babo-esque 
trickster disappears beneath the domineering public persona of Adam 
Sunraider– a name that alludes both to Ahab’s intense hatred (“he piled upon 
the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his 
whole race from Adam down”) and the delusional cosmic arrogance (“I’d 
strike the sun if it insulted me”) that leads him to chase Moby-Dick (Melville, 
Moby-Dick 184, 164).    
 Trained from his youth by a powerful black minister—an office that 
Ellison describes as “manipulator of eloquence and emotions”— Bliss 
 171	  
achieves a level of “eloquence” and rhetorical power that evokes Ahab’s 
demagogical authority over the crew of the Pequod (“Work in Progress”). 
Reverend Alonzo Hickman, a jazz man turned man of God, teaches Bliss the 
art of audience manipulation as he trains him to be a part of a grotesque 
evangelical performance.66 Hickman would have Bliss carried down the 
center aisle in a coffin, and at a pre-determined moment, Bliss would burst 
out of the coffin, shout Christ’s words from the cross—“Lord, Lord, Why 
has thou forsaken me?”— and then co-preach an antiphonal sermon with 
Hickman (Three Days 332-334).67  After Bliss reaches the height of his power 
as Sunraider, Hickman worries that he had unknowingly instructed Bliss in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 66 Michael Szalay has recently argued that Bliss’s “commodification” of his 
identity as Adam Sunraider represents a betrayal of the “precapitalist wholeness” and 
the “prelapsarian moment of community in which Bliss lives happily within 
Hickman’s congregation” (799, 810).  But this strict dichotomy between Hickman 
and Bliss romanticizes Bliss’s childhood with Hickman, which was fraught with racial, 
sexual, and financial anxieties. It also inaccurately describes the relationship between 
Bliss and Hickman, since Bliss first learns the practice of self-commodification from 
Hickman’s highly theatrical evangelical sermons. 
 67 Unless otherwise noted, all parenthetical page citations in this section refer 
to Bradley and Callahan’s Three Days Before the Shooting (2010). 
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the art of “eloquence” during these powerfully effective sermonic 
performances. Anxiously, he wonders “whether I was conducting a con game 
or simply taking part and leading a mysterious prayer” (413). 
 In adolescence, Bliss runs away from Hickman’s congregation and 
begins passing as white, but he continues using his training in eloquence and 
theatricality to manipulate the people around him. Indeed, he becomes a 
remarkably self-reflective master of deception and confidence games. Ellison 
on several occasions recounts Bliss’s thoughts about his life as a confidence 
man, which often evoke cinematic imagery as a model for his performances. 
“Scenes dictate masks, and masks scenes,” he says; Bliss believes he can that 
play any “scene” to his advantage if only he performs the right part (399). 
When the “scene” shifts, he shifts his identity along with it to maximize his 
power. After leaving Hickman, Bliss’s life becomes a sequence of brief, 
spottily narrated “scenes” in which he cons a series of mostly black audiences 
by posing as an evangelical preacher, a Hollywood movie-maker, and a 
salesman of skin-whitener and hair-straightener. Bliss’s life as a “confidence 
man” culminates in his identity as Senator Sunraider, who, like Ahab, is a 
demagogical master of inflammatory rhetoric. If Ahab “play[s] round” the 
“savageness” of his crew to exhort them in the hunt for the white whale, 
Sunraider manipulates the deep-seated racism of his constituents to gain and 
maintain his power (Melville, Moby-Dick 212). 
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 But despite Sunraider’s racist rhetoric, Hickman maintains political 
hope in Bliss. When Bliss was a child, Hickman had expressed a prophetic 
democratic hope in the young boy’s prodigious rhetorical power—a power 
that Hickman believes results from Bliss’s cultural hybridity. Hickman echoes 
Ellison’s own defense of  “cultural appropriation” and creative racial cross-
pollination in essays such as “The Little Man at Cheehaw Station” (515).  In 
this essay, Ellison celebrates the hybridized identity of a figure he calls the 
“American joker”: “His garments were, literally and figuratively, of many 
colors and cultures, his racial identity interwoven of many strands” (511). An 
Ellisonian faith in the democratic possibilities of Bliss’s hybridity—his white 
skin paired with his upbringing in black culture—leads Hickman to 
bring up the child in love and dedication in the hope that 
properly raised and trained, the child’s color and features, his 
inner substance and his appearance would make it possible for 
him to enter into the wider affairs of the nation and work 
toward the betterment of his people and the moral health of the 
nation.  (140/3) 
Hickman believes Bliss’s “mixture of blackness and whiteness” has  
endowed that child with a command of the Word which was so 
inspiring that we came to accept him as the living token and key 
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to that world of togetherness for which our forefathers had 
hoped and prayed. (526)  
“Because of his power and grace with the God-given word,” Hickman 
continues, “we imagined him as a means of breaking the slavery-forged 
chains which still bind our country” (528). Bliss’s “command of the Word” 
on one level obviously refers to his mastery of the Bible and his ability to use 
scripture effectively in his sermons. But it also refers to his power to deploy 
language itself—a power that Hickman believes is based in Bliss’s “mixture” 
of racial identities.68 Even after Bliss has transformed into Sunraider, 
Hickman holds out hope that his cross-cultural experience and powerful 
command of language will allow him to “speak for our condition from inside 
the only acceptable mask” and “embody our spirit in the councils of our 
enemies” (413). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 68 Several characters link Bliss’s chameleonic power to his mastery of 
“words” and language. When Bliss was a child, Hickman stressed to him that 
“words are your business boy! Not just the Word. Words are everything and 
don’t you ever forget it” (251).  Later in his life one character observes that 
“He sure knows how to use the words,” and another says that in his con-man 
days before becoming a senator, he “had so many ways of speaking that 
nobody could pin him down” (1010, 895). 
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  Privately, Bliss adheres to the same democratic hopes as Hickman.  
He articulates Ellisonian arguments about how American democracy has 
failed through its exclusion of blacks and expresses his desire to “destroy” 
this unfair system from the inside.  In notes for the novel, Ellison imagines 
Bliss saying to himself, “Those who believe in democracy but insist on 
excluding the Negro really don’t understand that this is the very foundation 
of the democratic ideal.  Reject this foundation, and you reject the very 
essence of democracy” (140/2).  Bliss’s claim echoes Ellison’s often-stated 
argument that the health of American democracy depends on “the inclusion, 
not assimilation, of the black man” as an equal member of the political 
community (“What” 586, original emphasis).  “The senator understands the 
democratic ideal better than those who ascribe to liberalism,” Ellison writes; 
“He also understands the weakness done [to] the system through the failure 
to accept it in its entirety, and he discussed techniques for destroying it” 
(140/2).   
 Bliss’s technique for destroying the flawed American political system 
closely resembles Invisible Man’s “jujitsu of the spirit,” or “denial and rejection 
through agreement” (“Change” 110).  At one point in the manuscripts, Bliss 
asks himself, “HOW THE HELL DO YOU GET LOVE INTO POLITICS 
OR COMPASSION INTO HISTORY?”  His paradoxical answer: “strike 
back hard in angry collaboration” (392). Ellison calls this “the strategy of a 
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guerilla fighter transposed to the world of politics” (Juneteenth 361).  “Extend 
their vision until they disgust themselves, until they gag,” Bliss tells himself; 
“Stretch out their nerves, amplify their voices, extend their grasp until history 
is rolled into a pall” (392).  In his own self-conception, Bliss fights for racial 
equality by “yessing” in “angry collaboration.” This mode of attacking a racist 
social structure deeply resonates with how Ellison—in interviews about 
Invisible Man—describes what the narrator learns from his grandfather and 
Rinehart: “to collaborate with its destruction of its own values” (Conversations 
76).   
 But Bliss’s racist identity as Sunraider ultimately gets away from him, 
takes on a life of its own, and eclipses the commitment to racial equality that 
inspired Bliss’s entry into politics.  Bliss performs racism purely for its power 
to ingratiate his audience, but his spectacular rhetoric slips out of his 
control—a slippage that destabilizes the boundary between ironic 
performance and complicit embrace.  This slippage comes into focus as 
several voices from black communities exploited by Bliss recount the 
destructive effects of his racialized con games. Two of the most expressive of 
these voices are a savant named Cliofus and an “aspiring intellectual” named 
Walker Millsap, who both explicitly compare Bliss to Ahab. Both of these 
characters are accorded significant authority within the novel, the former as a 
voice of black “community conscience” and the latter as an educated, 
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thoughtful writer, who frequently draws on an intensive knowledge of history 
and literature in his study of racial identities in America (860).  Cliofus and 
Millsap embarrass and undermine Hickman and Bliss’s Ellisonian hopes in 
the democratic confidence man. Rather than love or compassion, these 
characters (among others) show that Bliss in reality brings vitriol, fear, and 
hatred into racial politics in the U.S.   His “angry collaboration,” in their 
accounts, collapses into mere collaboration, and Bliss becomes 
indistinguishable from the racism that he attempts to sabotage.  
 In a difficult, nightmarish segment of the manuscripts, Cliofus 
suggests that Bliss’s race-baiting rhetoric is a degrading exploitation of 
African Americans by figuring Bliss as an “Ahab” who kills and showcases a 
“black whale” (880).  Cliofus is called the “unblinking eye of community 
conscience” for a group of African Americans in Oklahoma City (Ellison’s 
hometown) who were particularly damaged by one of Bliss’s pre-Sunraider 
scams and who kept track of him after he became a senator (860). Bliss’s 
scam involved preying on the black community’s desire for equality by 
claiming to be a director and soliciting donations for a dubious “Hollywood 
movie” that would star African American actors.  Bliss also seduced a 
beautiful young woman under false pretenses, and just before killing herself 
she gave birth to his son, who would grow up to be the man who shoots 
Sunraider. Cliofus’s name (evoking the muse of history) entails that he 
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understands and bears responsibility for mediating the community’s traumatic 
past, even though he often expresses their history in opaque, hardly 
intelligible, yet entertaining parables.  Cliofus works as a storyteller and toast-
giver at a bar, where the audience seems to have heard his story about 
“Ahab” many times.  One character tellingly describes Cliofus as an “oracle,” 
who “mixes what really happened with tales he’s been told, books he’s read, 
and stories he makes up” in order to communicate the community’s history 
(848).  Cliofus’s synthesis of community history with fictional narrative 
manifests itself in his Melvillean rendering of Bliss as an Ahab who 
brandishes an embalmed, bedecked black whale to entertain his audiences.  
 When asked to describe Bliss, Cliofus launches into an arcane, 
disturbing story about going on a field trip with his kindergarten class to “see 
the great whale” (879).  After walking “way down in the bowels of 
downtown,” they find the whale, and the children are appalled.  “He was 
rubbery and black and it took three flat cars to support him,” Cliofus 
remembers.  As Miss Kindly, his teacher, tries to give the children a lesson 
about the difference between fish and mammals, Cliofus and his peers fixate 
upon the horrific “black whale,” “full of embalming fluid” and surrounded by 
“light bulbs suspended above him from head to tail, and [. . .] two big red 
ones which stuck out of the sockets where his eyes had been.” Cliofus also 
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remembers that the whale had several “rope-dangling harpoons stuck in his 
hump [that] trembled whenever a truck rolled past” (880). 
 This parodic synthesis of Bliss and Ahab becomes more transparent as 
the children lose interest in Miss Kindly’s biology lesson, and “a little old 
white man” appears and “comes hobbling toward us on a short wooden leg” 
(882).  This “Ahab” figure demands “a nickel apiece just for looking at the 
whale” and a dime more for the story of how he killed it.  Miss Kindly pays 
the man, and he “swears that after he harpooned the whale from his boat and 
got dragged through foaming seas for two hundred miles and a quarter, the 
whale jumped salty, knocked a hole in his boat and bit off his leg.”  To keep 
the kids’ attention, “Ahab” “pulls a switch to make the whale’s red eyes 
flash” and “gives a twist to some kind of valve,” and the whale starts 
“spouting” water as “Ahab” laughs and shouts, “Thar she blows!” (883).   
 Cliofus’s “Ahab” has converted the black whale into a spectacle by 
replacing its eyes and inner organs with grotesque adornments to attract and 
amuse a crowd—an apt allegory for Bliss’s degradation of black identity. An 
embalmed whale adorned by lights and equipped with glowing eyes and a 
switch-activated spout: this, Cliofus provocatively suggests, is what Bliss 
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makes out of African Americans in order to entertain his audiences and 
sustain his power.69   
 Ellison further elaborates Bliss’s kinship with Ahab in Millsap’s long 
letter to Hickman, who had hired Millsap to find and keep track of Bliss just 
before he emerged as Sunraider. Full of philosophical, literary, and obscure 
historical references, this almost comically intellectual letter details Bliss’s 
relationship with a Babo-esque trickster named Sippy—a “confidence man” 
who “trained” Bliss (693).  Skilled in performance and rhetoric, Bliss, Millsap 
writes, was “made to order for Sippy’s ultimately subversive plan” (698).  
Like Babo, Sippy “can manipulate the stereotype role thrust upon him” to 
achieve “power”: Babo’s performative “debonair” behavior “about his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 69 Although he does not mention Cliofus, Szalay insightfully argues that Three 
Days Before the Shooting is a text deeply concerned with “whose political interests 
fantasies of blackness were mobilized” to serve (796).  Szalay maintains that Bliss 
represents Ellison’s figuration of “hip” Democrats such as John Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson, who attempted to garner support by subtly aligning themselves 
with what Szalay calls “black style” (798-799).  Szalay’s argument sketches a 
compelling political context for Cliofus’s Ahabian portrayal of Bliss as having 
subdued, captured, and commodified a “black whale”—symbolizing his relationship 
with African American culture. 
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master” becomes Sippy’s “ironic, debonair respect” for white people, which 
he performs as he “operates behind the mask of a genial but not too 
intelligent butler, waiter, bellhop, chauffeur, or yardman” (687, 694).  Millsap 
writes that Sippy’s performances of servility undermine the power of his 
white audiences without their even knowing it.  He can “lure them into a 
serene quicksand of black-and-white illusion and leave them as naked as 
fledgling jaybirds while strutting like the king who wore no clothes”—a 
reversal of power resonant with Babo’s manipulation of Delano (686).  
Millsap believes that Sippy’s equalizing “hustle” has powerful democratic 
implications.  The power it affords Sippy is his only chance at “a fair share of 
American democracy,” and its shrewd reversal of black-and-white power 
dynamics ironizes America’s claim to “freedom and justice for all” by 
exposing “the difference between reality and an as-yet unfleshed ideal” (695).  
 But as Millsap’s “little saga” continues, Bliss eventually abandons 
Sippy after receiving “a free-wheeling Ph.D’s instruction” in con games (698). 
Soon after, he becomes what Millsap refers to as  “a young mammy-made 
Ahab”(685). Not knowing that Hickman had raised Bliss, Millsap speculates 
that Bliss had been “some kind of poor orphan of a white boy who, as a 
child, had passed through the loving hands of some Negro nursemaid or 
cook who treated him as one of her own” (684). Such a child usually at some 
point “adopt[s] attitudes more in keeping with its acclaimed racial 
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superiority,” but Bliss, Millsap thinks, failed to sever his connection to his 
black mammy, and he thus still longs for the love and community of his 
childhood and suppresses guilt for abandoning them (686).  Bliss’s 
incomplete severance from his black caretaker has created what Millsap calls 
“an unmistakable air of defiant loneliness”—a self-perpetuated refusal of all 
human attachment that resembles Ahab’s self-imposed isolation from both 
his crew and his wife and child ashore.  Millsap implicitly compares Ahab’s 
severed limb to Bliss’s severed relationship with the black community that 
raised him: both losses render unhealing psychic wounds that lead to 
obsession, exploitation, and self-destruction.                                                        
 “Mammy-made Ahab” is also a phrase that fuses Bliss’s powerful 
“mixture of blackness and whiteness” and the destructive ends to which Bliss 
puts this mixture.  In the context of the letter, “mammy-made” clearly refers 
to Millsap’s vaguely psychoanalytic theory about Bliss’s upbringing. But 
Ellison uses the phrase elsewhere to indicate, as John Kevin Young writes, “a 
transgression or mixture of ostensibly pure racial categories” (174).  Young 
points to Ellison’s 1952 letter to Murray, in which he calls himself a 
“mammy-made novelist” because he published the Prologue to Invisible Man 
in The Partisan Review—a journal edited, written, and read predominately by 
white intellectuals (Ellison, “Before Publication” 32). As Jackson points out, 
before this Ellison had published his fiction mostly in journals with a small 
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black readership, and he “wanted more prestige”: “What he needed,” writes 
Jackson, “was publicity and the imprimatur of high art” (433-34).  The phrase 
“mammy-made novelist,” Young argues, is how Ellison “acknowledges the 
impure roots of his novel’s public appearance” (174).  
  With this in mind, “mammy-made Ahab” takes on deeper resonances 
that speak to the complex layers of Ellison’s interest in Melville: his 
presentation of his work to white audiences, his fervid commitment to 
mixtures of racial categories, and his hope in the democratic power of the 
racial “joker.”  In Millsap’s account, Bliss’s “mixture of blackness and 
whiteness” and his resulting theatrical power renders not a democratic savior, 
as Hickman hopes, but “a monster with two heads inhabiting a single body” 
(685).  
---  
  Millsap’s account of Bliss in many ways recapitulates Ellison’s own 
complicated attitudes toward the politics of invisibility. His “little saga” of 
Bliss’s transformation from a democratic confidence man into to a “mammy-
made Ahab” reflects the stark differences between Ellison’s representations 
of racial performativity in Invisible Man and in the unfinished second novel.  
In Invisible Man, Ellison expresses hope in Bliss Proteus Rinehart’s “multiple 
parts” as the basis for subversive, democratizing performances.  But when 
Ellison attempted to practice something like Rinehart’s democratic 
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performativity with his “Western Critical Mask,” his ostensibly subversive 
ingratiation of the postwar academy backfired: it allowed Ellison to be 
deracialized and treated as a white-canon-building cultural conservative by 
both liberal academics and radical intellectuals. In the second novel, 
Rinehart’s more fully fleshed-out counterpart, Bliss, aspires to use such 
performativity in the service of democratic, anti-racist ends, but he ends up 
perpetrating the very racist system he set out to undermine, and he is 
ultimately destroyed by the offspring of his own deceptive power.  
 Winfried Fluck has argued that political hope in “performance or 
performativity” and “flexible, multiple identities” represents “the new mantra 
in Cultural and American studies” (78, 79). I want to conclude by suggesting 
that Ellison’s fraught relationship with the democratic confidence man—a 
relationship that culminates in his fractured and skeptical portrait of Bliss—
challenges us to reconsider this “mantra,” which remains fashionable in 
contemporary Ellison scholarship and in critical and cultural theory more 
broadly. This political hope resembles the faith that Hickman and his 
congregation invest in Bliss’s racial hybridity and skilled theatricality—only to 
be left, in Hickman’s words, “puzzled by the wreck of our dreaming” (527).  
Ellison’s struggle to communicate from behind his “Western critical mask” 
and his conflicted representations of Bliss antagonize any stable distinction 
between performatively sabotaging and destructively affirming a hegemonic 
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discourse. Without this distinction, the subversive potential of the democratic 
trickster threatens to mutate into the manipulative and destructive Ahabian 
power of Sunraider. Ellison’s writing about Bliss thus suggests that while 
strategic performativity may be a valuable and pragmatic means of acquiring 
power, it should not be thought of as inherently liberatory or even 
subversive. For such performativity may betray the democratic oppositional 
motivations of those who practice it, and it may also, as it does for Bliss, lead 
to destructive delusions of political efficacy. 
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Conclusion 
“the vision of innocence and the claim of newness” 
 The title to this short conclusion alludes to R.W.B. Lewis’s claim that an 
American obsession with innocence has produced “a dismissal of the past” and “a 
habit of forgetfulness” (9). Lewis, of course, refers to the infamous thematic of “the 
American Adam,” which he argues characterizes America’s “staccato intellectual and 
literary movements” (9). But a disavowal of guilty history and a vision of radical 
oppositionality against it are also dominant trends of the last thirty years of 
Americanist criticism. During that time, many have condemned critical texts like 
Lewis’s The American Adam (1955) for neglecting women writes, ethnic minorities, and 
popular literatures, for skirting issues of race and gender, and ultimately for 
perpetuating a patriarchal, white American nationalism. While this denunciation is 
unquestionably justified and deeply valuable to the democratization of American 
literary studies, it has also enabled an overly-simplistic disciplinary narrative: a vision 
of a radical cut from an ostensibly corrupt past. This familiar narrative of “moral 
superiority,” to return to Fleissner’s arresting language, has obscured the complex 
political work of postwar Americanist criticism and fueled a wearisome professional 
culture in which one feels, to quote Winfried Fluck, “a constant pressure to 
outradicalize others” (56).  
 The very existence of this dissertation might suggest that these powerful 
trends of critical oppositionalism are loosening, and this loosening can also be felt in 
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recent calls for a greater “attention to the ways in which knowledge is produced in 
the field,” to quote Winfried Fluck (67). Following Fluck, Robyn Wiegman has 
challenged Americanists to be more cognizant of how our critical work always falls 
short of fulfilling the political desires that animate it. And Caleb Smith, in the 
inaugural issue of J19, gestures toward what he somewhat ironically calls a “reflexive 
turn,” in which we might become more cognizant of, as he puts it, “the always 
contested and compromised” histories in which our work takes place—histories that 
are “never outside structures of power”(165). Smith’s name for this latest among a 
dizzying array of “turns” is ironic because the New Americanists from whom it turns 
away actually initiated the project of disciplinary self-reflexivity when they 
condemned their predecessors as servants of Cold War nationalism and its attendant 
qualities of racism, masculinism, and imperialism. Fluck, Wiegman, and Smith’s calls 
for disciplinary reflexivity should, therefore, be heard as efforts to return to and 
reanimate one of the central imperatives of the New Americanism. This dissertation 
has aimed to corroborate this call for greater reflexivity, and to respond to it by 
attending to the emergence and persistence of a powerful attachment to Melville 
among critics in the field and intellectuals and artists on its fringes—an attachment 
that remains alive in criticism, imaginative writing, and hybrids of the two.  
 This attachment takes shape in a politically multivalent form that I have called 
“the romance with Melville”—a form that found a sort of abstract crystallization in 
Gilles Deleuze’s essay, “Bartleby; or, the Formula” (1993). For Deleuze, “the biggest 
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problem haunting Melville’s oeuvre”—and, I would add, Melville’s readers—is the 
problem of “the pure outsider” (73). This outsider, Deleuze writes, always reveals 
“the world as masquerade” (82). As the outsider makes visible  “its emptiness” and 
“the imperfection of its laws,” the world becomes mere forms to be manipulated, 
criticized, or changed (83).  Deleuze claims that the outsider—who in this dissertation 
has appeared as same-sex desire, the transnational working class, and racial 
“exceptions” to American democracy—confounds and destabilizes “the Universal or 
the whole,” “the paternal authority” (88). The outsider thus always brings “the 
democratic contribution”: the irritation that pushes toward the unfulfillable fulfillment 
of “America”—its promise of “universal immigration” and its promise to become a 
permeable space of integration that is ever “open to all contacts” (87). “The world” 
loses its solidarity, Deleuze writes, in favor of “an infinitely proliferating patchwork: 
the American patchwork becomes the law of Melville’s oeuvre” (77). At this point it 
becomes clear that even in its most radical, cosmopolitan, deconstructive 
manifestations, the romance remains entangled with patriotic piety, national essence, 
and an almost utopic hope in variously envisioned democratic futures. While there 
are many varieties in content and tone, this fundamentally conflicted form—or 
“formula”—persists mostly intact from Melville’s proud and also blackly shrouded 
emergence into Americanist discourse in the 1920s to the present. 
 After Ellison’s fraught, strikingly reflexive wrestling with this duality of the 
romance, several other imaginative adaptations display a similar dynamic between 
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“outsiders” and “America.” Robert Lowell, for instance, brought the concerns of 
Ellison and James together in his Civil-Rights Era stage production of Benito Cereno, in 
which Babo—no longer silent—becomes the eloquent voice of the oppressed third 
world before the consummate American, Amasa Delano, who appears dressed in red, 
white, and blue (staged 1965; published 1968). Thomas King’s more recent novel, 
Green Grass Running Water (1994)—a title that evokes the broken promises of U.S. 
treaties with Native Americans—links Melville to the intertwined histories of Indian 
Removal and environmental exploitation, as Bartleby’s “I’d prefer not to” becomes 
the mantra of a defiant Native American who is asked to move so that a dam can be 
built. Similarly, Leslie Marmon Silko praises Melville’s “anatomy” of anti-native 
ideology in “The Metaphysics of Indian Hating”; it is “a mighty prophecy and a great 
moral vision,” she writes. Her novel of Native American genocide, Almanac of the 
Dead, she says is “an homage of sorts to Melville” (98). One of the only feminist 
versions of the romance is Sena Jeter Naslund’s Ahab’s Wife. This novel centers on 
the originally peripheral character it names—a shift of focus that was inspired, 
Naslund says, by her frustration that a book in which “half the human race is 
ignored” could be considered “The Great American Novel” (3). In all these cases, 
one sees the formula: the “outsider” makes a claim on “America,” antagonizing its 
order and coherence while simultaneously betraying a deep attachment to it as a 
political and symbolic entity.  
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 This same dynamic resonates throughout the history of Melville criticism—a 
good sign for Melvilleans, since it indicates that their concerns have broad cultural 
relevance. From its earliest manifestations to the present, the romance has gathered 
critics and imaginative writers, bringing together what James would call “criticism and 
life” (“Letters 231). The critical and the creative powerfully converge in Toni 
Morrison’s writing about Melville, much as they had in Ellison’s. Not unlike Ellison, 
Morrison uses Melville to unveil “the informing and determining Afro-American 
presence in traditional American literature” (“Unspeakable” 145). Morrison praises 
Melville for his “recognition of the moment in America when whiteness became an 
ideology.” In her topsy-turvy reading of Moby-Dick, the white whale becomes this 
monstrous ideology, and Ahab becomes “the only white American heroic enough to 
try and slay the monster” (“Unspeakable” 143).  
 Counterintuitive as Morrison’s reading seems, I think she is in some sense 
right to identify Ahab as the hero of ideology critique. For his hatred of evil, moral 
fervor, and iconoclastic rebellion reverberate in the intense political desires of many 
still dominant New Americanist voices. As these desires for radical oppositionality 
were directed against the “old” voices in the field, the New Americanism’s romance 
with Melville made the Old Americanism into the “paternal authority” that Melville’s 
work confounds and subverts. Donald E. Pease, James H. Kavanagh, and William V. 
Spanos all perform elaborate, transhistorical readings of Moby-Dick and Benito Cereno 
to show that Melville “prolepticly”—to use Spanos’s term—condemns the Cold War 
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consensus that had “hegemonized” Melville’s work.70 Other critical arguments from 
this political turn in American literary studies—such as Michael Paul Rogin’s 
presentation of Melville as a sort of “American Marx,” Caroline L. Karcher’s 
explication of Melville’s anti-racism, Robert K. Martin and Eve Sedgwick’s uses of 
Melville to articulate an anti-homophobic politics—were less explicitly hostile to their 
critical predecessors. But this work has nonetheless played into what Fleissner has 
called “the self-congratulatory narrative of progress toward the present moment”—a 
narrative that congratulates the “new” for critiquing and thus triumphing over the 
hegemonic complicities of the “old”(“After” 174).   
  The “allure” of “critique, ” Smith perceptively writes, is that it is “a way of 
knowing” that offers “the consolatory promise of noncomplicity in a corrupt order” 
(161). Wiegman has compellingly claimed that directing this “way of knowing” at 
“the Old Americanism” is a defining character of the field’s contemporary identity. 
American literary studies, Weigman argues, is a field largely defined by “a politics of 
identificatory refusal aimed at [. . .] its predecessor” (Object 201). For the past thirty 
years, she argues, Americanists have presented these predecessors as “complicit” in a 
hegemonic order, “figured (non)complicity as a choice,” and pursued “the fantastic 
wish for an uncontaminated future” (Object 200, 238). Even in Castiglia and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 70 See Spanos, Errant 38; Pease “Cultural Persuasion” 415; Kavanagh, “Liberal 
Hero” 377. 
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Fleissner’s recent “reparative” returns to “old” critics like Arvin and Chase, the voice 
from the critical past is invested with this critique-based power of noncomplicity—a 
power that only more recent Americanists have imagined themselves as possessing.  
 My problems with this reparative mode of returning to critical history 
notwithstanding, I want to acknowledge that it was Castiglia and Fleissner who first 
persuaded me to consider postwar criticism as part of a response to the pressing 
question: after critique, what? But it seems to me that neither the paranoid nor the 
reparative approach to critical history helps us with this question, because both, to 
borrow more of Sedgwick’s language, “narrow one’s choices to accepting or refusing” 
the hegemonic (Touching 12). Both, that is to say, obscure what is most challenging 
and valuable about postwar criticism: the self-conscious, reflective occupation of 
what Sedgwick calls “the middle ranges of agency” (Touching 13). The tired, barren 
poles of the subversive and the complicit do not very well describe the messy 
dynamics of the romances with Melville I’ve analyzed: Ellison’s fraught performances 
of canonical criticism; James’s negotiation between appeals to literary nationalism and 
criticisms of nationalistic totalitarianism; and Chase, Arvin, Forster, and Britten’s 
careful attention to the seductions and cruelties of postwar heteronormativity. These 
critical and creative renderings of Melville represent a mode of ideological 
engagement other than critique—a mode of engagement that appeals to and 
sometimes overtly affirms hegemonic ideologies, but that also draws out their 
exclusionary, unjust, and violent and ramifications. 
 193	  
 What comes of attending to these “middle ranges of agency” that I’ve found 
in the romance with Melville? What new modes of writing criticism might open if we 
approach critical history in these terms?  
 One cannot deny that much has been gained in eschewing these middle 
ranges. For identifying clear enemies and heroes of the fight against oppression has 
undeniably been a vital part of bringing the field to its current radically democratic 
orientation. The New Americanism’s denunciation of their predecessors also marked 
the first intensive interrogations of the politics of Americanist discourse—an 
important project to which this dissertation contributes.  
 But in a moment in which radical oppositionalism has become a professional 
mandate and in which many voice frustration with the political heroics of ideology 
critique, I think there is more to be gained from attending to the “contested and 
compromised” histories of the textual attachments, hermeneutic practices, and 
political ambitions that persist through the major cuts in disciplinary history. 
 With striking pertinence to the recent sense that critique is “out of steam,” in 
1953 Arvin wrote that “the habit of rejection, of repudiation [. . .], has ceased to seem 
relevant or defensible” (America 6). Later in the same volume of the Partisan Review, 
Chase elaborated a resonant alternative to this adversarial disposition which I referred 
to in my introduction—a practice he calls “dissidence from within” (America 30). 
Unlike ideology critique, it is “an unheroic mission,” Chase says, and it is “not for 
those who insist on purity or perfect rationality in their view of history or of morals, 
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nor for those who imagine that to reject or accept America is still their option” 
(America 30). Here Chase discusses the critics’ relationship with the “damaging and 
cruel” ideologies that structure “American life” (27). But I want to conclude by 
thinking about what “dissidence from within” could mean for the field of 
Americanist criticism, and for how we engage with our critical predecessors, whether 
they be “new” or “old.” 
 It would mean a greater acknowledgement and examination of one’s place in 
longstanding, broad discursive histories that reach in and out of the field—histories 
that we cannot wholly “reject or accept.” It would mean a renewed attention to the 
deep genealogical lineaments of our attachments to writers like Melville and of our 
desires to use these writers to understand national identity and to advance democracy. 
It would thus mean reading “old” criticism for other reasons than to attack the 
unwitting complicity of one’s predecessors. It would mean trying to transition from 
citing other critics for the purpose of carving out space for oneself, to citing them for 
the purpose of historicizing one’s own interests, textual fixations, and critical 
aspirations.  
 By more consciously acknowledging the attachments and desires that we share 
with our predecessors, we could more readily interrogate the ways in which our work 
humbly floats in the broader currents of critical history and imaginative production—
currents, as I have shown, that erode boundaries of nation, genre, and profession. 
Such acknowledgement might help us to step aside from the cycles of oedipal 
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iconoclasm that have become so familiar and, for many, so frustrating. This mode of 
critical sociality would, of course, run against the professional protocols of advancing 
ideas and careers. These protocols are so ingrained into our interpretive practices that 
it is almost impossible to get out of the language and mindset of critiquing and 
throwing aside our critical antecedents, even when, in principle, that is precisely what 
one aspires to do. My own at times ungenerous criticisms of the New Americanism 
betray these difficulties, and in this sense this dissertation also continues what 
Wiegman calls “the familiar quest to outrun the familiar and the disciplinary demand 
that regenerates it” (Object 326). But I also hope that my analysis of the romance with 
Melville has demonstrated how a more “reflexive” approach to studying literature 
could perhaps open less familiar ways of meeting this disciplinary demand, and I 
hope to have persuaded my readers of this approach’s value to the increasingly 
critique-weary field of American literary studies.  
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